Macroeconomics and information frictions by Pei, Guangyu
Zurich Open Repository and
Archive
University of Zurich
Main Library
Strickhofstrasse 39
CH-8057 Zurich
www.zora.uzh.ch
Year: 2018
Macroeconomics and information frictions
Pei, Guangyu
Posted at the Zurich Open Repository and Archive, University of Zurich
ZORA URL: https://doi.org/10.5167/uzh-152578
Dissertation
Published Version
Originally published at:
Pei, Guangyu. Macroeconomics and information frictions. 2018, University of Zurich, Faculty of Eco-
nomics.
Macroeconomics and Information Frictions
Dissertation
submitted to the
Faculty of Business, Economics and Informatics
of the University of Zurich
to obtain the degree of
Doktor der Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Dr. oec.
(corresponds to Doctor of Philosophy, PhD)
presented by
GUANGYU PEI
from China
approved in July 2018 at the request of
Prof. Dr. Fabrizio Zilibotti
Prof. Dr. Nir Jaimovich
1The Faculty of Business, Economics and Informatics of the University of
Zurich hereby authorizes the printing of this dissertation, without indicating
an opinion of the views expressed in the work.
Zurich, July 18, 2018
The Chairman of the Doctoral Board: Prof. Dr. Steven Ongena
Dedicated to My Son
Acknowledgements
First and foremost, I want to thank my advisor, with the most sincerity, Prof.
Fabrizio Zilibotti for his continuous support in the past five years of my Ph.D.
study in Zurich. It has been the great honor for me to have the opportunity
to learn from him, not only in Economics, but also on how to contribute to the
general society in life.
Secondly, I want to express my gratitude to Prof. George-Marios Angeletos,
Prof. Massimo Marinacci and Prof. Nir Jaimovich for the inspiring comments
and great supports for my researches. Also, I am grateful to my coauthors, Dr.
Heng Chen and Dr. Yulei Luo, for the great experience they gave to me when
we were working together. I also want to thank the faculty and my colleagues
in Department of Economics, University of Zurich for all the great memory they
gave me in the last five years.
Also, I would like to express my gratitude to the UBS Center for Economics
in Society, University of Zurich for the generous scholarship that finances my
Ph.D. study.
Last but not the least, I am really thankful to my wife Yang LI, my mother
Xianjuan JIN and my father Yanji PEI. Their long-lasting support, patience and
love are the foundations of my life and dedication to do academic researches.
ii
Overview
Macroeconomic environment features complicated interactions among rational
agents. Therefore, knowing what the economic fundamentals are and know-
ing what others know are essential for making economic decisions. Assuming
information frictions in macroeconomic environments is not only the more rea-
sonable assumption that depicts the real world but also turns out to have sig-
nificant impacts on the economy both positively and normatively. The focus of
this dissertation is the macroeconomics of information frictions (a) in shaping
agents’ information acquisition decisions, i.e., Chapter 1, (b) in creating busi-
ness cycle fluctuations when agents are ambiguity averse, i.e., Chapter 2 and
finally (c) in explaining the origins of financial sentiment when the economy
features endogenous information production and transmission, i.e., Chapter 3.
Chapter 1 is the joint work with Heng Chen and Yulei Luo, “Attention Mis-
allocation, Social Welfare, and Policy Implications”. We study how agents al-
locate attention between private and public signals to reduce the uncertainty
about observation noises when coordination is an important concern. We find
that attention allocation is non-monotone in the endowed attention capacity. In
response to more attention capacity, agents may decrease their attention on or
even ignore the more accurate signal. The desire to coordinate with each other
may generate inefficient information acquisition behaviours. As a result, social
welfare may decrease when they have more attention to process information
when misallocation is severe. Finally, we derive sufficient and necessary con-
ditions under which multiple equilibria emerge and study the implications of
equilibrium multiplicity for macroeconomic policies. This paper has been pub-
lished in Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 2015, 59: 37-57.
In Chapter 2: “Ambiguity, Pessimism and Economic Fluctuations”, I de-
velop a novel theory of ambiguity-driven business cycles that contributes to
explain the co-movements across market confidence, belief divergence and ag-
gregate economy. I extend the RBC model with (a) aggregate demand external-
ities; (b) ambiguity averse agents with preferences represented by the smooth
iii
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model of ambiguity axiomatized by Klibanoff et al. [2005,2009] and finally
(c) incomplete information over ambiguous aggregate fundamentals. With the
smooth model of ambiguity, ambiguity shock is formulated in a Bayesian fash-
ion, namely shock to the variance of agents’ prior belief over possible models.
I highlight the dual impacts of this Bayesian formulation of ambiguity shock: a
positive ambiguity shock makes all agents, who are ambiguity averse, behave
as if they believe the aggregate fundamental is turning bad and becoming more
volatile. When the economy features imperfect coordination due to incom-
plete information, dual impacts of a positive ambiguity shock translates into
depressed belief over aggregate demand and the increased incentives to use pri-
vate information both when making output decisions or output forecasts. The
former maps into depressed market confidence and the latter maps into height-
ened belief divergence. And finally, aggregate output falls due to the increase in
the economy-wide pessimism over aggregate demand. In combination, a pos-
itive ambiguity shock generates recession with depressed market confidence
and heightened belief divergence. Quantitatively, ambiguity shock is shown to
be capable of generating co-movements across real quantities together counter-
cyclical belief divergence as measured by the cross-sectional dispersion in out-
put forecast in SPF dataset. Also, the estimated time series of market confidence
closely tracks Sentiment Index in Michigan Survey of Consumer. Therefore, I
conclude that fluctuations in market confidence, belief divergence, and the ag-
gregate economy are nothing more than the many shades of ambiguity shock.
Finally, in Chapter 3: “Financial Sentiments and Coordinated Information
Provision”, I demonstrate that financial sentiments, which has been documented
to create much of the volatilities in the financial market, may stem from the
process of information production and transmission. Within a sender-receiver
game that features information production by analysts and information trans-
mission from analysts to investors, I demonstrate that, in addition to funda-
mental equilibrium where aggregate investment only responds to fundamen-
tals, there exist sentiment equilibrium, in which, other than exogenous funda-
mentals, endogenous non-fundamental aggregate uncertainty, i.e., sentiment,
affects aggregate investment. I derive the necessary and sufficient condition for
the existence of sentiment equilibrium stating that as long as analysts care so
much about reporting the level of aggregate investment K or have sufficiently
strong incentive to align own report with the other analysts’ reports, sentiment
equilibrium arises. Finally, welfare implications of self-fulfilling sentiment fluc-
tuations are discussed.
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Chapter 1
Attention Misallocation, Social Welfare and
Policy Implications
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and Finance for their helpful comments. Luo thanks the Hong Kong General Research Fund
(#HKU791913) for financial support.
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1.1. Introduction
Coordination games with heterogeneity in information and complementarity
in action have been widely applied to macroeconomic environments, financial
markets and even collective actions. In this paper, we study a scenario, where
agents that play such a coordination game have only limited capacity to pro-
cess relevant information. Consequently, they have to allocate their capacity
optimally among various information sources and then take actions based on
the information they acquire. As Sims (2005) argue, this information processing
constraint may have significant welfare implications for understanding the ef-
fects of policies that reveal public information and can be critical when evaluat-
ing the optimality of policies, e.g., the transparency of public announcements.2
To abstract from a specific market structure and retain tractability, we for-
malize our model in a “beauty contest” framework, as in Morris and Shin
(2002), where the payoff for an individual depends on the distance of his ac-
tion from an unobservable state and from the average action. To take the best
action, agents must estimate the underlying state and forecast the average ac-
tion of others. There are two correlated signals that reveal noisy information
about the fundamental, and they can be observed if agents pay attention to
them. One of the signals is private and contains idiosyncratic noise, and the
other is public, can be potentially observed by all agents and contains common
noise. The main point of departure of our model is to assume that agents can-
not perfectly observe these signals because they possess a limited capacity to
process information. Consequently, agents can only observe these signals with
idiosyncratic observation noises.
This setting has captured the essence of several important macroeconomic
environments and financial markets. For example, consider a price setting
model with monopolistic competition in an informationally segregated island
economy. Firms want to minimize the distance between their price and a target
price that is the weighted average of an unknown state (e.g., log of nominal
output) and the aggregate price. The representative firm on each island has
access to public information about the nominal output (e.g., the central bank’s
guidance) and some island-specific information (e.g., local forecast). They can
extract information about the state of the economy through those public and
local sources, both of which reveal noisy information about the aggregate state,
2Sims (2005) argues that “rational inattention may have far-reaching implications for macroe-
conomics andmonetary policy generally, once its implications are fully worked out. In the mean-
time, though, it may shed some light on transparency in monetary policy.”
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and are relevant for forecasting the aggregate price level. Constrained by a lim-
ited amount of capacity, firms need to decide on the allocation of their attention
to process each of the noisy signals.
Another case in point is institutional investors in financial markets. They
typically have access to information from a public source, e.g., announcements
by the central bank or annual reports released by the firms whose securities are
traded, and information from private sources, e.g., research reports on macro
conditions or specific firms provided by analysts in research departments. Both
types of sources reveal noisy information about the market fundamental. In-
vestors need to allocate their limited attention optimally so that they can esti-
mate the true fundamental and the aggregate action before making decisions.
Questions naturally arise. How do individuals allocate their attention be-
tween these two information sources? Under what conditions, do multiple
equilibria emerge? Does social welfare necessarily increase when individuals
possess more information-processing capacity?
In this model, a number of forces interact and shape agents’ decisions: de-
creasing returns to attention, the relative accuracy of the public signal to the
private signal, the coordination motive and the correlation between the two sig-
nals.3 It is more attractive for agents to observe the signal with higher accuracy,
because a signal of higher quality helps agents estimate the state more accu-
rately. However, the force of diminishing returns to attention provides agents
with incentives to diversify their attention and spend their capacity on both sig-
nals.4 The coordination motive tilts the attention allocation decision toward the
public signal, which better aligns their actions. Furthermore, a higher correla-
tion across signals dampens the effect of diminishing returns to attention and
amplifies the effect of the coordination motive.
The four factors combined may lead to the fact that agents allocate their
attention in a non-monotone fashion, i.e., attention paid onto each signal may
3Sims (2010) argues that finite capacity can be elastic in response to a change in environment,
given that the marginal cost of information processing is constant. In this case, inattentive agents
are allowed to adjust optimal capacity in such a way that the marginal cost of information-
processing for the problem at hand remains constant, which is consistent with the concept of
“elastic” capacity proposed in Kahneman (1973). ?) notes that the two assumptions, i.e., constant
capacity and constant marginal cost of information processing, are observationally equivalent in
the sense that they lead to the samemodel dynamics governed by the Kalman gain. In this study,
for simplicity, we focus on the fixed capacity assumption and do not consider the effect of prior
uncertainty on elastic capacity.
4“Diminishing returns to attention” refers to the fact that the marginal increase in the agent’s
welfare is decreasing as capacity increases. Luo (2008) and Luo and Young (2010) illustrate this
property in partial equilibrium permanent income models with inattentive agents.
1.1. INTRODUCTION 5
not necessarily increase in the total amount of capacity. For example, one in-
triguing scenario may arise, where agents can first focus on the relatively more
precise private signal and then diversify their attention when capacity is higher;
however, when there is a further increase in capacity, they may reduce their at-
tention on or even ignore the private signal of higher quality and instead focus
on the relatively imprecise public signal. We label this phenomenon “attention
misallocation.” Further, when the coordination motive or correlation is suffi-
ciently high, the relative accuracy is not extreme and the amount of capacity is
not very high, multiple equilibria can arise in this model.
We also find a number of distinct results on social welfare, i.e., the average
distance between individual decisions and the underlying state. First, social
welfare may decrease when individuals possess more capacity to process infor-
mation. This result hinges on the fact that agents may “misallocate” their atten-
tion from a social perspective and the misallocation may become more severe
in response to higher capacity. When there is an increase in capacity, agents can
observe signals more clearly and better estimate the underlying state. However,
given the desire to align their actions, they may decrease the attention paid to
the private signal, even though it is relativelymore precise, and coordinate even
more attention on the less precise public signal. When agents take action, they
assign a larger weight to the observation of the public signal, which exacerbates
the “overreaction” to the public signal and causes a decrease in social welfare.5
Second, the limit case of this model is the world ofMorris and Shin (2002), in
which agents possess an infinite amount of capacity and can therefore perfectly
observe both signals. However, strikingly, social welfare in the Morris-Shin
world may be even lower than that in our model with capacity-limited agents.
On the one hand, with a finite amount of capacity, agents have a less precise
estimation of the fundamental than that in the Morris-Shin world. On the other
hand, agents may endogenously pay little attention to the public signal and
therefore reduce their reliance on it in their action which, to a certain degree,
alleviates the overuse of the public signal. We show that the second effect can
dominate.
Third, ourmodel also sheds some light on the debate about the transparency
of monetary policy. Morris and Shin (2002) show that social welfare can de-
5In the existing rational inattention literature, welfare typically increases in the capacity of
processing information. For example, Luo (2008) shows that the welfare loss due to finite ca-
pacity decreases with channel capacity within a partial equilibrium permanent income model.
Mac´kowiak andWiederholt (2011) obtains the same result in a general equilibrium business cycle
model.
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crease when the central bank delivers a clearer public announcement due to
an overreaction to the public signal. Svensson (2006) questions the empirical
relevancy of this result and argues that it only holds when public information
is implausibly imprecise. We show that endogenous attention allocation can
amplify the “overreaction,” so that social welfare can decrease, even when the
precision of the public signal is reasonably high.
Finally, our results also offer a new perspective on the literature covering the
efficient use of information. Angeletos and Pavan (2007) show that equilibrium
use and the efficient use of information coincide if and only if the social and
private values of coordination are the same. However, once we allow for an en-
dogenous information structure, i.e., attention allocation of inattentive agents,
this relationship breaks down.
From a theoretical point of view, we also contribute to the literature of ra-
tional inattention by characterizing attention allocation between two correlated
signals. This is technically challenging because, in this case, some capacity has
to be “wasted” to learn the correlated part twice, and it is difficult to separate
the amount of capacity that effectively reduces the observation noise of one sig-
nal from the other. We have bypassed this difficulty by using a transformation
in which we define “effective capacity” so that such a separation is feasible. The
standard information processing constraint for independent signals becomes a
special case in our formulation.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2 discusses the re-
lated literature. Section 1.3 characterizes a beauty contest model with rational
inattentive agents and examines the equilibrium properties of the model. Sec-
tion 1.4 explores the attention allocation decision via comparative statics. Sec-
tion 1.5 studies the social welfare implications of limited attention. Section 1.6
addresses policy issues that are discussed in the literature. Section 1.7 contains a
discussion on the alternative information structures. The last section concludes.
1.2. Related Literature
There are two approaches to modeling information acquisition in the related lit-
erature: “costly acquisition” with the cost of acquiring information being con-
vex in the precision of signals and “rational inattention” with a fixed amount
of attention being split among signals. These two approaches captures two dis-
tinct aspects of learning. With the former, it is increasingly costly for agents to
find additional evidence for the truth; with the latter, agents are in a process
of increasingly directed or refined search for an answer when they spend more
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capacity in learning.6 In other words, the costly acquisition approach assumes
that agents incur increasing marginal cost when they acquire more information,
while the rational inattention approach assumes the marginal cost of informa-
tion acquisition is decreasing.
Pioneering studies that adopt the costly acquisition approach examine the
implications of information acquisition in coordination games, e.g., Hellwig
and Veldkamp (2009), Myatt and Wallace (2012) and Yang (2015). Hellwig and
Veldkamp (2009) show that there could exist multiple equilibria in their coor-
dination model, because agents make a binary signal purchase decision and
a public signal becomes more valuable when others also purchase it, due to
strategic complementarity. Myatt and Wallace (2012) show that equilibrium is
unique, even with complementarity in action, when agents can also choose the
observation noises. In contrast, we follow Sims (2003) and assume that agents
split a fixed amount of capacity on the signals to be observed. In our model,
we demonstrate that multiplicity can arise, when the information acquisition
is continuous and when learning takes the form of increasingly directed and
refined search, captured by the rational inattention approach.
We intend to offer a welfare analysis of the coordination game played by
rationally inattentive agents to study the effect that attention allocation has on
social welfare. Our setup differs from those of recent contributions to the liter-
ature that explicitly deals with welfare-related issues. Mac´kowiak and Wieder-
holt (2009, 2011) study how individuals or firms allocate their attention among
two independent states when they set the price in a market-based economy or
take collective actions. In our case, the two signals are correlated. We explic-
itly characterize the role of their correlation in optimal attention allocation and
show that correlation is of critical importance for the multiplicity and unique-
ness of equilibrium. For example, a high coordination motive does not neces-
sarily give rise to multiple equilibria, unless the correlation between the two
signals is sufficiently high.
This paper is closely related to the literature on the efficient use of infor-
mation, e.g. Angeletos and Pavan (2006) and Colombo, Femminis, and Pavan
(2012). The latter studies the interaction between the inefficient use and acqui-
sition of information. In their model, agents pay to gain private information
and can observe the public announcement precisely. In contrast, agents in our
6A capacity can be considered approximately the number of binary signals that partition
states of the world, and moreover, the interpretation of each signals depends on its predeces-
sors, see Veldkamp (2011) for elaboration.
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model can observe neither of the signals perfectly. Unlike their setup, which has
a unique equilibrium, the rational inattention assumption in our model gives
rise to the possibilities of multiple equilibria and of one of the signals being
endogenously ignored.
Our work also contributes to the growing literature on the social value of
public information. Cornand and Heinemann (2008) consider an interesting
setup in which only a fraction of the agents are allowed to observe the public
signal. In our model, agents can endogenously choose to ignore either public
or private information, or diversify their attention between both. Myatt and
Wallace (2009) study this issue in a model with multiple information sources
that differ in the degree of publicity. In our model, the publicity of public in-
formation is endogenous: the idiosyncratic observation noise is determined by
the amount of attention paid.
This paper is also broadly related to the literature on information choice,
attention allocation and asset allocation, which includes Peng (2005), Peng and
Xiong (2006), Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp (2009, 2010) and Mondria (2010).
The framework adopted in these studies consists of multiple assets and a con-
tinuum of agents who face the information processing constraints.
1.3. The Model
1.3.1. Players, Payoffs and Coordination
The economy is occupied by a continuum of agents, indexed by i 2 (0,1). Each
of them can choose an action, ai 2 R. In this economy, the fundamental state,
q, affects payoffs of agents. It is selected by nature but unknown to agents.
Following Morris and Shin (2002), the payoff for agent i is specified by
ui =  (ai   q)2   a1  a (Li   L¯), (1.1)
where a is constant, such that 0< a < 1, and Li =
R
(aj   ai)2dj and L¯ =
R
Lidi.
When agent i takes action, two types of loss are incurred. The first compo-
nent is measured by the distance between individual action and the uncertain
state: agents would be better off if they were to choose an action closer to the
fundamental. The second component is the distance between individual and
average actions, which captures the idea that agents want to align their actions.
A higher a implies that agents assign a larger weight to this strategic concern in
their payoff structure and have a stronger incentive to coordinate.
1.3. THE MODEL 9
1.3.2. Information Structure
Agents begin with some knowledge of the underlying state. Specifically, they
share a common normal prior over q,
q ⇠ N  q,s2  (1.2)
where q and s2 are the mean and variance of the prior distribution, respectively.
Each agent can access two potentially observable signals, i.e., the private signal
xi and the public signal z, and the distribution is specified as follows,
si =
 
xi
z
!
,
 
q + #xi
q + #z
!
, (1.3)
where #xi ⇠ N
 
0,s2x
 
and #z ⇠ N
 
0,s2z
 
are independent of the true state q. Note
that #xi is independently and identically distributed across agents while #z is
common. The ex ante covariance matrix of si can be written as
S =
 
s2 + s2x s
2
s2 s2 + s2z
!
. (1.4)
The information structure described thus far resembles that in Morris and
Shin (2002). The public signal can be interpreted as a public announcement
made by the central bank or statistics released by the public agency. The private
signal can be interpreted as information only accessible to individuals and not
to the general public. Noise terms #xi and #z can be interpreted as senders’
noise contained in the signals, which cannot be reduced by paying attention
to the signals. One implicit assumption is that agents cannot directly observe
the fundamental and can obtain information only through analyzing the noisy
signals about it.
Following Sims (2003), we assume that agents have a finite capacity to pro-
cess available information, and that the reduction in uncertainty about the true
signals is limited by finite entropy. Therefore, agents can only observe the noisy
signals:
sˆi =
 
xˆi
zˆi
!
=
 
xi
z
!
+
 
xxi
xzi
!
, (1.5)
where (xxi xzi)
0 are observation noises, which are independent of the true state
and the sender noises, and are independently and identically distributed across
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agents. The presence of observation noises reflects the finite information pro-
cessing capacity. Its co-variance matrix is given by
L =
 
w2x 0
0 w2z
!
(1.6)
where w2x and w2z are variances in the observation noises for private and public
signals, respectively. Because the observation noises are idiosyncratic, noisy
observation of the public signal, zˆi, is imperfectly correlated across the agents,
whereas the observation of the private signal, xˆi, remains independent.
We define the posterior covariance matrix of si with Y ⌘ Var(si|sˆi), which
can be determined using the following Gaussian updating formula,
Y = S  S (S+L) 1S or Y 1 = S 1 +L 1. (1.7)
We assume that each agent in this economy possesses a limited amount of
capacity to process information. Specifically, each agent is assumed to face the
following information-processing constraint:
1
2
ln
✓ |S|
|Y|
◆
 k, (1.8)
where |S| and |Y| denote the determinant of the prior covariance matrix of si
and the corresponding posterior covariance matrix, respectively, and k is posi-
tive and denote the individual’s finite channel capacity. This constraint implies
that the reduction in the uncertainty about the state gained from observing new
signals is bounded from above by a finite capacity.
Given the specifications of (1.4), (1.6) and (1.7), the information processing
constraint (1.8) can be rewritten as
1
2
ln
 
w2x +
 
s2x + s
2  1  r2 
w2x
!
| {z }
kˆx
+
1
2
ln
 
w2z +
 
s2z + s
2  1  r2 
w2z
!
| {z }
kˆz
 kˆ, (1.9)
where r is the prior correlation across signals and kˆ is the effective capacity.
They are defined by,
r ⌘ Corr(xi,z) =
s
s2s2
(s2x + s2) (s2z + s2)
, kˆ ⌘ 1
2
ln
 
exp (2k)  r2 (exp (2k)  1)  .
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Effective capacity is the amount of capacity used to reduce observation noises
while a certain amount of capacity must be “wasted” to learn the correlated
part of the two signals twice. Intuitively, for a fixed amount of k, the higher is
the correlation between signals and the lower is the effective capacity, kˆ. If the
signals are independent, i.e., r = 0, then k = kˆ.
The effective capacity spent on the private and public signals are denoted
by kˆx and kˆz, respectively. Naturally, we impose the following non-negativity
restriction,
kˆz   0, and kˆx   0. (1.10)
The variances in observation noises can be recovered from equation (1.9) as
follows:
w2x =
 
s2x + s
2  1  r2 
exp(2kˆx)  1 , w
2
z =
 
s2z + s
2  1  r2 
exp(2kˆz)  1 . (1.11)
If agents spend more effective capacity on observing a signal, then that signals’
observation noise is smaller or it is clearer to the agents. In a limit case, agents
possess an infinite amount of capacity and can therefore perfectly observe both
signals, i.e., w2x = 0 and w2z = 0. To facilitate the characterization that follows,
we define the relative accuracy of the public signal by
r⌘
s
(s2x + s2)
(s2z + s2)
,
and it can be readily verified that r <r < 1r .
1.3.3. Equilibrium
This model environment can be considered as a two-stage game. In the first
stage, nature draws the underlying state and agents make decisions on their
attention allocation by optimally splitting the effective capacity between the
signals to be observed. In the second stage, agents observe the realized signals
and then take action.
We focus on a linear symmetric equilibrium in which all agents follow the
same strategy in attention allocation and adopt a linear strategy in actions. Be-
cause the attention allocation is determined in the first stage, the heterogeneity
in signal observations in the second stage does not affect their decision. Once
agents decide their attention allocation, the variances in observation noises are
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also determined. The action strategy ai in the second stage is linear in both the
prior and observations on signals,
ai =Pq,iq +Px,i xˆi +Pz,i zˆi, (1.12)
where (Pq,i,Px,i,Pz,i) are the weights assigned to the prior and observations.
We first solve the second-stage game, where the equilibrium remains unique.
The solution to this game is the optimal weighting rule for any arbitrary allo-
cation of attention in the first stage. Then, we solve for the optimal attention
allocation in the first stage, taking the optimal weighting rule as given.
Given the linearity of the strategy and the normality of the information
structure, we can show that an agent’s action is a weighted average of the ob-
servations and their prior. That is,
Pq,i +Px,i +Pz,i = 1. (1.13)
Individual i’s payoff depends on the other agents’ choices. Let the action
strategy of the other agents be (kˆx, kˆz,Pq ,Px,Pz). The expected utility of indi-
vidual i, E[ui], can be written as the sum of three components,
E [ui] =  11  a
✓
P2q,i
1
fq
+P2x,i
1
fx,i
+P2z,i
1
fz,i
◆
| {z }
L†
  a
1  a
⇣
(Pz,i  Pz)2 s2z + (Pq,i  Pq)2 s2
⌘
| {z }
L‡
+ C, (1.14)
with
fq =
1
(1  a)s2 , fx,i =
1
s2x +w
2
x,i
, fz,i =
1
(1  a)s2z +w2z,i
, (1.15)
and
C =  a
1  a
✓Z
a2j dj  a¯2
◆
  L¯
 
.
The first component of the utility function,  L†, is the quadratic loss of agent
i, when everybody uses the same weights on their signals in action strategy.
It shows that both sender and observation noises are of importance for the ex-
pected loss. The second component, L‡, is another possible source of expected
loss for agent i: utilizing a different action strategy from that used by the other
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agents. Obviously, when agent i adopts the same strategy, L‡ becomes zero.
Moreover, C is the effect of actions taken by other agents on agent i and it can-
not be affected by her choice. Note that w2x,i and w
2
z,i are the variances of agent
i’s observation noises on the private and public signals, respectively, which are
given by (1.11), and a is the aggregate action.
1.3.4. Characterization
Agent imaximizes E [ui] by choosing kˆz,i optimally.7 To analyze the equilibrium
allocation of attention, we study agent i’s best response allocation strategy. We
begin by defining the relative marginal return of attention on the public signal,
which turns out to be convenient in the analysis of the main mechanisms. That
is,
g (kˆz,i, kˆ⇤z ) ⌘ ∂E [ui]/∂kˆz,i∂E [ui]/∂kˆx,i . (1.16)
It is straightforward that g (kˆz,i, kˆ⇤z ) measures the relative attractiveness of pay-
ing additional attention to the public signal, given others’ attention allocation
plan kˆ⇤z . There are four forces that shape the attention allocation decision and
thus affect g. In the following sections, we fix the correlation between the two
signals and discuss the role of the other three. We elaborate on the effect of the
correlation in Section 1.4.2.
Lemma 1.1. g (kˆz,i, kˆ⇤z ) decreases in kˆz,i, increases in r, and increases in a.
First, the force of diminishing returns to attention takes hold. The more at-
tention that is paid to the public signal, the less attractive it becomes. Second,
agents prefer the signal with higher accuracy; that is, the higher its relative accu-
racy, the more attractive it is. Third, the coordination motive tilts agents’ choice
toward learning the public signal because they are rewarded in two ways when
they spend more attention on the public signal: they are better informed about
the underlying true state and their actions are better aligned. In other words,
due to the coordination motive, the relative attractiveness of the public signal
is magnified. The first part of Lemma 1.1 also implies that agent i increases her
attention on the public signal if and only if g (kˆz,i, kˆ⇤z ) > 1, and decreases her
attention if and only if g (kˆz,i, kˆ⇤z ) < 1.
In symmetric equilibrium, we impose the condition that kˆz,i = kˆ⇤z , and three
7Note that the optimal weighting rule
⇣
P⇤z,i,P⇤x,i,P⇤q,i
⌘
in the second stage is uniquely deter-
mined by the attention allocation plan
⇣
kˆ⇤z,i, kˆ⇤x,i
⌘
.
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0
1
ˆ
⇤ z/
ˆ
r⇢ 1/⇢
(a) a < 1  r/exp (kˆ) .
0
1
ˆ
⇤ z/
ˆ
r⇢ 1/⇢
(b) a   1  r/exp (kˆ) .
Figure 1.1. The equilibrium uniqueness and multiplicity.
situations can arise. First, agents spend all of their attention on the public sig-
nal, where g (kˆ⇤z , kˆ⇤z ) > 1 and kˆ⇤z = kˆ. Second, they spend all of their attention
on the private signal, where g (kˆ⇤z , kˆ⇤z ) < 1 and kˆ⇤z = 0. Third, they split their at-
tention between both signals, where g (kˆ⇤z , kˆ⇤z ) = 1 and kˆ⇤z 2 [0, kˆ]. The following
proposition offers the complete equilibrium characterization.
Proposition 1.1. In linear symmetric equilibria, agents adopt the same attention allo-
cation strategy, where the equilibrium attention allocation is such that
kˆ⇤z =
8>>><>>>:
0 if rr0
˜ˆkz if r 2 (min{r0,r1},max{r0,r1})
kˆ if r r1
(1.17)
kˆ⇤x = kˆ   kˆ⇤z
where
˜ˆkz =
1
2
kˆ + ln
 
(1  a) (1  rr) + (r  r)exp(kˆ)   1  r2 
(1  a) (1  rr)exp(kˆ) + (r  r) r (1  r2)
!
(1.18)
and
r0 = exp (kˆ)r+ 1exp (kˆ) + r , r1 =
(1  a) (exp(2kˆ)  1) +  1  r2 
(1  a) (exp(2kˆ)  1)r+ exp(kˆ) (1  r2) .
(1.19)
There exist multiple equilibria, i.e., kˆ⇤z = {0, ˜ˆkz, kˆ}, if and only if
r1 <r <r0 and a   1  rexp(kˆ) ; (1.20)
otherwise, the equilibrium attention allocation is unique.
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When the relative accuracy is extreme, agents find it optimal to focus on
only one of the signals; that is, for a fixed amount of capacity kˆ and a coordina-
tionmotive a, if the relative accuracy is sufficiently high, i.e., max{r1,r0}r,
then agents choose to only observe the public signal. If the relative accuracy is
sufficiently low, i.e., r min{r1,r0}, then agents choose to observe the pri-
vate signal only.
When the relative accuracy is not too extreme, this model can admit either
multiple equilibria or a unique equilibrium.8 See Figure 1.1. Multiple equilib-
ria can arise when the coordination motive (or correlation) is sufficiently high
and/or the total amount capacity is relatively low. First, the relative accuracy
cannot be too extreme for the existence of multiple equilibria. When everybody
focuses on the lower quality signal, agent i finds that the benefit of deviating
and instead focusing on the relatively more precise signal is dominated by the
cost of adopting a different strategy from other agents. Second, the coordi-
nation motive must be sufficiently large, such that when the strategic concern
is strong, agents are more severely punished for deviating from the strategy
adopted by other agents and therefore have less incentive to do so. Third, if
the amount of capacity available is too large, then it is too costly for agent i
to follow the others’ strategy, conditional on the rest of the population coordi-
nating on a “wrong” choice. In contrast, there is only a unique equilibrium if
the coordination motive (or correlation) is not sufficiently strong or capacity is
large.
In both cases, a symmetric equilibrium is formed if all agents choose the
global minimizer of L†, because both L† and L‡ (defined in equation (1.14))
achieve global minimization and no individual has an incentive to deviate from
it. We label it strategic utility maximizing equilibrium, because it generates the
maximum of strategic utility, which is defined by E[usi ] ⌘  L†   L‡; that is the
component, on which the choice of agents has an influence.
1.4. Attention Allocation
In this section, we analyze the comparative statics of the equilibrium attention
allocation, not only because the issue of attention allocation itself is interesting
but also because it provides building blocks for our examination of social wel-
8Technically, L† can be either quasi-concave or quasi-convex in kˆz,i. The equilibrium is unique
if and only if it is quasi-concave. In this model, the entropy is not a convex function of signal
precision and that is why multiple equilibria can possibly emerge in this model. In contrast,
with the costly acquisition approach, the cost function of noise reduction is usually assumed to
be convex.
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fare in Section 1.5, and policy issues in Section 1.6. We also highlight the role
that the correlation between the public and private signals plays in attention
allocation, as it is absent in most of the previous literature.
1.4.1. Non-monotonic Attention Allocation
For any relative accuracy and coordination motive, when the capacity is suf-
ficiently large, the effect of diminishing returns eventually dominates, which
leads to a diversified attention allocation. Because both signals can be extremely
clear, the coordination motive and relative accuracy do not affect the attention
allocation, with agents simply splitting a large amount of attention evenly be-
tween the two signals.
Proposition 1.2. The share of effective capacity devoted to the public signal, kˆ⇤z/kˆ,
converges to 1/2, when capacity is sufficiently high.
When the capacity is not large enough, the three forces characterized in
Lemma 1.1 are intertwined and affect how the equilibrium attention allocation
responds to an increase in capacity.
Proposition 1.3. If the public signal is less accurate than the private signal, agents
specialize in learning the latter, when the capacity is low. When the capacity increases,
the share of effective capacity devoted to the public signal is monotonically increasing, if
the private signal is very precise or the coordination motive is not so strong; otherwise,
it is hump-shaped.
In the proof of the proposition, we offer a complete characterization of this
comparative statics. If the private signal is sufficiently accurate or the coordina-
tion motive is sufficiently low, it is never worthwhile to only observe the public
signal, despite the effect of the coordination motive. The key trade-off here is
between the effects of diminishing returns and relative accuracy, with the for-
mer eventually dominating the latter when the capacity is higher. Let kˆ0 be the
threshold value of kˆ, at which agents are indifferent about specialization in the
private signal or diversification. In this case, when the capacity is higher than
kˆ0, the share of attention devoted to the public signal monotonically increases
in kˆ. See Figure 1.2(a).
If the coordinationmotive is strong, its effect manifests in the non-monotonicity
of the share of attention spent on the public signal. See Figure 1.2(b). When
there is an increase in capacity, both the diminishing returns and the coordi-
nation motive have larger effects, and both forces tilt the choice of attention
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Figure 1.2. The equilibrium share of attention allocated to the public signal is either monotonic
or hump-shaped in effective capacity.
allocation toward the public signal. Thus, there is a sharp increase in kˆ⇤z/kˆ.
However, when agents allocate a predominant share of their attention to the
public signal, the mechanism of diminishing returns to attention takes stronger
effect and pushes agents to diversify. The effect of the coordination motive is
eventually dominated and therefore, kˆ⇤z/kˆ decreases in kˆ.
If the precision of the private signal is close to that of the public one, the
effect of the strong coordination motive can be so prominent that the share of
attention on the public signal can reach 100%. See Figure 1.2(c). It is interesting
to observe that in this case, agents’ attention fans out, contracts inward, then
fans out again. The number of signals that agents pick up does not monotoni-
cally increase in capacity.
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Notably, kˆ⇤z/kˆ being hump-shaped implies that, the absolute amount of at-
tention paid to the more precise private signal can decrease (even to zero) when
the total amount of capacity increases, as the result of a strong coordination mo-
tive. We formalize this mechanism with “attention misallocation,” and demon-
strate further how this mechanism critically affects the social welfare of this
economy in Section 1.5.
Definition 1.1. (Attention misallocation) Let j be the relatively more precise signal,
i.e., sj = min{sx,sz} and j 2 {x,z}. Attention misallocation arises, if the absolute
amount of attention paid to the signal j in equilibrium decreases in response to an
increase in total capacity, i.e., dkˆ⇤j /dkˆ < 0.
Lemma 1.2. When the private signal is more precise than the public signal, the
absolute amount of effective capacity allocated to observing the private signal
can even decrease in the total amount of capacity, on the condition that 2a+ r>
1. Specifically, dkˆ⇤x/dkˆ < 0.
When the coordination motive is very strong, all three equilibria can exist
in the intermediate range of capacity. See Figure 1.2(d). Intuitively, this is the
case in which none of the effects of relative accuracy, diminishing returns or
coordination motive dominate the other two. Once other agents adopt one of
the strategies, it is costly to deviate because the coordination motive is very
high. Note that, in this case, the diversification equilibrium can never be the
strategic utility maximizing equilibrium.9 Therefore, if we focus on the strategic
utility maximizing equilibrium, agents can shift their focus entirely from the
private to the public signal when capacity crosses a cutoff value of kˆs. The key
trade-off here is between taking advantage of high accuracy and the desire for
coordination.
In contrast, if the public signal is relatively more accurate, agents special-
ize in learning the public signal to take advantage of both higher accuracy and
better coordination when the capacity is lower than kˆ1, i.e., the threshold value
at which agents are indifferent between specialization or diversification. They
eventually diversify, due to the effect of diminishing returns, and the equilib-
rium share of attention devoted to the public signal decreases monotonically.
See Figure 1.2(e).
9When there exist multiple equilibria, L† is quasi-convex and the diversification allocation
leads to a local minimum of E[usi ].
1.4. ATTENTION ALLOCATION 19
1.4.2. The Role of Correlation
In this section, we turn to the role of correlation. The indirect effect of a change
in correlation is straightforward. For any capacity k, a higher correlation re-
duces the effective capacity available to agents, dkˆ/dr < 0. Intuitively, because
the two signals are correlated, observing both of them costs agents some capac-
ity to learn the correlated part twice. The direct effect is characterized in the
following proposition.
Proposition 1.4. For any effective capacity, a higher correlation dampens the effect
of diminishing returns to attention and amplifies the effect of the coordination motive.
Specifically, (i) both kˆ0 and kˆ1 increase in r; (ii) kˆs decreases in r.
First, for any amount of effective capacity available to agents, the observa-
tion noises are reduced more effectively when the correlation is higher. See
equation (1.11). Because the two signals are correlated, knowing one of the
signals helps reduce the other’s observation noise. Therefore, agents have a
stronger incentive to focus on one of the signals and the effect of diminishing
returns is mitigated.
To demonstrate this, consider the case where only unique equilibrium exists
for any capacity.10 Due to the effect of diminishing returns, agents switch from
specialization to diversification when the effective capacity is higher than kˆ0 for
the case of r < 1 and kˆ1 for the case of r > 1. When the correlation is higher,
both cutoff values increase. That is, agents find it worthwhile to diversify only
when the effective capacity is at a higher level. In this respect, the effect of an
increase in the correlation differs from that of a rise in the coordination motive
a, which raises kˆ1 and lowers kˆ0.
Second, the correlation across signals also amplifies the effect of the coordi-
nation motive. Consider the case where the private signal is more precise. The
rise in correlation entails a change in the trade-off between relative accuracy
and coordination motive. In such a case, if agents spend more of their attention
on the public signal, they estimate the underlying state less accurately but they
can better align their actions. When the correlation between the private and
public signals is higher, the two signals become more “substitutable,” in terms
of estimating the fundamental. Therefore, agents incur less welfare loss when
they spend capacity on the less accurate public signal and they favor the public
signal even more.
10As shown in Proposition 1.1, it is the case where a+ r/exp(kˆ) < 1.
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There are three ways to see the effect of this mechanism. First, as shown
in Proposition 1.1, for any effective capacity level kˆ, and relative accuracy r 2
[r1,r0], multiple equilibria emerge in this model when either a or r is suffi-
ciently large. Second, when we consider the strategic utility maximizing equi-
librium in this case, agents shift their focus from the private to the public signal
at kˆ = kˆs. We observe that kˆs decreases in both r and a. Third, in Lemma 1.2,
we show that, on the condition that either a or r is sufficiently high, attention
misallocation can arise.
1.5. "Too Much of a Good Thing": Social Welfare Analysis
Social welfare is the average distance of individual actions in society from the
fundamental. Agents benefit more from predicting the average opinion than
other individuals, but it is a zero-sum game at the society level. In other words,
the coordination motive only affects individual welfare and disappears at the
society level. In this section, we analyze the comparative statics of social welfare
by focusing on the strategic utility maximizing equilibrium.
The expected social welfare, E [W s (a,q)], is a weighted average of E ⇥usi ⇤,
which is the objective expected utility maximized by agents, and the spillover
effect, which is not considered by agents. The spillover receives a higher weight
in social welfare if the coordination motive, a, is stronger.
E [W s (a,q)] =  E
Z
i
(ai   q)2
 
= (1  a)
"
 s2
✓
1+
fx
fq
+
fz
fq
◆ 1#
| {z }
E[usi ]
+a
⇥ P2qs2  P2zs2z ⇤| {z }
Spillover
.
The unintended spillover effect arises from agents’ desire to align their ac-
tions and the fact that they do not consider the effects that their choices have on
others. Agents make use of the common prior and their correlated noisy obser-
vations on the public signal, when they forecast the actions of others and choose
their own actions. As both the prior and the public signal are noisy, the actions
taken by agents may be anchored around commonly known but imprecise in-
formation. Therefore, the spillover contributes negatively to social welfare and
its magnitude is determined by how precise the signals are, i.e., s2 and s2z , and
how much agents rely on them, i.e., Pq and Pz.
Proposition 1.5. (Social Welfare and Capacity) When the capacity to process in-
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formation increases, social welfare can decrease. Specifically, there may exist kˆa < kˆb,
such that
E [W s(kˆa)] > E [W s(kˆb)] .
It is interesting to observe that a higher capacity to process information does
not necessarily imply higher social welfare. On the one hand, E
⇥
usi |xˆi, zˆi
⇤
, the
part of welfare optimized by agents, always increases in capacity. On the other
hand, the spillover can cause a decrease in social welfare when there is an in-
crease in capacity. We know that spending more attention on the private signal
reduces the spillover and enhances social welfare by loweringPz. However, re-
call the mechanism of attention misallocation shown in Lemma 1.2, agents may
decrease the absolute amount of attention on the more accurate private signal
when capacity increases, which results in a higher Pz. Therefore, an increase
in capacity can be detrimental to social welfare. In addition to this mechanism,
holding constant kˆ⇤x , a higher capacity implies that the amount of attention al-
located to the public signal increases. Therefore, agents assign a larger weight
to their observations on the public signal, zˆi, which is also socially costly.11 In
short, a strong coordination motive or a high correlation between signals can
distort the allocation of attention so much that the spillover increases quickly
in response to a higher capacity, which results in a decrease in overall social
welfare.
To demonstrate this mechanism, we choose a set of parameters with high
coordination motive (or high correlation) and intermediate relative accuracy,
such that agents switch their attention entirely from the private signal to pub-
lic signal at kˆs, in the strategic utility maximizing equilibrium.12 When kˆ = kˆs,
agents are indifferent about only observing the private signal or the public sig-
nal; that is, E
⇥
usi |xˆi
⇤
= E
⇥
usi |zˆi
⇤
. In other words, fx = fz. For the same reason,
Pq is the same in both cases. When kˆ increases from kˆ s to kˆ+s , kˆ⇤x decreases from
kˆs to 0 and Pz jumps from 0 to 1 Pq , so that there is a discontinuous decrease
in social welfare. Because E [W s] monotonically increases in kˆ, when kˆ < kˆs,
there must exist kˆa and kˆb such that E [W s(kˆa)] > E [W s(kˆb)] and kˆa < kˆs < kˆb.
11We show that ∂Pq/∂kˆ⇤x = 0; that is, the increase in fx must equal the decrease in fz when
kˆ⇤x is optimally chosen. ∂Pq/∂kˆ < 0, as holding kˆ⇤x constant, a higher capacity implies a higher
fz and therefore, Pq must decrease. Intuitively, when the capacity is higher, agents rely more on
their observation(s) and less on their prior knowledge.
12This situation arises, when a > 1   r and r˜ < r < 1, where r˜ is defined in the proof of
Proposition 1.3. Under this set of parameters, this model admits multiple equilibria and in this
example, we focus on the change of social welfare in response to an change in capacity in a
strategic utility maximizing equilibrium. However, this result does not rely on this particular
case. In fact, the proof of Proposition 1.6 also implies Proposition 1.5. To establish Proposition
1.6, we focus on cases in which only a unique equilibrium exists.
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See Figure 1.3(a).
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Figure 1.3. The non-monotonicity of social welfare.
If the accuracy of the private signal is higher (or r is lower), the abso-
lute amount of attention paid to the private signal decreases gradually and the
weight assigned to the observation on the public signal also increases gradu-
ally. Therefore, social welfare may decrease continuously in capacity. See Fig-
ure 1.3(b). The following equation summarizes the key mechanisms discussed
above, where the sign of+ ( ) stands for a derivative being positive (negative).
dE [W s]
dkˆ
= (1  a) dE
⇥
usi
⇤
dkˆ| {z }
+
+a
26664d
  P2qs2 
dkˆ| {z }
+
+
∂
  P2zs2z  
∂kˆ⇤x| {z }
+
dkˆ⇤x
dkˆ|{z}
+/ 
+
∂
  P2zs2z  
∂kˆ| {z }
 
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Figure 1.4. Finite vs. infinite capacity.
Proposition 1.6. (Too Much Capacity) Social welfare can be higher when agents are
endowed with a finite amount of capacity to process information than when they have
an infinite amount of capacity. Specifically, there is a finite kˆ0, such that
E
⇥W s(kˆ0)⇤ > lim
kˆ!+•E [W
s(kˆ)] ⌘ E [Wms] .
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This result is striking. When agents possess an infinite amount of capacity
to process information, they can perfectly observe both signals. In this case,
the model is identical to the Morris-Shin model, in which the social inefficiency
is well understood, i.e., agents overreact to the public signal. Specifically, the
weight agents assign to the public signal in their action is higher than that in
their posterior belief, which is socially costly because the coordination motive
driving the overreaction does not count in social welfare. Social welfare in the
Morris-Shin model can be written as follows
E [Wms] =  
"
fmsx + f
ms
z +
1
(1 a)fq
(fmsx + fmsz + fq)
2 +
Pmsz a(1 a)
fmsx + fmsz + fq
#
1
s4
,
where variables with superscriptms are counterparts in the Morris-Shin model.
In our case, capacity-limited agents cannot clearly observe signals; thus,
their estimation of the underlying state is less accurate than that when they have
an infinite amount of capacity. However, agents may endogenously choose to
spend very little attention on observing the public signal, as a result, the total
amount of noise in the observation, zˆi, becomes very large. Therefore, they rely
on it much less when they take actions; that is, the weight that it is assigned,
Pz, can be lower than Pmsz . A lower level of capacity can actually be welfare
enhancing, because it does, to some extent, correct the inefficient use of pub-
lic information. If the second effect dominates the first, social welfare can be
higher than that in the Morris-Shin model. See Figure 1.4.
We demonstrate the two opposing effects with the following simple case.
Let the total amount of capacity in our model be kˆ0. We choose a set of pa-
rameter such that agents are indifferent between specialization in the private
signal or diversification; that is, they endogenously ignore the public signal, or,
fz = 0.13 We write social welfare as follows
E [W s] =  
"
fx + 1(1 a)fq
(fx + fq)
2
#
1
s4
.
Given the finite capacity, agents cannot perfectly observe the private signal
and thus the precision of observation of the private signal is smaller; that is,
fx < fmsx . Moreover, in the Morris-Shin model, the public signal is also infor-
mative and enhances the estimation of the underlying state, which results in
13Section 1.4 demonstrates that such a kˆ0 exists, unless both a+ r > 1 andr > r˜ hold, where
r˜ is defined in the proof of Proposition 1.3.
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fx < fmsx + f
ms
z . Intuitively, agents with finite capacity are always worse off in
terms of estimating the underlying state. It always holds that
 
"
fx + 1(1 a)fq
(fx + fq)
2
#
1
s4
<  
"
fmsx + f
ms
z +
1
(1 a)fq
(fmsx + fmsz + fq)
2
#
1
s4
.
The second term in E [Wms] shows the additional welfare loss caused by
overusing the public signal in the Morris-Shin model. There is no overuse of
the public signal in this particular finite-capacity case in that Pz = 0, because
fz = 0. The socially costly overreaction to the public signal does not exist in this
case
0>  
"
Pmsz a(1 a)
fmsx + fmsz + fq
#
1
s4
.
When social inefficiency is high in the Morris-Shin model, the welfare loss due
to “overreaction” to the public signal can be so large that the gain from a better
estimation of the fundamental is dominated.
Given that the capacity can be “too much,” is it possible for agents to vol-
untarily burn some capacity to achieve higher welfare? The answer is no. That
is because, if everyone else collectively discards some of their capacity, individ-
ual i can increase her welfare by fully using all of her capacity to enhance the
estimation of the fundamental in the first stage and adopting the same action
strategy in the second stage to avoid being “punished” for using a different
strategy.14
1.6. Policy Issues
In previous sections, we have fully characterized the optimal attention alloca-
tion and explored its implications for social welfare via comparative statics. In
this section, we discuss two welfare-related issues to shed light on how pol-
icy prescriptions in the literature can be amended, considering that agents are
capacity-constrained.
1.6.1. Generalization and Efficient Use of Information
Angeletos and Pavan (2007) offer a flexible efficiency benchmark to assess the
welfare properties of a general class of games where the social value of coordi-
nation may be higher or lower than the private one. In this section, we demon-
14This argument can be formalized and its proof is available on request.
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strate that our key results on social welfare can continue to hold in that general-
ized environment. Moreover, we also explain how the equilibrium multiplicity
generated by our model mechanism would affect policy prescriptions offered
in their work.
To accommodate this analysis, we enrich the payoff structure in this model
by following Angeletos and Pavan (2007), where the utility function is specified
by a general linear quadratic function, u = U (k,K,sk,q), where k and K are
individual and aggregate actions, respectively; sk ⌘
R
i (k  K)2 di is the action
dispersion. In fact, we can write the utility function as follows,
u ⌘  (ki   q)2   r (ki   K)2 + rs2k| {z }
I
+
✓
Uss
2
  r
◆
s2k| {z }
I I
+
✓
UKK
2
+ r
◆
K2| {z }
I I I
+ (UkK   2r) kK| {z }
IV
+
✓
Uqq
2
+ 1
◆
q2| {z }
V
+
✓
Ukk
2
+ 1+ r
◆
k2| {z }
VI
+ (Ukq   2) kq +UKqKq.
where r is a positive constant. Our model is a special case, where we have
Uss = 2r, UKK =  2r, UkK = 2r, Uqq =  2, Ukk =  2 (1+ r), Ukq = 2 and UKq =
0.15 Part I is the standard beauty contest utility specification, by letting a= r1 r .
The private value of coordination, or how much agents care about aligning
their actions, is measured by a. The socially optimal degree of coordination
is represented by a⇤ and it is the weight that the social planner would assign
to the aggregate action in its best response. In the general case, they can be
characterized as follows,
a⇤ = 1  Ukk + 2UkK +UKK
Ukk +Uss
a = 1  Ukk +UkK
Ukk
. (1.21)
Note that the beauty contest game is a special case with a⇤ = 0 (i.e., the so-
cial planner does not value coordination) and with a > 0 (i.e., individuals care
about aligning their actions). Efficient attention allocation and efficient use of
information are derived by solving a social planner problem while respecting
the information processing constraint (1.9).
First, in the benchmark case, we have demonstrated in Proposition 1.5 and
15We restrict our attention to the case where there is no inefficiency under complete informa-
tion. That is, we impose a restriction on Ukq and UKq , which is standard as in Angeletos and
Pavan (2007).
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Lemma 1.2 that social welfare may decrease in response to an increase in ca-
pacity due to attention misallocation, on condition that coordination motive
and/or correlation between signals are sufficiently strong. Alternatively, this
result can be interpreted as follows. The social planner does not value coordi-
nation among agents at all in the beauty contest case. When the private value
of coordination perceived by the agents is high, the equilibrium allocation may
deviate a lot from the social optimum. Therefore, a further increase in capacity
can result in an even severer attention misallocation, which may cause a reduc-
tion in social welfare.
In this general case, this mechanism can still produce the same effect, that
social welfare decreases in capacity, when there is a large enough discrepancy
between the value of coordination perceived by individuals, a, and the central
planner, a⇤. To illustrate this point, consider the following scenario. Suppose
the payoff function is parametrized such that a = a⇤. A positive Uss implies
that the action dispersion has positive externality on individuals’ payoffs. An
increase in Uss reduces the social value of coordination, a⇤.16 Therefore, the
central planner prefers a higher action dispersion and allocating even less atten-
tion to the public signal and more attention to the private signal. However, the
equilibrium value of coordination is not affected by the change in Uss. When
Uss is large enough, the attention misallocation, due to the discrepancy in equi-
librium and efficient degree of coordination, can intensify and cause a decrease
in social welfare when capacity increases.17
Second, one of the key insights in Angeletos and Pavan (2007) with the ex-
ogenous information structure is that the equilibrium use of information is effi-
cient if and only if the social and private values of coordination coincide. How-
ever, this result may not hold once we allow for an endogenous information
structure. Further, in this model, even though attention allocation is efficient, it
does not necessarily lead to an efficient use of information.
In contrast to Angeletos and Pavan (2007), we argue that even when the
central planner corrects the coordination incentives of agents to the socially op-
timal level with a tax policy, the equilibrium attention allocation and the use of
information may still be not socially optimal. The key to understanding this ar-
gument is to recall that multiple equilibria may arise. Consider the case where
the socially optimal degree of coordination a⇤ is higher than the private value
of coordination a and it is so high that there exist multiple solutions in the cen-
16Note that both Ukk + 2UkK +UKK and Ukk +Uss are negative in this case.
17Similar arguments can be applied to other cases and detailed analysis is available on request.
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tral planner’s social welfare optimization problem. It is obvious that the central
planner picks the solution that gives rise to the highest social welfare. In a de-
centralized economy, with a policy similar to that proposed in Angeletos and
Pavan (2007), the central planner can incentivize agents to value the coordina-
tion as much as it does, but it is still undetermined on which equilibrium agents
coordinate. The planner needs another set of tools that help direct agents to co-
ordinate on the social welfare maximizing equilibrium.
Further, in this framework, the equilibrium use of information can still be
inefficient, even though the equilibrium attention allocation is efficient. To see
this, we assume that a > a⇤ > 0. The social planner also values the coordi-
nation and may dictate that agents focus on the public signal and ignore the
private one. Under the same conditions, individuals could also choose exactly
the same attention allocation. In other words, the attention allocation is socially
optimal. However, as the private and social values of coordination differ, in
the second stage, individuals would assign a higher weight in their action strat-
egy to the common prior than would the social planner. To understand this,
recall the fact that the common prior serves a “free public signal,” which does
not require any attention, and observations on the public signal are imperfectly
correlated across agents in this economy due to the idiosyncratic observation
noises. Therefore, the equilibrium use of information is still not socially opti-
mal.
1.6.2. Transparency of Public Announcement
This study adds another dimension to the debate about central bank trans-
parency. Unlike the common presumption that higher transparency is always
beneficial, Morris and Shin (2002) show that it may be detrimental to social
welfare when the central bank delivers clearer public announcements. In their
beauty contest model with an exogenous information structure, an increase in
the precision of public information entails two opposing effects. On the one
hand, it allows agents to better estimate the underlying fundamental. On the
other hand, it also increases agents’ reliance on the noisy public information
in their actions, which is socially costly. Both effects are enlarged as the preci-
sion of public information increases. Morris and Shin (2002) show that social
welfare is U-shaped, such that when the precision of the public signal is exceed-
ingly low, the second effect dominates. Specifically, social welfare decreases in
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Figure 1.5. Central bank transparency and social welfare.
its precision if and only if
s2x
s2z
+
s2x
s2
< (2a  1)(1  a). (1.22)
Therefore, it may be socially desirable to withhold public information.
One important critique of this argument is Svensson (2006), that questions
its empirical relevancy and stresses that it can hold only when public informa-
tion is implausibly imprecise.18 See the dashed line in Figure 1.5 where social
welfare is plotted against the left side of equation (1.22), holding s2x and s2
fixed.19
However, we argue that the precision of the public signal needs not nec-
essarily to be exceedingly low to generate a decline in social welfare, when we
allow for endogenous attention allocation. When agents can decide to which in-
formation source they pay their attention, the precision of each signal that they
observe becomes endogenous in that it not only depends on variances in sender
noises, but also on those of observation noises, which are chosen by agents.
To illustrate this, we plot social welfare in our model with the solid line in
Figure 1.5.20 When the precision of the public signal is very low, agents ignore it
and focus on the private signal. Therefore, a marginal increase in the precision
of the public signal does not affect social welfare. When the precision of the
public signal is sufficiently high, agents diversify their attention. An increase
18Even the maximum of the right side of (1.22) is a very small number, which implies that s2z
must be sufficiently large for this condition to hold.
19In this numerical example, a = 0.7 and sx = 0.1. s is normalized to unit.
20In this numerical example, the capacity available to agents is k = 3.2 bits and all other pa-
rameters are the same as those for computing the counterpart in the Morris-Shin model. With
this set of parameters, there is a unique equilibrium.
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in its precision leads to a higher reliance on the public signal in their action, as
in Morris and Shin (2002). In addition, agents also direct a larger proportion of
their attention toward the public signal in response to a higher precision. This
additional mechanism reinforces the previous one and both contribute to the
decline in social welfare. As a result, social welfare still decreases, even when
the precision of the public signal is reasonably large.21
1.7. Alternative Information Structures
Following Hellwig and Veldkamp (2009) and Myatt and Wallace (2012), we
have made two implicit assumptions about the way in which agents learn in
the benchmark model. First, agents cannot directly observe the fundamental,
but can learn about it through analyzing noisy signals. In other words, agents
can only obtain noisy observations about the underlying signals that are in-
formative about the fundamental.22 That assumption is realistic in settings in
which information acquisition takes the form of the assimilation of the avail-
able information and agents face a constraint to information transmission and
comprehension. Second, the source of noisy information can be both public and
private.23 That assumption captures the scenario that agents may have access to
information sources of a different nature, i.e., economy-wide information that is
commonly accessible and local information that is conditionally uncorrelated.24
This set of assumptions, although common in the literature, is important for our
results. The following discussion outlines how our results would change if we
have allowed for alternative information structures.
21When the precision of the public signal is high enough, agents pay all their attention to the
public signal. In this situation, an increase in the precision of the public signal is always welfare-
enhancing.
22The rational inattention model characterized by Myatt and Wallace (2012) allows agents to
learn one noisy signal about the fundamental that contains exogenous sender’s noise. They
explicitly specify a cost function without studying the attention allocation problem, which is the
focus of this paper.
23Hellwig and Veldkamp (2009) adopt the same set of assumptions, but they have a different
specification for the way agents reduce the observation nosies. In their work, they allow agents
to pay a fixed cost to obtain a noisy signal of the fundamental, which reduces the variance of the
observation noise from infinity to zero. In contrast, we allow agents to choose the variance of
the observation noises by spending capacity on those signals. Furthermore, the cost function of
acquiring information is also different in their work.
24Private information can be interpreted alternatively. In an example of an island economy,
island-level productivity can be a noisy signal about the aggregate productivity. Firms can ob-
tain a noisy signal about local productivity by paying attention to it. The island-specific com-
ponent, i.e., the difference between idiosyncratic island productivity and aggregate productivity,
corresponds to the sender’s noise in the private signal in our model. An increase in attention to
the island-level productivity only reduces the observation noise.
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1.7.1. Observe the fundamental directly
We first consider a case in which agents can pay attention to observe both the
fundamental directly and a noisy public signal about the fundamental. Inter-
estingly, this scenario is a special case in our benchmark model, in which the
variance of the noise contained in the private signal s2x is 0. In this case, the
relative accuracy of the public signal takes an extreme valuer= r. (Recall that
r is always bounded by r and 1/r.)
Two results arise from this extreme case. First, spending all of the endowed
capacity on observing the fundamental directly is always an equilibrium and
socially optimal.25 Intuitively, to estimate the fundamental q, spending capac-
ity to observe q directly is always more efficient than learning a noisy signal z
about it, in terms of reducing the observation noises. At the limit, when agents
process an infinite amount of capacity, they only want to spend the capacity to
observe q, in which case they can obtain the value of the fundamental. From the
perspective of society, obtaining a clearer signal about the fundamental and dis-
carding the public signal entirely is also the optimum, given that coordination
is socially costly.
Second, agents may also coordinate on an inefficient equilibrium, in which
everybody pays all his attention to the public signal and does not observe the
fundamental at all. That case arises, only when the coordination motive is suf-
ficiently strong, i.e., (1+
p
1  r2)/2 < a < 1 and the total capacity is not too
large or too small.26 The intuition is also not so different from the reason why
multiple equilibria emerge in the benchmark case (discussed in Section 1.3.4).27
1.7.2. Observe two public signals
The assumption that the two information sources are of different publicity is
important for our results. To highlight its effect, in this section we investigate
an alternative setting where the two signals are both public but differ only in
25In other words, it holds that g(0,0) < 1 for any kˆ.
26In this case, even though r takes the smallest possible value r, it is still possible that r1 <
r = r < r0. Recall that both r1 and r0 vary in kˆ. In this case, rˆ, that is, the minimum of r1,
is smaller than r. See Figure 1.A.1(e) for an illustration of the attention allocation pattern, when
r = r.
27When the strategic concern is strong, agent i is severely punished for deviating from the
strategy of observing the public signal only, on the condition that everyone else adopts this strat-
egy. To ensure that it is an equilibrium, the amount of capacity available cannot be too large;
otherwise it is too costly for agent i to follow this strategy, that is, spending capacity on observ-
ing fundamental directly is more efficient in terms of learning q. The amount of capacity cannot
be too small either; otherwise the effect of relative accuracy dominates and agent i chooses to
deviate.
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precision.28
Some results from this case are the same as those from our benchmarkmodel.
First, in this case, agents focus on the relatively more precise signal when the
capacity available is rather small and diversify when it is very large. Second,
it is also the case that multiple equilibria may emerge, when capacity is in the
intermediate range. The intuitions gained from our benchmark model can be
applied to explain these two results.
However, in this setting, it is not possible that agents pay full attention to the
less accurate signal and ignore the relatively more precise one, unless multiple
equilibria exist. In other words, the key mechanism of attention mis-allocation
in our benchmark model does not exist in this setting. Intuitively, if one of the
signals is private and more precise and the other is public but less precise, it
can be the case that agents may decrease their attention to, or totally ignore, the
more precise private signal when the available capacity increases, because the
desire of coordination dominates the effect of diminishing returns and relative
accuracy. However, in the case of two public signals, that cannot be the case
because both signals are public and can help coordinate agents’ actions. There-
fore, agents either pay full attention to the more precise public signal (when the
effect of relative accuracy dominates), or divide their attention between the two
public signals (when the effect of diminishing returns dominates).
1.8. Conclusion
There has been a recent surge of interest in modeling information acquisition
and the endogenous information structure in macroeconomic environments.
See Veldkamp (2011) for a textbook treatment on this topic and Hellwig, Kohls,
and Veldkamp (2012) for an excellent review. However, fewer studies have
touched on the welfare implications of information acquisition in this class
of economies. This study focuses exclusively on a range of welfare issues in
beauty contest models, in a context where agents are rationally inattentive and
therefore optimally allocate a limited amount of attention between correlated
private and public signals.
We fully characterize the sufficient and necessary conditions for the equilib-
rium uniqueness and multiplicity, and show that the attention allocation and
the number of signals that agents decide to observe are not necessarily mono-
tonic, in response to the increase in the capacity of processing information. Un-
28We can provide a full characterization of this case upon request.
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like the literature, we also highlight the role of the correlation between two sig-
nals, which critically affects the equilibrium uniqueness and multiplicity, along
with the welfare properties in this model. Further, we show that in this setting,
when capacity increases, the social welfare of this economymay not necessarily
increase. In fact, it can decrease as a result of attention misallocation. Interest-
ingly, social welfare can be even higher when agents possess a finite amount of
capacity than when they have an infinite amount of capacity.
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Appendix of Chapter 1
1.A. Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1.1. First, we solve for the weighting rule adopted by all of the
other agents, on the condition that their attention allocation is (kˆ⇤x , kˆ⇤z ):
P⇤x =
f⇤x
f⇤x + f⇤z + f⇤q
, P⇤z =
f⇤z
f⇤x + f⇤z + f⇤q
, P⇤q =
f⇤q
f⇤x + f⇤z + f⇤q
,
where
f⇤x =
1
s2x + (w⇤x)
2 , f
⇤
z =
1
(1  a)s2z + (w⇤z )2
, f⇤q =
1
(1  a)s2 ,
and
w⇤x =
s
(s2x + s2) (1  r2)
exp (2kˆ⇤x)  1 , w
⇤
z =
s
(s2z + s2) (1  r2)
exp (2kˆ⇤z )  1 .
Second, we solve for the optimal action rule for agent i, i.e., (P⇤z,i,P⇤x,i,P⇤q,i),
conditional on the others’ allocation strategy (kˆ⇤x , kˆ⇤z ) and his own (kˆx,i, kˆz,i). It
is the solution to the following optimization problem,
max
Px,i ,Pz,i ,Pq,i
E [ui] s.t.
 
kˆz,j, kˆx,j
 
= (kˆ⇤z , kˆ⇤x) for all j 6= i,
where E [ui] is given by equation (1.14). First order conditions imply that
P⇤x,i =P⇤x +
(c1P⇤q   c2P⇤x) (c1 + c5 + c3 + c4)  (c1P⇤q   c3P⇤z ) (c1 + c5)
(c1 + c5 + c2) (c1 + c5 + c3 + c4)  (c1 + c5)2
,
(1.23)
P⇤z,i =P⇤z +
(c1P⇤q   c3P⇤z ) (c1 + c5 + c2)  (c1P⇤q   c2P⇤x) (c1 + c5)
(c1 + c5 + c2) (c1 + c5 + c3 + c4)  (c1 + c5)2
. (1.24)
where
c1 = (1  a)s2, c2 = s2x +w2x,i, c3 = (1  a)s2z +w2z,i,
c4 = as2z , c5 = as
2.
Therefore, the relative marginal return of attention on the public signal g can
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be re-written by replacing P⇤x,i and P⇤z,i with (1.23) and (1.24).
g =

C1 exp (2kˆz,i) + C2 exp (2kˆ)
C3 exp (2kˆz,i) + C4
 2 1
r2 exp (2kˆ) .
where
C1 = [(1  a)P⇤q + (1  a)P⇤z +P⇤x] (1 rr) ,
C2 = a
✓
1
r2
  1
◆
P⇤z + [(1  a)P⇤q + (1  a)P⇤z +P⇤x]
✓r
r
  1
◆
,
C3 = [(1  a)P⇤q + (1  a)P⇤z +P⇤x]
✓
1
rr   1
◆
,
C4 = a
✓
1
rr  
r
r
◆
P⇤z + [(1  a)P⇤q + (1  a)P⇤z +P⇤x]
⇣
1  rr
⌘
.
Therefore, we can show
∂g (kˆz,i, kˆ⇤z )
∂kˆz,i
< 0,
∂g (kˆz,i, kˆ⇤z )
∂r > 0,
∂g (kˆz,i, kˆ⇤z )
∂a
> 0.
Proof of Proposition 1.1. The first part of Lemma 1.1 implies that the best re-
sponse of agent i to the allocation strategy adopted by others is unique. There-
fore, the allocation (kˆx, kˆz) = (kˆ,0) constitutes a symmetric equilibrium if and
only if g(0,0) < 1. That is,
r exp (kˆ)r+ 1
exp (kˆ) + r
⌘r0.
Similarly, the allocation (kˆx, kˆz) = (0, kˆ) constitutes a symmetric equilibrium if
and only if g(kˆ, kˆ) > 1. That is,
r  (1  a) (exp(2kˆ)  1) +
 
1  r2 
(1  a) (exp(2kˆ)  1)r+ exp(kˆ) (1  r2) ⌘r1.
A symmetric equilibrium with diversification must be such that kˆ⇤z 2 (0, kˆ)
and it exists if and only if g (kˆ⇤z , kˆ⇤z ) = 1 where we have
g (kˆ⇤z , kˆ⇤z ) =
⇣⇣
r
r   1
⌘
(exp(2kˆ)  exp(2kˆ⇤z )) +r
⇣
1
r   r
⌘
exp(2kˆ⇤z )
⌘2
exp(2kˆ)
⇣
(1  a)
⇣
1
r  r
⌘
(exp(2kˆ⇤z )  1) +
⇣
1
r   r
⌘⌘2 . (1.25)
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Figure 1.A.1. Patterns of bounds r0 and r1.
Such an equilibrium arises if
r 2 (min{r0,r1},max{r0,r1}) .
The optimal allocation is given by (1.18). Obviously, the equilibrium must be
unique, if r0 <r1, which also implies a < 1  rexp(kˆ) . In other words, multiple
equilibria emerge if and only if the condition (1.20) holds.
Proof of Proposition 1.2. When kˆ is sufficiently large, r1 monotonically in-
creases and limkˆ!+•r1 = 1r whiler0 monotonically decreases and limkˆ!+•r0 =
r. Therefore, for any r, when kˆ is sufficiently large, it holds that r 2 (r0,r1).
According to Proposition 1.1, the equilibrium is unique and 0< kˆ⇤z < kˆ. Further,
the last part of this proposition can be obtained from equation (1.18).
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Proof of Proposition 1.3. The complete characterization of the equilibrium at-
tention allocation can be summarized in the following claims.
Claim 1: If the relative accuracy is sufficiently low (i.e., r < rˆ), agents spe-
cialize in learning the private signal and then eventually diversify their atten-
tion when the capacity increases, where
rˆ = 1
r
  1
r
1
2
q
a(1 a)
(1 r2) r+
2(1 a)
(1 r2) r
2 + 1
;
kˆ⇤z/kˆ can be either monotonically increasing or hump-shaped.
Proof. We first establish some properties of r0 and r1. As illustrated in Figure
1.A.1, there are in total five patterns, according to the combinations of a and r.
For any kˆ > 0, the bounds r0 and r1 can be characterized as follows,
1. limkˆ!+•r0 = r and limkˆ!+•r1 = 1/r.
2. r0(0) =r1(0) = 1.
3. r0 monotonically decreases in kˆ.
4. r1 may or may not be monotone:
(i) If 0 < a < 1 r2 , r1 monotonically increases in kˆ. Otherwise, r1 de-
creases and then increases, reaching the trough at kˆ = ˆˆk, where
ˆˆk = ln
✓
r+
q
a (1  r2)/ (1  a)
◆
.
(ii) If 1 r2 < a < 1  r, r1 is always larger than r0 for any kˆ.
(iii) If 1  r < a, r0 and r1 cross only once at kˆ = ln
  r
1 a
 
, on the con-
dition that kˆ is positive. Further, r1 is smaller than r0 if and only if
kˆ < ln( r1 a ).
(iv) If 1  r< a< 1  r2,r0 andr1 cross on the left side of ˆˆk; if 1  r2 <
a < 1, they cross on the right side of ˆˆk.
We can show the first three items by using the expression in equation (1.19).
The last item can be verified by noting that,
dr1
dkˆ
µ (1  a)exp(2kˆ)  2 (1  a)rexp(kˆ) + r2   a.
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Denote rˆ ⌘ r1
  ˆˆk  and r˜ ⌘ r1  ln  r1 a  , we obtain
rˆ = 1
r
  1
r
1
2
q
a(1 a)
(1 r2) r+
2(1 a)
(1 r2) r
2 + 1
; r˜ = 1
r
  1
r
a
 
1  r2 
1  (1  a)2 .
Intuitively, rˆ is the minimum ofr1 and r˜ is such that r˜=r1
 
ln
  r
1 a
  
=
r0
 
ln
  r
1 a
  
. If r 2 (r,rˆ), it holds that r < r1 for any kˆ; and there exists
a cutoff kˆ0, such that for any kˆ 2 (0, kˆ0), r < r0 and for any kˆ   kˆ0, r   r0.
According to Proposition 1.1, the first part of this Claim is shown.
Regarding the pattern of attention allocation kˆ⇤z/kˆ, it can be categorized in
the following two cases:
1. When the coordination motive is not so high, i.e., 0 < a < 1  r, kˆ⇤z/kˆ is
monotonically increasing in kˆ, ifr<r, wherer= [r+(1  a)]/[(1  a)r+
1]; and is hump-shaped in kˆ, if r <r < 1.
2. When the coordination motive is high, i.e., 1   r < a, kˆ⇤z/kˆ is hump-
shaped in kˆ, ifr<r<min{r˜,rˆ}; and is monotonically increasing in kˆ,
if r <r.
The details of the proof of the above two cases are contained in the Technical
Appendix.
Claim 2: Suppose the coordination motive is strong, i.e., (1   r)/2 < a 
1  r, and the relative accuracy is not extremely high, i.e., rˆ < r < 1. Agents
re-allocate their attention in the following fashion. When capacity is low, they
specialize in learning the private signal only, then diversify their attention allo-
cation and then specialize in learning the public signal only before eventually
diversifying again.
Proof. The proof is similar to that of Claim 1. See Figure 1.A.1(b) for illustration.
Claim 3: Suppose the coordination motive is very strong, i.e., 1  r < a < 1,
and the relative accuracy is not extremely high, i.e., r˜  r < 1. Agents re-
allocate their attention in the following fashion. When the capacity is suffi-
ciently low, they focus only on the private signal. When the capacity is higher,
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they may coordinate on one of the three equilibria. When there is a further in-
crease in capacity, they pay attention only to the public signal. And when the
capacity is sufficiently high, they eventually diversify.
Proof. We show that r˜ < 1 if and only if r > 1  a. The proof is similar to that
of Claim 1. See Figure 1.A.1(c), (d) and (e) for illustration.
Claim 4: Suppose the coordination motive is very strong, i.e., 1  r < a  1,
and the relative accuracy is low, i.e., max{r,rˆ}r< r˜. If 1  r< a 1  r2,
they allocate their attention in the same fashion as that in Claim 2. If 1  r2 <
a  1, when capacity is low, agents specialize in learning the private signal
only. When the capacity is higher, they may coordinate on one of the three
equilibria. When there is a further increase in capacity, they pay attention only
to the private signal again. And when the capacity is sufficiently high, they
eventually diversify. Note that r < rˆ, if and only if a < (1+p1  r2)/2.
Proof. The proof is similar to that of Claim 1. See Figure 1.A.1(d) and (e) for
illustration.
Proof of Lemma 1.2. This proof offers a sufficient condition underwhich Lemma
1.2 holds. We consider the following two cases: (i) 2a+ r> 1, (1  a)exp(kˆ)> r
andr< 1; (ii) a+ r> 1 andr< rˆ. Under these two cases, if kˆ> kˆ0, 0 kˆ⇤x < kˆ.
Therefore, we can show,
dkˆ⇤x
dkˆ
µ (r  r) (1  a)exp(2kˆ)  ⇥ 1  r2   (1  rr) (1  a)⇤ (1  a)exp(kˆ)
  ((1  a)exp(kˆ)  r) ⇥ 1  r2   (1  a) (1 rr)⇤
<
⇥
(r  r)exp(kˆ)   1  r2 + (1  rr) (1  a)⇤ (1  a)exp(kˆ).
Therefore, dkˆ⇤x/dkˆ < 0, if
⇥
(r  r)exp(kˆ)   1  r2 + (1  rr) (1  a)⇤ < 0.
This holds true, if
1 rr
r  r < exp(kˆ) <
 
1  r2   (1  rr) (1  a)
r  r .
The first inequality must hold so that kˆ > kˆ0. The second inequality can hold on
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the condition that a is sufficiently large; that is,
a > 1 
 
1  r2 
(1  rr) .
Proof of Proposition 1.4. A simple calculation leads to
dr1
dr
=
(exp (2kˆ)  1) (1  a) ⇥  (1  a) (exp (2kˆ)  1) + 2rexp (kˆ)   1+ r2 ⇤
[(1  a) (exp (2kˆ)  1)r+ exp (kˆ) (1  r2)]2 .
Let T1 =   (1  a) (exp (2kˆ)  1) + 2rexp (kˆ) 
 
1+ r2
 
. If and only if r <
(1  a)exp (kˆ), T1 decreases in kˆ and T1 < 0. In other words, dr1/dr < 0 for
any kˆ > ln(r/(1   a)). This implies that kˆ1 increases in r. Similarly, we can
show that r0 is an increasing function of r, and therefore kˆ0 increases in r.
Let l(kˆ) be the difference between the expected utility of adopting the strat-
egy kˆ⇤z = kˆ and that of kˆ⇤z = 0, when condition (1.20) holds. The cutoff kˆs is such
that l(kˆs) = 0. It implies that kˆ⇤z = kˆ if and only if
l(kˆ) =

1+
(1  r2)
exp(2kˆ)  1
 
r2   arr 
"  
1  r2 
exp(2kˆ)  1 + (1  a)
#
> 0.
Under this circumstance, it is straightforward to show the following facts:
l(kˆ) is strictly increasing in kˆ, limkˆ!0 l(kˆ) < 0 and limkˆ!+• l(kˆ) > 0. Therefore,
there is a unique kˆs > 0, such that l(kˆs) = 0, where
kˆs = ln
 s
(1  r2) (1 r2)
a (1  rr)  (1 r2) + 1
!
.
By noting that kˆs decreases in r, this proposition is shown.
Proof of Proposition 1.5. We show that social welfare can be decreasing in the
case where a + r > 1 and r˜ < r < 1. If kˆ⇤z = 0 or kˆ⇤z = kˆ, social welfare is
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calculated by the following
E [W s] =  
2641+ (1  a) fxfq⇣
fx
fq
+ 1
⌘2
375s2,
E [W s] =  
2641+ (1  a) fzfq⇣
fz
fq
+ 1
⌘2
375s2   a
⇣
fz
fq
⌘2
⇣
fz
fq
+ 1
⌘2s2z ,
when kˆ < kˆs, kˆ⇤z = 0 and dE [W (a,q)]/dkˆ > 0. To see this, we notice that fx
increases in kˆ and E [W s] increases in fx,
dE [W s]
dfx
=
s2
h
(1+ a) + (1  a) fxfq
i
⇣
1+ fxfq
⌘3
fq
> 0.
Similarly, when kˆs < kˆ < kˆ1, kˆ⇤z = kˆ and social welfare increases in kˆ. When
kˆ= kˆs, agents are indifferent of specialization in private or public signals, which
implies that fx = fz, and social welfare discontinuously decreases at kˆ = kˆs.
Because E [W s] monotonically increases in kˆ, when kˆ < kˆs, there must exist kˆa
and kˆb such that E [W s(kˆa)] > E [W s(kˆb)] and kˆa < kˆs < kˆb.
Proof of Proposition 1.6. Except in the case where a+ r> 1 and r˜<r< 1, we
can show that kˆ⇤x = kˆ0 and kˆ⇤z = 0, when kˆ = kˆ0. To show E [W s(kˆ0)] > E [Wms],
we only need to show f ⌘ E [W s(kˆ0)]  E [Wms] > 0, where
f =
1⇣
r
(r r) +
1
(1 a)(1 rr)
⌘   a r(r r)⇣
r
(r r) +
1
(1 a)(1 rr)
⌘2
  1⇣
r(1 r2)
(1 rr)(r r) +
1
1 a
⌘   a r(1 r2)(1 rr)(r r)⇣
r(1 r2)
(1 rr)(r r) +
1
1 a
⌘2 .
To provide a sufficient condition under which the inequality holds, we denote
f (a) = f1 (a) + f2 (a) ,
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where
f1 (a) =
✓
1
1  rr   1
◆
(1  a)2   a2 + 4a  2 ✓ rr  r
◆2
f2 (a) =
(1  a)2 rr
1  rr
"✓
1
1  rr   1
◆
(a  2)2 + 2
✓
1
1  rr   1
◆2
  2  1
1  rr
(2  a)2
(1  a)2
#
f1 (a) > 0 if and only if  a2 + 4a   2 > 0, or a > 2 
p
2. When r is suf-
ficiently low and close to r, rr r can be arbitrarily large and
1
1 rr is close to a
constant 11 r2 . Therefore, f1 (a) can be arbitrarily large and f2 (a) is close to a
constant. Moreover, it must hold that r < (1  a)exp(kˆ0) or,
(1  a)
r
>
r  r
1  rr .
This holds when r is low enough.
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Proof of Proposition 1.3, Part 2 of Claim 1. The following lemma is particularly
useful for our characterization.
Lemma 1.3. When the equilibrium is unique, the fraction of attention paid to
the public signal, i.e., kˆ⇤z/kˆ, strictly increases in kˆ if and only if 0< kˆ⇤z/kˆ < 1 and
kˆ⇤z
kˆ
  F (kˆ) < 0, (1.26)
where
F ⌘1
2
+
1
2
T
(1  a) (1  rr) (r  r) ·
1
1  (1 r2) (1 a)(1 rr)(r r)exp(kˆ)
· 1
exp (kˆ)  r1 a
,
T =(1  rr)a [(1  rr) (1  a)  r (r  r)] .
Proof. We re-write equation (1.18) as follows,
kˆ⇤z
kˆ
=
1
2
+
1
2 ln

(1 a)(1 rr)+(r r)exp(kˆ) (1 r2)
(1 a)(1 rr)exp(kˆ)+(r r) r(1 r2)
 
ln [exp (kˆ)]
. (1.27)
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Derive its derivativewith respect to exp(kˆ) andwe find that ∂(kˆ⇤z/kˆ)/∂exp (kˆ)>
0 if and only if the condition (1.26) holds.
We first show that in the case of r > 1, kˆ⇤z/kˆ monotonically decreases in kˆ,
when kˆ > kˆ1. There are three sub-cases.
Case 1: a< 1  r andr2
⇣
1 a+r2
(1 a)r+r ,
1
r
⌘
. We can verify that T< 0 and further
0> ln
✓
r
1  a
◆
> ln
  
1  r2   (1  a) (1  rr)
r  r
!
,
which implies that F (kˆ) is strictly increasing and approaches 1/2 from below
when kˆ approaches +•.
We can also show that kˆ⇤z/kˆ approaches 1/2 from above, because the second
term in (1.27) is positive when kˆ approaches +•, i.e.,
lim
kˆ!+• ln
"
(1  a) (1  rr) + (r  r)exp (kˆ)   1  r2 
(1  a) (1  rr)exp (kˆ) + (r  r) r (1  r2)
#
= ln
 r  r
(1  a) (1  rr)
 
> 0.
Further, the first part of Proposition 1.3 implies that limkˆ!kˆ+1 kˆ
⇤
z/kˆ = 1. We can
show that kˆ⇤z/kˆ   F (kˆ) > 0, for any kˆ > kˆ1, by constructing a contradiction.
Suppose there exists kˆ0 such that kˆ⇤z (kˆ0)/kˆ0 < F(kˆ0). Lemma 1.3 implies that it
must hold that kˆ⇤z/kˆ approaches 1/2 from below. A contradiction. This fact
further implies that kˆ⇤z/kˆ monotonically decreases, by using Lemma 1.3 again.
Case 2: a< 1  r andr2
⇣
1, 1 a+r
2
(1 a)r+r
⌘
. In this case, we can show that F (kˆ)
is strictly decreasing and approaches 1/2 from above, when kˆ approaches +•.
Further, it must hold that F(kˆ1)  1, that is because kˆ⇤z/kˆ must decrease, when
kˆ is slightly higher than kˆ1, according to the first part of Proposition 1.3.
Similar to the previous case, Lemma 1.3 implies that kˆ⇤z/kˆ   F (kˆ) cannot
cross zero from above; that is, kˆ⇤z/kˆ   F (kˆ) > 0 for any kˆ > kˆ1. In other words,
kˆ⇤z/kˆ decreases monotonically.
Case 3: The proof for the case where a > 1  r and r > 1 is similar.
We then establish that kˆ⇤z/kˆ can be either monotonically increasing or hump-
shaped when r < 1.
Case 1: a < 1   r and r 2  r,r . In this case, we can show that F(kˆ)
is monotonically decreasing and approaches 1/2 from above. The first part
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of Proposition 1.3 implies that limkˆ!kˆ+0 kˆ
⇤
z/kˆ = 0. Under this case, kˆ⇤z/kˆ ap-
proaches 1/2 from below because the second term in (1.27) is negative when
kˆ approaches +•, i.e.,
lim
kˆ!+• ln
"
(1  a) (1  rr) + (r  r)exp (kˆ)   1  r2 
(1  a) (1  rr)exp (kˆ) + (r  r) r (1  r2)
#
= ln
 r  r
(1  a) (1  rr)
 
< 0.
Using similar arguments in previous cases, we can show that kˆ⇤z/kˆ monotoni-
cally increases in kˆ.
Case 2: a 2 (0,1  r) and r 2 (r,1). This case differs from the previous
one in that kˆ⇤z/kˆ approaches 1/2 from above when kˆ!+•. Therefore, Lemma
1.3 implies that kˆ⇤z/kˆ must be increasing and then decreasing, i.e., it is hump-
shaped.
The proofs of the remaining cases are also similar.
Chapter 2
Ambiguity, Pessimism and Economic
Fluctuations1
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2.1. Introduction
Recessions are times with depressed market confidence and heightened diver-
gence in belief. Before the onset of any economic crisis, markets are quite con-
fident in the prospects of the economy and less diverged in their beliefs. When
the crisis steps in, market confidence plummets and belief divergence soars. In
the data, we proxymarket confidence by sentiment index inMichigan Survey of
Consumers and measure belief divergence by the cross-sectional dispersion of
real GDP forecasts in Survey of Professional Forecasters. Depicted in Figure 2.1,
over the last thirty years, all three recessions experienced by the US economy
feature large swings in both market confidence and belief divergence. Natural
questions of interests arise. Why the aggregate economy co-moves with market
confidence and belief divergence? What explains the strong negative correla-
tion between market confidence and belief divergence?
Figure 2.1. Market Confidence and Belief Divergence.
Note: The figure plots consumer sentiment index (red line) and cross-sectional dispersion of real
GDP forecasts by professional forecasters (dashed blue line) over the period 1987Q1-2014Q4.
Correlation is around  0.45 over the entire period. Both of the time series are bandpass-filtered
at frequencies 6-32 quarters and re-scaled. Consumer sentiment index is from Michigan Survey
of Consumers, and real GDP forecast data is from Survey of Professional Forecasters provided
by the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
Recent financial crisis highlights the importance of ambiguity2 in driving
fluctuations in asset prices and aggregate economy. Along the onset of the
crisis, a sequence of events, such as the BNP Paribas announcement, the Bear
Stearns rescue, the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers, etc., made agents start to
2Ambiguity refers to subjective uncertainty over probabilities due to lack of ex-ante informa-
tion to pin down a specific model for the economy in the course of decision making.
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doubt their “ways of thinking” over the economy. Hit by these unusual events,
agents felt increasingly hard to pin down a probability model for the evalua-
tion of the outlooks of the economy. In response, investors began to question
their asset pricing models, and firms began to suspect the models that were
used to estimate market demand for their products. To self-insure against these
doubts over models or increased ambiguity in more general, agents started to
behave pessimistically, either by fire-selling or by shrinking production. These
manifested as a drop in market confidence. On the other hand, these doubts
over models also made it increasingly difficult to coordinate each others’ be-
liefs. Inability to formalize a common model for the evaluation of the outlooks
of the economy raised up belief divergence. In a pure narrative sense, ambigu-
ity tends to be an important driving force in the background of co-movements
across market confidence, belief divergence, and aggregate economy.
To materialize this idea, we extend the standard theories with ambiguity
averse agents3, who are hit by shocks that fluctuate the amount of ambiguity
they perceived. The key feature of the paper is that ambiguity averse prefer-
ences are mathematically represented by the smooth model of ambiguity ax-
iomatized by Klibanoff, Marinacci, and Mukerji (2005, 2009), within which the
amount of ambiguity can be measured by the variance of the Normal prior
belief over the set of possible models. This is crucial since it allows us to de-
fine ambiguity shock as the time-variations in the prior variance over different
possible models in a Bayesian fashion. In the real world, whenever there pre-
sented increasing doubts, either by investors or by firms, over the underlying
models of the aggregate economy, we interpret it as a positive ambiguity shock.
Under the smooth model of ambiguity, we highlight the dual impacts of am-
biguity shock in driving not only confidence but also uncertainty. Widely ac-
knowledged in the decision science, ambiguity aversion results in pessimistic
decisions in the sense that agents behave as if they possess a pessimistic be-
lief over the set of possible models. Overweighting pessimistic models when
making decisions implies that pessimism over possible models gets amplified
in response to a mean-preserving spread in beliefs over possible models, i.e.,
a positive ambiguity shock. Market confidence drops due to amplified pes-
simism over models. On the other hand, a positive ambiguity shock makes
agents more uncertain over different models. In response, agents rely more on
3Agents being ambiguity averse means that they dislike ambiguity more than risk. Put it dif-
ferently, decision-makers prefer to know the specific probability distribution rather than being
ambiguous over it. Ambiguity aversion is natural in the first place since it conceptually differen-
tiates ambiguity from risk and is consistent with many pieces of experimental evidence dating
back to the celebrated Ellsberg paradox.
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their private information when making expectations manifesting the fact that
private information is more valuable in times with heightened “uncertainty”.
Therefore, belief divergence goes up.
Motivated by this dual impacts of ambiguity shock, we develop a novel
theory of ambiguity-driven business cycles that contributes to explain the co-
movements across market confidence, belief divergence, and aggregate econ-
omy.
Framework andMechanism. We formalize an otherwise standard real busi-
ness cycle model that additionally features (a) aggregate demand externalities;
(b) ambiguity averse agents (households, workers or firmmanagers) and finally
(c) incomplete information over ambiguous aggregate fundamentals.
In the model, firms differ in productivities, which consists of an aggregate
component as well as an idiosyncratic component. The average productivities
of all firms are ambiguous in the sense that the cross-sectional mean of idiosyn-
cratic components can be anything on the real-line. Firms have perfect knowl-
edge over own productivity but incomplete information over the ambiguous
average productivities of all other firms. The key thing here is that when mak-
ing output decision, firms need to make expectations over the average produc-
tivities of the other firms since it is the sufficient statistics of own demand con-
ditions under aggregate demand externalities. Since firms are operated for the
interests of the ambiguity averse households, firms behave as if they are am-
biguity averse by themselves. Therefore, output decisions are made as if firms
possess a pessimistic belief over models when making expectations over de-
mand conditions. Pessimism at the firm level means that models with a lower
demand on average are perceived to bemore likely than optimistic models with
a higher demand on average. In response to a positive ambiguity shock, firms
become more uncertain across different possible models of demand conditions.
Such a mean-preserving spread of belief over models amplifies the degree of
pessimism of firms resulting in a depressed expectation over own demand con-
ditions. At the aggregate level, there would be an increase in the economy-wide
degree of pessimism, which is interpreted as depressedmarket confidence.
Also, firms rely on the observation of own productivity form expectations
over demand. This is because individual firm productivity equals to the aver-
age productivities of all other firms plus an idiosyncratic shock. In this sense,
the observation of own productivity serves as a private information over aver-
age productivities of all other firms or own demand conditions. When form-
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ing expectation over demand, firms face trade-offs between the use of prior
and private information. To note that, we formulate ambiguity shock as the
shock to the variance of prior belief over possible models. A positive ambiguity
shock results in a less informative prior information over demand conditions
from the perspective of firms. Hence it incentivizes more use of private infor-
mation in forming expectations over demand. Therefore, firm-level output re-
sponds more to private information, which further implies that aggregate out-
put responds more to average productivities of all firms. From the perspective
of the professional forecasters who are required to submit a personal forecast
over aggregate output, this indicates that there are more to be estimated. Also,
following the same arguments as in the case of firms, professional forecasters
would also usemore of their private information tomake forecast over the aver-
age productivities of the economy. In combine, output forecast of professional
forecasters respond more to private information, which heightens belief diver-
gence.
Finally, firms hire less labor and cut down output in response to depressed
expectation over own demand conditions, which eventually leads to a drop
in aggregate output. From this perspectives, ambiguity shock in this paper is
nothing more than a particular formulation of aggregate demand shock.
To note that, incomplete information is crucial in driving all these results in
our model. Technically, this is because if the information is complete, all agents
including firms and households can perfectly coordinate not only their beliefs
but also their actions. Common knowledge of the economy implies no hetero-
geneity in beliefs hence zero belief divergence. Also, all firms will have not only
perfect knowledge of own productivity but also perfect knowledge of own de-
mand conditions. Therefore, there exists no room for ambiguity shock having
any impact on market confidence, belief divergence or aggregate economy. The
broader insights are that incomplete information helps us to accommodate a
situation where ambiguity is mostly over others’ productivity rather than own
productivity. Alternatively, ambiguity is mostly over the short-run outlooks of
the economy rather than long-run perspectives, which is crucial in understand-
ing the aggregate demand shock nature of ambiguity shock.
Results. The paper starts with a simple business cycle model that abstracts
out capital accumulation that allows us to deliver a couple of analytical results
that clarifies the main mechanism of the paper. We demonstrate that a posi-
tive ambiguity shock generates lower market confidence hence lower aggregate
output and larger belief divergence if agents inside the economy are ambiguity
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averse and the information is incomplete. Therefore, we conclude that fluctu-
ations in market confidence, belief divergence and aggregate economy are the
many shades of ambiguity shock.
At the core of these results are the interplay between incomplete informa-
tion and dual impacts of ambiguity shocks. On the one hand, a positive am-
biguity shock makes agents (firms and households) believe that the aggregate
fundamental becomes more volatile and on the other hand, aggregate funda-
mental is turning bad when they are ambiguity averse. With the existence of
incomplete information, the former provides increased incentives for the use of
private information both in making forecasts and decisions resulting in height-
ened belief divergence and the latter translates into increased pessimism over
aggregate demand resulting in depressedmarket confidence. Aggregate output
plummets since all firms believe their demand is turning bad and in response
cut down output.
We deliver such dual impacts of ambiguity shock by a game theoretic inter-
pretation of the equilibrium, which resembles the idea in Angeletos and La’O
(2009) such that any business cycle models with incomplete information can be
transformed into a beauty contest. This game-theoretic interpretation allows us
to clarify the role of incomplete information in driving aggregate fluctuations.
It turns out that incomplete information acts as an amplification mechanism
for ambiguity. In the extreme case when there presents complete information,
ambiguity shock has no impact at the aggregate level. Finally, to note that our
aggregate demand channel relies on incomplete information but not on any
forms of nominal rigidities. Therefore, aggregate fluctuations generated by am-
biguity shock are consistent with the fact that most of the aggregate fluctua-
tions observed in the US data are disconnected from productivity or inflation4.
Our novel theory of ambiguity-driven business cycles features non-inflationary
demand-driven aggregate fluctuations.
We further conduct a couple of quantitative evaluations of the impacts of
ambiguity shock within the dynamic RBC framework. Ambiguity shock is
shown to be able to generate aggregate co-movements in output, consumption,
hours and investment without commensurate movements in labor productiv-
4Angeletos, Collard, and Dellas (2016a) identifies a business cycle factor, which is a one-
dimensional summary of aggregate movements. The business cycle factor turns out to discon-
nect from technology or inflation. Further see Gali (1999) and Basu, Fernald, and Kimball (2006)
for the former point. And Mavroeidis, Plagborg-Møller, and Stock (2014) for a survey of the
empirical evidence on NKPC that corresponds to the latter point, namely inflation puzzle. Also,
see Beaudry and Portier (2014) for a couple of evidence that US business cycles are mainly non-
inflationary demand-driven.
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ity similar to confidence shock alias Angeletos, Collard, and Dellas (2016b) and
Huo and Takayama (2015). This further allows us to interpret ambiguity shock
as aggregate demand shock quantitatively. What drive the co-movements in
quantities are fluctuations in the degree of pessimism over the short run out-
looks of the economy, i.e., fluctuations in market confidence due to ambigu-
ity shock. The model is capable of generating empirically plausible counter-
cyclical labor wedge. In this sense, we can alternatively interpret ambiguity
shock as the counter-cyclical tax on labor supply or pro-cyclical subsidy on
labor demand. Moreover, quantitatively the model can capture cyclical be-
haviors in cross-sectional dispersions in output forecasts indicated by the SPF
dataset. Finally, the estimatedmarket confidence closely tracks Sentiment Index
in Michigan Survey of Consumer manifesting the fact that our theory captures
movements in market confidence quantitatively.
Contributions. The contributions of our paper are four folds. First of all,
we propose a theory of ambiguity-driven business cycles that is capable of
generating non-inflationary demand-driven aggregate fluctuations. We com-
plement the current literature with an alternative formulation of aggregate de-
mand shock. Our paper further extends the conventional wisdom in under-
standing the co-movements across confidence, uncertainty, and aggregate econ-
omy by arguing that these can be the endogenous outcomes of ambiguity shock
not only qualitatively but also quantitatively.
Secondly, we also contribute to the ambiguity literature with a Bayesian for-
mulation of ambiguity shock based on the smooth model of ambiguity. Con-
ceptually, it differs with the existing literature in the sense that it is a shock to
the amount of ambiguity rather than a shock to agents’ taste over ambiguity as
in Bhandari, Borovicka, and Ho (2016) or a mix of both as in Ilut and Schneider
(2014). The unique insight for our Bayesian formulation of ambiguity shock
that cannot be shared with the others is that it induces endogenous fluctuations
in measured uncertainty, such as dispersion measures. Our paper further con-
tributes to the literature with a particular channel to let second-moment shock,
i.e., ambiguity shock, have the first-moment impact. Such a channel relies on
the interplay between ambiguity aversion and incomplete information rather
than the non-convex adjustment costs as in the theory of uncertainty shock.
Finally, wemake onemethodological contribution by the provision of a link-
age between (a) business cycle models featuring ambiguity aversion and in-
complete information and (b) games of incomplete information with ambiguity
aversion. The game theoretic interpretation of the business cycle model allows
2.2. RELATED LITERATURE 51
us to build the key economic intuition behind main mechanisms of our paper
and to deliver more insights into the interplay between ambiguity, ambigu-
ity aversion, and incomplete information. It turns out incomplete information
acts as an amplification mechanism for ambiguity when agents are ambiguity
averse.
Layout. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the
literature. Section 3 sets up the simple model without capital. Section 4 char-
acterizes the equilibrium by a formal definition as well as a set of optimality
conditions. Then in Section 5, impacts of ambiguity shocks are closely stud-
ied within the simple model without capital. Section 6 sets up a dynamic RBC
model where a couple of quantitative evaluations are conducted. Finally, Sec-
tion 7 concludes.
2.2. Related Literature
This paper is related to the literature of expectation-driven business cycles in-
cluding (a) the news shock literature, Beaudry and Portier (2004,2006) and also
Jaimovich and Rebelo (2009); (b) noise shock literature, Lorenzoni (2009), Barsky
and Sims (2012) and Blanchard, L’Huillier, and Lorenzoni (2013); (c) confidence
shock literature, Angeletos and La’O (2013), Angeletos, Collard, and Dellas
(2016b) and Huo and Takayama (2015); (d) misspecification shock literature,
Bhandari, Borovicka, and Ho (2016); (e) non-bayesian ambiguity shock litera-
ture, Ilut and Schneider (2014) and Ilut and Saijo (2016) and finally (f) uncer-
tainty shock literature, Bloom (2009), Bidder and Smith (2012) and Bloom, Floe-
totto, Jaimovich, Saporta-Eksten, and Terry (2016). We contribute this line of
literature with an alternative “exotic” shock, i.e., Bayesian formulation of ambi-
guity shock, which generates not only aggregate fluctuations but also endoge-
nous co-movements across market confidence and belief divergence within the
lens of the business cycles.
Our theory of ambiguity-driven business cycles, on the one hand, directly
connects to the theory of confidence shock alias Angeletos and La’O (2013),
Angeletos, Collard, and Dellas (2016b) and Huo and Takayama (2015) in gener-
ating animal-spirit-like aggregate fluctuations, at the core of which is the inter-
play between ambiguity aversion and incomplete information. In response to a
positive ambiguity shock, firms behave as if their beliefs over average produc-
tivities of the others are depressed but beliefs over own productivity, on which
they have perfect information, are unaffected. In this sense, we provide amicro-
foundation of the heterogeneous prior setup in Angeletos, Collard, and Dellas
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(2016b). More importantly, our theory of ambiguity shock has the additional
ability to capture fluctuations in belief divergence.
On the other hand, our paper also relates to the theory of uncertainty shock
alias Bloom (2009) and Bloom, Floetotto, Jaimovich, Saporta-Eksten, and Terry
(2016) in generating time-varyingmeasures of uncertainty, specifically for belief
divergence. Under our Bayesian formulation, the nature of ambiguity shock is
a second-moment “model uncertainty” shock, a positive realization of which
incentivizes more use of private information for agents when making output
forecasts hence heightened uncertainty. In the broader context, we share the
same research spirit with uncertainty shock literature in identifying a particu-
lar mechanism that enables second-moment shocks to have first-moment im-
pacts. Uncertainty shock literature relies on non-convex adjustment costs while
we rely on the interplay between ambiguity aversion and incomplete informa-
tion. However, as noted by Angeletos, Collard, and Dellas (2016b), uncertainty
shocks as in Bloom (2009) and Bloom, Floetotto, Jaimovich, Saporta-Eksten, and
Terry (2016) “can only generate realistic aggregate co-movements through in-
ducing strong pro-cyclical movements in aggregate TFP”. From this perspec-
tive, it is an alternative formulation of aggregate productivity shock. While in
our paper, ambiguity shock is by nature aggregate demand shock. A notable
exception in the uncertainty shock literature is Bidder and Smith (2012), who
demonstrates that interaction between robust preference and stochastic volatil-
ity generates animal spirits fluctuations. We differentiate with them in the un-
derlying preference structure and also with the transmission mechanism from
animal spirit to aggregate fluctuations. They rely on news shock channel while
we rely on the confidence channel.
There are some other works that study the implications of ambiguity aver-
sion in the context of business cycle models, but with the different mathematical
representation of the preferences. For example, Ilut and Schneider (2014) and
Bhandari, Borovicka, and Ho (2016). Apart from the above-mentioned differ-
ence in the ability to capture fluctuations in belief divergence or measured un-
certainty in general, our paper differs with both of the above-mentioned works
in a few other aspects. Ilut and Schneider (2014) uses multiple priors prefer-
ence axiomatized by Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) to model ambiguity aver-
sion, and ambiguity shock is modeled in a classical statistics fashion. Bhandari,
Borovicka, and Ho (2016) uses robust preference proposed by Hansen and Sar-
gent (2001a, 2001b) and focus on time-varying concerns for model misspecifi-
cation, which can be understood as time-variations in the degree of ambiguity
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aversion. While in our paper, ambiguity aversion is modeled by (recursive)
smooth model of ambiguity axiomatized by Klibanoff, Marinacci, and Mukerji
(2005, 2009) and learning over models features smooth rule updating proposed
by Hanany and Klibanoff (2009) to ensure dynamic consistency. Our Bayesian
formulation of ambiguity shock is a pure shock to the amount of ambiguity
rather than a shock to agents’ taste over ambiguity as in Bhandari, Borovicka,
and Ho (2016) or a mix of both as inIlut and Schneider (2014). Our concept of
ambiguity shock is consistent with empirical studies on the recent financial cri-
sis that demonstrate that sudden increases in credit spreads observed during
the 2007-2008 crisis are mainly due to the increase in the amount of ambiguity
rather than the increase in agents’ taste over ambiguity5.
A notable exception in this area is Ilut and Saijo (2016). In their paper, am-
biguity averse preference is represented by the multiple priors preference ax-
iomatized by Epstein and Schneider (2003). Ambiguity aversion is modeled as
an amplification mechanism of business cycles rather than devices for exoge-
nous variations. In their paper, recessions are periods of less learning. With
an exogenous entropy constrain, reduced learning translates into a larger range
of models. Therefore, there features endogenous counter-cyclical ambiguity.
They focus on the aggregate implications of their model and succeed in cap-
turing aggregate fluctuation in the data. However, their model implications
for dispersion measures are ambiguous. Less learning in recession implies less
use of private information when making forecasts. In most of the cases, this
implies lower cross-sectional dispersions either in output forecasts or realized
outputs. We differ with them in generating the right co-movement pattern in
cross-sectional dispersion measures.
Ambiguity averse preferences, especially recursive multiple prior prefer-
ences, have been intensively used in the literature to generate asymmetric re-
sponses of aggregate variables to aggregate shocks in recessions and boom. For
example Epstein and Schneider (2008), Ilut (2012), Ilut, Kehrig, and Schneider
(2016), Baqaee (2017) and Zhang (2017). These papers assume there presents
ambiguity over precisions of various sources of information to provide agents
with state-dependent subjective belief over precisions of related information.
Then negative realizations of shocks are associated with a subjective belief of
higher precisions hence increased responses to shocks in bad times. In our pa-
per, ambiguity is over the first-moment of shocks but ambiguity shock is of
second-moments, which is the unique feature of the smooth model of ambigu-
5See Boyarchenko (2012) for more details.
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ity. The interplay between ambiguity aversion and incomplete information in
our paper also generates counter-cyclical responses to aggregate (productivity)
shock. This is because a positive ambiguity shock incentivizes the use of private
information in making expectations hence in making output decision. Eventu-
ally, aggregate output responds more to aggregate productivity shock. In sum,
as far as we know, we are the only paper in the literature that studies joint im-
plications of ambiguity aversion and incomplete information within the lens of
business cycles.
Our paper also relates to the theory of beauty contest pioneered by Mor-
ris and Shin (2002) then extended by Angeletos and Pavan (2007). We further
extend the theory by allowing for ambiguity averse preference. Finally, in a
broader context, our paper is also related to those studying coordination games
with model uncertainty, such as Chen, Lu, and Suen (2016) and Chen and Suen
(2016).
2.3. The Simple Model without Capital
In this section, we construct a static general equilibrium model in the vein of
Angeletos and La’O (2009). The model embeds three key features in an oth-
erwise standard real business cycle environment: (a) aggregate demand exter-
nalities, (b) incomplete information over the ambiguous aggregate state of the
economy and finally (c) smooth model of ambiguity together with ambiguity
shock. We first describe the physical environment along with the uncertainty
structure and the evolving of information sets of all agents. We then specify the
preferences and interim belief systems. Finally, we close up this section by a
couple of remarks and interpretations of the setup.
2.3.1. Physical Environment, Shocks and Information Structure
Geography, markets and timing. The economy consists of a continuum of is-
lands, indexed by j 2 J = [0,1] and a mainland. On each island j, there exists a
continuum of firms, indexed by (i, j) 2 I ⇥ J = [0,1]2 and a continuum of work-
ers, indexed by (m, j) 2 M⇥ J = [0,1]2. Island firms and workers interact with
each other in the locally competitive labor market for the production of dif-
ferentiated island commodities indexed by j. These commodities are traded
in a centralized market operated on the mainland, where a continuum of con-
sumers, indexed by h 2 H = [0,1] and a large number of competitive final good
producers inhabit. We assume that consumer h and a continuum of workers
{(h, j) ; j 2 J} constitute a large household indexed by h 2 H, who owns a con-
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tinuum of firms {(h, j) ; j 2 J}. By doing so, we ensure the existence of a repre-
sentative household at the mainland and a continuum of representative firms
and workers on every island. This is because, as it will become evident later,
there exist no heterogeneities, either in fundamental or in information, within
an island.
We focus on the static setup in this section. There is only one period, say
period t, which is decomposed into three stages. At stage zero, period t shocks
are realized. At stage 1, island-specific competitive labor markets open up. The
representative household sends out workers to each islands. On island j, firms
make labor demand decisions and symmetrically, workers make labor supply
decisions on the basis of incomplete information over the ambiguous aggregate
state of the economy. At stage 2, on the mainland, the centralized commodities
market opens up. All uncertainty, either risk or ambiguity, is resolved. Final
good producers produce. And the representative household makes consump-
tion decisions upon receiving all the transfers from workers and firms on the
basis of perfect information.
Households. The utility of the representative household is given by:
C1 gt   1
1  g   c
Z
J
N1+ej,t
1+ e
dj
where g is the relative risk aversion and e is the inverse Frisch elasticity of labor
supply. To note that, in our static setup, g also controls for the income effects of
labor supply. The corresponding budget constraint of household is such that
PtCt =
Z
J
Wj,tNj,tdj+
Z
J
Z
I
Pi,j,td (i, j)
where Pt denotes the price of final goods,
R
J Wj,tNj,tdj denotes the total labor
income and finally
R
J
R
IPi,j,td (i, j) denotes the total realized firm profits.
Island firms. Island j firms use labor only for the production of island j
commodity. The production function of firm (i, j) is given by
Yj,t = Aj,tN1 ai,j,t (2.1)
where Aj,t is the island-specific productivity and the realized profit is given by
Pi,j,t = Pj,tYi,j,t  Wj,tNi,j,t
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where Wj,t denotes the nominal wage on island j in period t and Pj,t denotes
the market price of island j commodity to be determined at stage 2 when the
centralized markets opens up. Since it is assumed that it is the representative
household who owns the firm, any realized profits are to be transferred to the
consumer for the purchase of final goods for consumption. Therefore, in the
absence of any uncertainty concerns, island j firms care about the consumer
valuation over its profits given by
u0 (Ct)
Pt
Pi,j,t
where Pt is the price of final goods normalized to 1.
Final-good producers. The competitive final-good sector employs a CES
production technology given by
Yt =
✓Z
J
Y
q 1
q
j,t dj
◆ q
q 1
where q is elasticities of substitution among island commodities that controls
the strength of aggregate demand externalties. Demand function for island j
commodity is, therefore, given by
Yj,t =
✓Pj,t
Pt
◆ q
Yt
where Pt ⌘
⇣R
J P
1 q
j,t di
⌘ 1
1 q denotes the price of final goods normalized to 1.
Productivity and ambiguity shocks. Aggregate productivity at ⌘ logAt
follows a Normal distribution with mean 0 and variance s2z
at ⇠ N
⇣
0,s2z
⌘
Island-specific productivity, defined by aj,t ⌘ logAj,t, equals to aggregate
productivity plus some idiosyncratic productivity shock ij,t:
aj,t = at + ij,t
Idiosyncratic productivity shocks ij,t are assumed to be i.i.d normally distributed
with mean wt and variance s2i . Objectively, the cross-sectional mean of idiosyn-
cratic productivity shock is zero, i.e. wt = 0. However, agents inside the econ-
omy cannot fully “understand” it. They possess some ambiguity over it. Specif-
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ically, they believe that anything on the real-line can be a potential candidate for
wt. And they possess a common zero-mean6 Normal prior belief over wt 2R:
wt ⇠ N
 
0, eyt
 
with
where yt measures the amount of ambiguity perceived by the agents7. We as-
sume that yt is chosen by nature such that
yt = y+ tt with tt ⇠ N
 
0,s2t
 
(2.2)
where y denotes the amount of ambiguity perceived by all agents at the am-
biguous steady state8. And we interpret tt as ambiguity shock, which is Nor-
mally distributed with mean 0 and variance s2t .
Information structure. Denote It,0, Ij,t,1 and It,2 as the information sets
that are available to all agents at stage 0 of period t, are only available to island
j agents at stage 1 of period t and are available to all agents at stage 2 of period
t, respectively. We define these information sets by
It,0 = {yt} Ij,t,1 = It,0 [
 
aj,t
 It,2 = [jIj,t,1 [ {zt} (2.3)
There are a couple of implicit assumptions behind this information structure.
First of all, information is symmetric within each island but is asymmetric across
islands. Secondly, ambiguity shock tt happens at the beginning of each period
t. Thirdly, at stage 1 of period t, island j productivity aj,t is only accessible for
island j agents. In this sense, aj,t serves as the private information of island j
agents over the average productivity
R
J aj,tdj, which is ambiguous. Therefore,
labor supply and demand decisions on each island are made under incomplete
information over the ambiguous aggregate state of the economy. Fourthly, It,2
contains the complete set of local information that is originally dispersed at
stage 1. This is justifiable since commodities prices or transfers perfectly reveal
the island-specific productivity that is previously dispersed at stage 1. Fifthly,
6The objective model wt are assumed to be inside the set of possible models of all agents.
By assuming this, we rule out any mis-specification concerns and focus on ambiguity. See
Peter Hansen and Marinacci (2016) for a detailed discussion of the differences between mis-
specification and ambiguity
7Maccheroni, Marinacci, and Ruffino (2013) proposes to use the variance of the ex-ante ex-
pected utility of a particular model to quantify the amount of ambiguity in general information
structure, which is shown to be consistent with a quadratic approximation akin to Arrow-Pratt
approximation. Our measure of the amount of ambiguity is consistent with theirs ordinally un-
der Normality.
8Ambiguous steady state refers to the state the economy converges to in the absence of any
shocks but taking into account of the existence of ambiguity.
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all uncertainty, either risk (state uncertainty over at) or ambiguity (model uncer-
tainty over wt) is resolved at stage 2 of period t. Hence consumption decisions
are made under perfect information.9
We close the description of the physical environment, shocks and informa-
tion structure by the timeline of our model in Figure 2.1.
Stage 0
It,0 = { t}
Nature generates
at and {aj,t; j 2 (0, 1)}.
Ambiguity  t realizes.
Stage 1
Ij,t,1 = It,0 [ {aj,t}
Island j firms and workers observe aj,t,
and make local labor
supply and demand decisions.
Stage 2
It,2 = [jIj,t,1 [ {⇣t}
Household observes
nR
j aj,tdj, ⇣t
o
and makes consumption decisions Ct.
Final goods producers produce.
Figure 2.1. Timeline for Period t
2.3.2. Preferences and Interim Belief Systems
All agents inside the economy are ambiguity averse in the sense that they dis-
like ambiguity more than risk. Ambiguity averse preferences can be math-
ematically represented by the smooth model of ambiguity first proposed by
Klibanoff, Marinacci, and Mukerji (2005), which features a separation between
the amount of ambiguity (characteristics of subjective belief) and degree of am-
biguity aversion (characteristics of decisionmakers’ tastes). Such a separation is
appealing because onlywith it, we can seriously study the impacts of ambiguity
shock upon controlling for decision makers’ taste over it. It is widely acknowl-
edged that Bayesian updating is only dynamic consistent under expected utility
preferences. To ensure dynamic consistency across stages within a period, we
employ the smooth rule of updating, which is a re-weighted Bayesian updating
rule proposed in Hanany and Klibanoff (2009)10.
At stage 2, when all uncertainty is resolved, the representative household’s
preferences are represented by a standard utility function. In what follows, we
carefully specify the preferences and interim belief systems for the representa-
tive household at stage 1 of period t and formulate the stage 1 workers’ and
firms’ problems when there features incomplete information is over the am-
biguous fundamentals.
9The assumption that all period t uncertainty resolves at the second stage of period t is in
some sense ad-hoc to ensure tractability. However, most of the key messages delivered in this
paper do not rely on this particular assumption on information structure.
10See Appendix for a discussion over dynamic consistency
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Preference of the representative household at stage 1. At stage 1, pref-
erence of the representative household is represented by the smooth model of
ambiguity proposed in Klibanoff, Marinacci, and Mukerji (2005). The corre-
sponding island j workers’ problem is such that
max
Nj,t
Z
R
f
 
Ewtj,t,1
"
C1 gt   1
1  g   c
Z
J
N1+ej,t
1+ e
dj
#! ef hj,t,1 (wt)dwt (2.4)
s.t. PtCt =
Z
J
Wj,tNj,tdj+
Z
J
Z
I
Pi,j,td (i, j) (2.5)
where the island j workers decide how much labor Nj,t to supply into island-
specific competitive labor market given nominal wageWj,t.
Here f (x) is some strictly increasing and concave function, whose curva-
ture captures decision makers’ taste over ambiguity, i.e., degree of ambiguity
aversion and Ewtj,t,1 [·] denotes the mathematical expectation conditioned on It,1
under a particular model wt for the cross-sectional mean of idiosyncratic pro-
ductivity shock wt. And ef hj,t,1 (wt) stands for the probability density function of
interim belief of island jworkers over period t ambiguity wt. It is nothing more
than the posterior belief over possible models wt, which follows smooth rule of
updating
ef hj,t,1 (wt) µ f
0
✓
Ewtj,t,0

C1 gt  1
1 g   c
R
J
N1+ej,t
1+e dj
 ◆
f0
✓
Ewtj,t,1

C1 gt  1
1 g   c
R
J
N1+ej,t
1+e dj
 ◆
| {z }
Weights
f
 
aj,t|wt
 
ft (wt)| {z }
Bayesian Kernel
(2.6)
Here f
 
aj,t|wt
 
is the conditional probability density function of aj,t under a
particular model wt, which is the Normal density with mean wt and variance
s2z + s
2
i , and ft (wt) stands for the period t prior belief density over wt, which is
the Normal density with mean 0 and variance eyt .
Relative to the standard Bayesian updating, the smooth rule putsmoreweight
to the model that provides higher marginal incentive to act ex-ante (at stage 0)
when comparing to its ex-post (at stage 2) counterparts:
f0
 
Ewtt,0
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C1 gt   1
1  g   c
Z
J
N1+ej,t
1+ e
dj
#!
> f0
 
Ewtt,2
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#!
Through re-weighting in interim belief, incentives to act in ex-ante (at stage
0) and in ex-post (at stage 2) can be aligned with each other, which leads to
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dynamic consistency across stages within a period.
Firm problem at stage 1. Firm problem can be formulated as follows:
max
Ni,j,t
Z
R
f
 
Ewtj,t,1
"
C gt
Pt
 
Pj,tYi,j,t  Wj,tNi,j,t
 #! ef fj,t,1 (wt)dwt (2.7)
subject to the production function of island j firms (2.1). The firm decides how
much labor to hire by taking nominal wageWj,t as given and by making expec-
tation over its terms of trade Pj,t to be determined at stage 2 by
Yj,t ⌘
Z
I
Yi,j,tdi =
✓Pj,t
Pt
◆ q
Yt (2.8)
Interim belief systems of island j firms follows an extended smooth rule of
updating given by
ef fj,t,1 (wt) µ f
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(2.9)
Unlike the standard smooth rule of updating, firms’ incentives to act are not
aligned in a pure ex-ante versus ex-post sense. Instead, the proposed extended
smooth rule of updating aligns incentives to act of the representative household
in ex-ante with that of the firms in ex-post. This ensures dynamic consistency
from the perspective of the representative household. That is if we allowed the
household to make ex-ante contingency plans of production for island firms,
the contingency plans are to be respected ex-post by firms when it is their turn
to move.
To note that, we formulate the firms’ problem in a way that the firms are
ambiguity averse by themselves. We can justify the formulation of firms’ prob-
lem by arguing that firms’ are maximizing the shareholder value. Therefore,
firms behave as if they are ambiguity averse by themselves and share the same
belief with their shareholders when evaluating the marginal benefit of labor
demand. The additional concavity introduced by the f function manifests the
former point, and the extended smooth rule of updating takes care the latter.
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Therefore, we can alternatively formulate the firms’ problem by
max
Ni,j,t
Z
R
Ewtj,t
⇥
SDFt
 
Pj,tYi,j,t  Wj,tNi,j,t
 ⇤
f j,t,1 (wt)dwt (2.10)
where the stochastic discount factor SDFt is given by
SDFt ⌘ f0
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Here the stochastic discount factor takes cares not only households’ risk atti-
tude C
 g
Pt but also ambiguity attitude f
0
✓
Ewtj,t,0

C1 gt  1
1 g   c
R
J
N1+ej,t
1+e dj
 ◆
. The two
formulations (2.7) and (2.10) are isomorphic to each other.
To close up the description of the model, we assume that f (x) takes the con-
stant absolute ambiguity aversion (CAAA) form for simplicity and tractability:
Assumption 2.1. (CAAA) We assume f (x) =   1l e lx where l   0 measures
degree of ambiguity aversion of all agents.
2.3.3. Remarks and Interpretations
We conclude this section by some remarks and interpretations on the three key
features of our model that have been listed at the beginning of this section.
1. Ambiguity is introduced into the model in the form of the cross-sectional
mean of idiosyncratic productivity shock. But this does not mean there is any
ambiguity over local economic conditions. Instead, firms and workers on is-
land j have the perfect understanding of own island productivity, but an incom-
plete and ambiguous understanding of average productivity of all other islandsR
J aj,tdj. This is because from the perspective of island j agents, cross-sectional
mean of idiosyncratic productivity shock wt can be regarded as some tempo-
rary aggregate productivity shocks. Therefore, if local economic decisions are
made solely depending on expectations over local economic conditions, output
or labor will not respond to ambiguity shock at all11. This is the exact reason
why we need aggregate demand externalities.
2. In our model, with aggregate demand externalities, incomplete and am-
biguous information over the average productivity of all other islands
R
J aj,tdj
11There are still some inter-temporal impact of ambiguity shock on consumption-saving trade-
offs. But this would, in general, imply no aggregate co-movements, which is the sentence to
death for any business cycle model.
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can be translated into incomplete and ambiguous information over own de-
mand conditions. We show in later sections that under the smooth model of
ambiguity and the smooth rule of updating, fluctuations in the amount of am-
biguity, i.e., ambiguity shock tt, generate fluctuations in island j agents’ belief
over local demand conditions, which eventually maps into aggregate fluctua-
tions. In this sense, we can formally interpret our ambiguity shock as a particu-
lar formulation of aggregate demand shocks. This differentiates our paper with
Ilut and Schneider (2014), where ambiguity shocks are designed to be some
form of news shocks about future productivity.
3. Ambiguity shock tt in our model is, by design, a second-moment shock.
This is the primary reason we can generate fluctuations in belief divergence,
i.e., cross-sectional dispersion of ex-ante output forecast. The key question here
is whether or not such a second-moment shock can generate the first-moment
impact at the aggregate level. The answer is yes if we have the smooth model
of ambiguity together with the smooth rule of updating. From this perspective,
we share the same spirit with Bloom (2009) and Bloom, Floetotto, Jaimovich,
Saporta-Eksten, and Terry (2016) in identifying possible mechanisms that en-
able the second-moment shocks to have first-moment impacts12.
2.4. Equilibrium Characterization
In this section, we first define the equilibrium of the model and then derive a
set of optimality conditions that jointly describe the equilibrium allocations and
beliefs of all agents. Finally, we demonstrate how to characterize the conditional
log-normal equilibrium associated with these optimality conditions.
2.4.1. Equilibrium Definition
Definition 2.1 (Equilibrium). An equilibrium consists of a set of
• allocations
n 
Ni,j,t,Yi,j,t
 
(i,j)2J ,
 
Nj,t
 
j2J ,Yt
o
;
• factors and commodities prices
n 
Wj,t
 
j2J ,
 
Pj,t
 
j2J ,Pt
o
;
• information sets
n
It,0,
 Ij,t,1 j2J ,It,2o;
• exogenous shocks
n
tt,zt,
 
ij,t
 
j2J
o
;
12In Bloom (2009) and Bloom, Floetotto, Jaimovich, Saporta-Eksten, and Terry (2016), the ex-
istence of non-convex adjustment costs generates the real value of wait-and-see when “uncer-
tainty” (risk in its nature) goes up, which has first moment impact on firms hiring and investment
decisions.
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• and finally interim beliefs over the set of possible models
nef hj,t,1 (wt) , ef fj,t,1 (wt)oj2J
such that:
• Information sets
n
It,0,
 Ij,t,1 j2J ,It,2o are defined in (2.30)
• At stage 1, given factors and commodities prices
n 
Wj,t
 
j2J ,
 
Pj,t
 
j2J ,Pt
o
and
the interim beliefs over the set of possible models
nef hj,t,1 (wt) , ef fj,t,1 (wt)oj2J ,  Nj,t 
solves the workers’ problem (2.4) and
 
Ni,j,t,Yi,j,t
 
(i,j)2J solves the firms’ problem
(2.7)
• Interim beliefs are such that: ef hj,t,1 (wt) is given by (2.6) and ef fi,j,t,1 (wt) is given
by (2.9).
• Market clears for island-specific labor marketsZ
I
Ni,j,tdi = Nj,t
• Market clears for island commodities
Z
I
Yi,j,tdj ⌘ Yj,t =
✓Pj,t
Pt
◆ q
Yt (2.11)
with
Yt =
✓Z
J
Y
q 1
q
j,t dj
◆ q
q 1
where the price of final goods Pt ⌘
⇣R
J P
1 q
j,t di
⌘1/(1 q)
is normalized to 1.
• Market clears for final good
Yt = Ct
2.4.2. Optimality Conditions
We can characterize the equilibrium with a set of optimality conditions. De-
tailed derivations can be found in Appendix.
First of all, within island j labor market, optimal labor supply is governed
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by the following condition
cNej,t =Wj,t
Z
R
Ewtj,t,1
⇥
u0 (Ct)
⇤ ef j,t,1 (wt)dwt (2.12)
Workers on island j equate stage 1 valuation of the marginal benefit of labor
(RHS) with marginal disutility of labor. On the other side of the labor market,
optimal labor demand condition is given by
Wj,t
Z
R
Ewtj,t,1
⇥
u0 (Ct)
⇤ ef j,t,1 (wt)dwt = ✓ZR Ewtj,t,1 ⇥u0 (Ct)Pj,t⇤ ef j,t,1 (wt)dwt
◆✓
(1  a) Yj,t
Nj,t
◆
(2.13)
Firms on island j equate stage 1 valuation of the marginal cost of labor (LHS)
with the marginal benefit (RHS). Unlike standard expected utility preferences,
ambiguity aversion implies that when evaluating marginal effects at stage 1 of
period t, firms andworkers on island j employs a distorted posterior belief over
the set of possible models given by
ef j,t,1 (wt) µ f0 Ewtj,t,0
"
C1 gt   1
1  g   c
Z
J
N1+ej,t
1+ e
dj
#!
| {z }
Belief Distortion
f
 
aj,t|wt
 
ft (wt)| {z }
Bayesian Kernel
(2.14)
It tells that whenever a model wt generates lower ex-ante (stage 0) expected
utility for the representative household at the margin of wt, island j firms and
workers tend to regard it as the more likely one in their posteriors. Put it dif-
ferently, ambiguity aversion implies a pessimistic posterior belief over the set
of possible models. To note that, firms on island j have the same distorted pos-
terior belief over the set of possible models as island j workers, which is the
by-product of the extended smooth rule we assumed in the interim belief sys-
tems of island firms.
Combing (2.12) and (2.13), equilibrium allocation of labor can be summa-
rized by the following key equation for labor market:
cNej,t =
0BBBB@
Z
R
Ewtj,t,1
"
u0 (Ct)
✓Yj,t
Yt
◆  1q # ef j,t,1 (wt)dwt| {z }
marginal utility of island j commodity
1CCCCA
0BBBB@ (1  a) Yj,tNj,t| {z }
marginal productivity
1CCCCA
(2.15)
The LHS of this key equation is the marginal disutility of labor, and the RHS is
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the multiplication of (a) marginal utility of island j commodity and (b) marginal
productivity of labor. The equation simply says, in the labor market equilib-
rium, stage 1 valuation of private benefit of labor equates with the private cost
of labor. Similar condition also appears in Angeletos and La’O (2009) and An-
geletos, Iovino, and La’O (2016). There are two main differences between ours
and theirs. First of all, there is another round of integration over models due to
the existence of ambiguity. Second, agents use a distorted posterior belief due
to ambiguity aversion.
2.4.3. Joint Approximation of Allocation and Belief
Using island production function Yj,t = Aj,tN1 aj,t and the market clearing condi-
tion for final goods Yt = Ct, we can transform (2.15) into a fixed point condition
over allocation
 
Yj,t
 
j2J :
cY
1+e
1 a 1+ 1q
j,t = (1  a)A
1+e
1 a
j,t
✓Z
R
Ewtj,t,1

Y
1
q g
t
  ef j,t,1 (wt)dwt◆ (2.16)
where the distorted posterior belief ef j,t,1 (wt) is given by
ef j,t,1 (wt) µ f0 Ewtj,t,0
"
Y1 gt   1
1  g   c
Z
J
 
Yj,t/Aj,t
 (1+e)/(1 a)
1+ e
dj
#!
| {z }
Belief Distortion
f
 
aj,t|wt
 
ft (wt)| {z }
Bayesian Kernel
(2.17)
To ensure complementarity in productions across islands, we make the fol-
lowing parametric restriction for the simple model without capital13:
Assumption 2.2. (Complementarity) It is assumed that 1q > g when there is no
capital.
Increase in output of all other islands k 6= j 2 J, on the one hand, raises the
demand for island j commodities due to aggregate demand externalities, but on
the other hand generates upward pressure on the wage rate of island j due to in-
come effect of labor supply. Assumption 2.2 ensures that income effect of labor
13To see why this is the case, observe that under perfect information, (2.16) can be simplified
into
cY
1+e
1 a 1+ 1q
j,t =
✓
h   1
h
◆
(1  a)A
1+e
1 a
j,t Y
1
q g
t
It is straight-forward to show ∂Yj,t/∂Yt > 0 if and only if 1q   g > 0.
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supply is so weak that the channel of aggregate demand externalities domi-
nates that of the income effects. Later in Section 2.6, we drop this assumption
when there exists capital accumulation and assume q = 1, i.e., a Cobb-Douglas
technology for the aggregation of island output
 
Yj,t
 
j2J and g = 1, i.e., log
utility for consumption. Such a parameterization also ensures complementarity
in production given the existence of consumption smoothing incentive, which
weakens income effect of labor supply.
The technical complication here is that the distorted posterior belief ef j,t,1 (wt)
is not orthogonal to equilibrium allocation. Allocations and beliefs have to be
solved simultaneously in equilibrium. As a result, the equilibrium of the econ-
omy is the solution to a double fixed point conditions: one solves (2.16) charac-
terizing the equilibrium cross-sectional allocation
 
Yj,t
 
j2J conditional on any
stage 1 distorted posterior belief over possible models ef j,t,1 (wt) and the other
one solves (2.17) characterizing equilibrium stage 1 distorted posterior belief
over the set of possible models conditional on any cross cross-sectional alloca-
tion
 
Yj,t
 
j2J of the economy.
Definition 2.2 (Conditional Log-Normal Equilibrium). An allocation
 
Yj,t,Yt
 
j2J
constitutes a conditional Log-Normal equilibrium if both Yj,t|yt and Yt|yt are Log-
Normally distributed.
Lemma 2.1. Up to second order, distorted posterior belief over the set of pos-
sible models efj,t,1 (wt) can be Normally approximated if allocation  Yj,t,Yt j2J
constitutes a conditional Log-Normal equilibrium.
Proof. See Appendix.
Lemma 2.2. Allocation
 
Yj,t
 
aj,t,yt
  
j2J constitutes a conditional Log-Normal
equilibrium if distorted posterior belief over possible models efj,t,1 (wt) is Nor-
mal.
Proof. Directly follows Angeletos and La’O (2009).
The complication of the joint determination (or approximation) of alloca-
tions and beliefs can be greatly simplified once we narrow our analysis down
to the focus of conditional log normal equilibrium defined in Definition 2.2.
On the one hand, conditional Log-Normal equilibrium embeds the standard
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Log-Normal equilibrium or log-linearized equilibrium as a special case when
there is no ambiguity shock. While on the other hand, it can be justified, up
to an approximation sense, by Lemma 2.1 and Lemma 2.2 in a self-fulfilling
fashion. The following proposition characterizes the approximated conditional
log-normal equilibrium.
Proposition 2.1 (EquilibriumCharacterization). Under some regularity conditions,
there exists a unique approximated symmetric conditional Log-Normal equilibrium
where the allocation
 
Yj,t,Yt
 
j2J is such that
yj,t ⌘ lnYj,t =
0B@y⇤ + hy  y | {z }
Ambiguous SS
1CA+ kyaj (yt,l) · aj,t| {z }
Use of Private Info.
+ bhy (yt,l)| {z }
Impact of Amb. Shock
(2.18)
and
yt ⌘ lnYt =
0B@y⇤ + hy  y | {z }
Ambiguous SS
1CA+ kyaj (yt,l) · Z
J
aj,tdj| {z }
Use of Private Info.
+ bhy (yt,l)| {z }
Impact of Amb. Shock
(2.19)
where y⇤ + hy
 
y
 
denotes the ambiguous steady state output. And kyaj (yt,l), the
slope of output w.r.t. productivity, is called the use of private information, which is a
function of the amount of ambiguity yt and degree of ambiguity aversion l. Finally,bhy (yt;l) denotes the impact of ambiguity shock on output satisfying
bhy  y,l  = 0
Finally, the distorted posterior belief over the set of possible models is Normal with mean
µt and variance s2t such that
µt =
 
eyt + gs (yt,l)
s2z + s
2
i + eyt + gs (yt,l)
!
xj,t +
 
s2z + s
2
i
s2z + s
2
i + eyt + gs (yt,l)
!
gµ (yt,l)
and
s2t =
 
s2z + s
2
i
s2z + s
2
i + eyt + gs (yt,l)
! 
eyt + gs (yt,l)
 
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where the distortion in mean gµ (yt,l) and in variance gs (yt,l) are given by
gµ (yt,l) =  lkJw
✓
1
1+ lkJwweyt
◆
eyt gs (yt,l) =  
✓
lkJwweyt
1+ lkJwweyt
◆
eyt
(2.20)
with kJw and kJww being functions of kyaj such that
kJw =e(1 g)y
⇤
✓⇣
1+ (1  g)hy
⌘
kyaj  
✓
1+
✓
1+ e
1  a
◆
hy
◆⇣
kyaj   1
⌘◆
> 0
(2.21)
kJww =e(1 g)y
⇤
⇣
1+ (1  g)hy
⌘
(1  g)k2yaj,t  
✓
1+
✓
1+ e
1  a
◆
hy
◆✓
1+ e
1  a
◆⇣
kyaj   1
⌘2 
> 0
(2.22)
Proof. See Appendix.
The approximation turns out to be quite accurate. In Appendix 2.B, we con-
duct a numerical check and demonstrate that our approximation is not only
accurate but also conservative in the sense it under-estimates the impact of am-
biguity shock.
The allocations (2.18) and (2.19) are akin to those of the Angeletos and La’O
(2009). Log deviations from the ambiguous SS for island output byj,t ⌘ yj,t  ⇣
y⇤ + hy
 
y
 ⌘
and aggregate output byt ⌘ yj   ⇣y⇤ + hy  y ⌘ can be expressed
into a linear function of island aj,t and average productivity
R
j aj,tdj, respec-
tively. We name the slope of these linear functions kyaj (yt,l) as the use of
private information, which is a function of the amount of ambiguity yt. Fur-
thermore, the intercept term bhy (yt;l) controls the impact of ambiguity shock
on aggregate output, given the fact that it is zero when evaluated at the ambigu-
ous steady state. These two terms (a) the use of private information kyaj (yt,l)
and (b) the impact of ambiguity shock on aggregate output bhy (yt;l) are at the
core of our analysis. Later in this Section 2.5, we study the impacts of ambiguity
shocks through comparative static analysis over these terms and demonstrate
how ambiguity shock can possibly generate co-movements across market con-
fidence, belief divergence and aggregate economy.
2.5. Impacts of Ambiguity Shock
In this section, we analyze the impacts of ambiguity shock by conducting a
couple of comparative static analysis. We start by providing a game theoretic
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interpretation of the equilibrium allocations of our business cycle model. Such a
game theoretic interpretation clarifies themainmechanisms of our paper, which
are the dual impacts of ambiguity shock. We then demonstrate how such dual
impacts of ambiguity shock are to bemapped into fluctuations in aggregate out-
put, market confidence, and belief divergence. Finally, we close up this section
with some discussions about the interplay between incomplete information and
ambiguity aversion.
2.5.1. Game Theoretic Interpretation
To build up the economic intuition behind impacts of ambiguity shock, we
present a game theoretic interpretation of the equilibrium of our business cy-
cle model, which resembles the beauty contest in Morris and Shin (2002) and
Angeletos and Pavan (2007), but with a distorted information structure that
captures the belief distortion or pessimism in belief due to ambiguity aversion.
Proposition 2.2. The approximated equilibrium allocations
 
Yj,t,Yt
 
j2J are identical
to that of a beauty contest such that
yj,t = kaaj,t + kyEj,t [yt]
where the coefficients ka and ky are such that
ka =
1+e
1 a
1+e
1 a   1+ 1q
ky =
1
q   g
1+e
1 a   1+ 1q
2 (0,1)
The information structure is distorted such that
eaj,t = eat +eij,t, eij,t ⇠ N  0,s2i  eat ⇠ N⇣gµ (yt,l),s2z + eyt + gs (yt,l)⌘
where distortions
 
gµ (yt,l) ,gs (yt,l)
 
are given by (2.20) and satisfies the follow-
ings
gµ (yt,l)  0, gµ ( •,l) = 0, gµ (yt,0) = 0, ∂gµ (yt,l)∂yt < 0.
and
gs (yt,l)  0, gs ( •,l) = 0, gs (yt,0) = 0, ∂
 
eyt + gs (yt,l)
 
∂yt
> 0
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Proof. See Appendix.
Within the beauty contest interpretation, island output yj,t is the linear com-
bination of island productivity aj,t and island j expectation of aggregate output
because the former controls the marginal cost of production on island j and
the latter manifests island j’s forecast over own demand conditions. However,
unlike standard beauty contest, perceived distribution of aggregate productiv-
ity is distorted both in mean and variance due to the existence of ambiguity
and ambiguity aversion. Here ky corresponds to the notion of coordination mo-
tive in the beauty contest literature. Its magnitude ky 2 (0,1) is the product of
Assumption 2.2, which ensures complementarity in action and uniqueness in
allocations once we fix a distorted information structure. Such a game theoretic
interpretation provides us a natural laboratory to study the impacts of ambi-
guity shock. In what follows, we utilize this beauty contest interpretation and
discuss in more details how ambiguity generates fluctuations in market confi-
dence, belief divergence and aggregate economy once and for all.
2.5.2. Market Confidence, Belief Divergence and Aggregate Fluctuations
What are the impacts of ambiguity shocks? As evident from Proposition 2.1,
ambiguity shock affects the allocations of the economy by fluctuating decision
makers’ distorted posterior belief over the set of possible models. Proposi-
tion 2.2 further decomposes the impacts of a positive ambiguity shock into two
parts: one generates an increased pessimism over aggregate fundamental and
the other one creates higher perceived volatility of aggregate fundamentals. We
call them the dual impacts of ambiguity shock.
Agg. State
Low AmbiguityHigh Ambiguity
Figure 2.1. Impact of Ambiguity Shock: Main Mechanism
Figure 2.1 plots the perceived "as if" distribution of aggregate fundamental
for the low level of ambiguity, i.e., yt is small, and for the high level of ambi-
guity, i.e., yt is large. It is named "as if" because these are the subjective beliefs
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over aggregate fundamentals that would deliver exactly the same allocation
as our baseline model when agents have expected utility preferences. Since is-
land j agents have perfect understanding over own productivity, distorted prior
belief over aggregate fundamental eat can be translated into distorted prior be-
lief over aggregate demand of island j. Therefore, a positive ambiguity shock
makes decision-makers believe that the aggregate demand becomes worse on
average and more volatile in their "as if" subjective prior. The former maps into
lower output, either island or aggregate, at the margin. While the latter maps
into an increased incentive in the use private information when making expec-
tation over aggregate demand hence when making factors demand and supply
decisions. We summarize these results in the following proposition
Proposition 2.3. A positive ambiguity shock that increases the amount of ambiguity
yt generates lower aggregate output in the sense that
∂bhy (yt,l)
∂yt
< 0 (2.23)
if agents are ambiguity averse, i.e. l > 0. Moreover, equilibrium use of private infor-
mation kyaj (yt,l) is an increasing function of amount of ambiguity yt:
∂kyaj (yt,l)
∂yt
> 0. (2.24)
Proof. See Appendix.
At the core of understanding (2.23) is the increased degree of pessimism
over the set of possible models. In fact, there are two forces at work that deepen
agents’ degree of pessimism over the set of possible models, one fundamen-
tal and one strategic. A positive ambiguity shock, on the one hand, increases
the amount of ambiguity faced by all agents. In response, agents behave more
pessimistic. This is the fundamental or direct channel. On the other hand, a
positive ambiguity shock induces all other agents to use more of their private
information when making output decisions. Under aggregate demand exter-
nalities, this raises the amount of ambiguity in firms’ demand structure, which
further increases the degree of pessimism. This is the strategic or indirect chan-
nel. Through the fundamental and strategic channels, a positive ambiguity
shock raises all agents’ degree of pessimism over the outlooks of the economy,
which eventually drives down economic activities.
Market confidence. We define market confidence as the “economy-wide
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average of agents’ first-order expectations of aggregate output of the economy”.
Such a definition is consistent with the practice of most of the survey exercise.
For example, in the Michigan Survey of Consumer, consumers are asked about
whether they believe output will go up or down in the following year. In a
broader context, it is a short-cut for agents forecasts about the outlooks of the
economy.
Definition 2.3 (Market Confidence). Market confidence is mathematically defined
to be
Con f . (yt,l) ⌘
Z
J
Z
R
Ewtj,t [yt] ef j,t,1 (wt)dwtdj
To note that, market confidence is defined under the distorted belief over
the set of possible models efj,t,1 (wt). By doing so, we implicitly assume that
ambiguity averse agents would use their as if belief, i.e., the pessimistic belief
to make forecasts. Also, we integrate individual agents’ first-order belief over
j to be consistent with the idea that market confidence is an economy-wide
concern. Following Proposition 2.1, it is directly to have that
Con f . (yt,l) = y⇤ + hy
 
y
 
+ kyaj (yt,l)
 
s2i
s2z + eyt + gs (yt,l)
!
gµ (yt,l) + bhy (yt,l)
Observe that economy-wide average of agents first-order belief over average
productivity is given by
Z
J
Z
R
Ewtj,t
Z
J
aj,tdj
  ef j,t,1 (wt)dwtd = kyaj (yt,l)
 
s2i
s2z + eyt + gs (yt,l)
!
gµ (yt,l)
(2.25)
Being hit by a positive ambiguity shock, all agents become more pessimistic
over the aggregate fundamental, i.e., gµ (yt,l) decreases. On the other hand, all
agents perceive the aggregate fundamental becomemore volatile eyt + gs (yt,l)
increases. The former increases the economy-wide pessimism. But the latter re-
duces economy-wide pessimism because agents find it optimal to use more of
the private information, the economy-wide average of which is objectively zero.
However, in equilibrium, the former always dominates the latter implying that
all agents are becoming more pessimistic over average productivity. The point
is all agents understand that all the others are more pessimistic. And they also
understand that the other agents understand this increase in economy-wide
pessimism. Further, they all understand that all the others understand that the
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others understand this, etc. The consequence of such an higher-order thinking
over each others eventually leads to a drop in aggregate output, i.e., bhy (yt,l).
This further depresses market confidence. Finally, all agents also understand
that the others all perceive aggregate fundamental being more volatile. Hence
they understand that all the others will use more of their private information.
Therefore, they know that aggregate output will respond more to aggregate
fundamental, i.e., kyaj (yt,l) increases. This raises output forecasts’ reliance on
the pessimistic belief over average productivity, which further depresses mar-
ket confidence. We summarize this result in the Corollary 2.1.
Corollary 2.1. (Depressed Market Confidence) A positive ambiguity shock
that increases the amount of ambiguity perceived by agents depresses market
confidence in the sense that
∂Con f . (yt,l)
∂yt
< 0
Proof. Directly following Proposition 2.2 and 2.3.
To note that in the model, island j agents have perfect information over own
productivity. An increase in the amount of ambiguity depresses island j agents’
belief over the average productivity of the other islands without changing be-
liefs over own productivity. These movements in belief are isomorphic to those
of a negative confidence shock under heterogenous prior setup alias Angeletos,
Collard, and Dellas (2016b). In this sense, our paper provides an alternative
micro-foundation for the heterogeneous prior setup by generating endogenous
movements in confidence.
Belief Divergence. To discuss the impact of ambiguity shock on belief di-
vergence, we need to define the expectation formation process of professional
forecasters formally. Equivalently, we ask the following question: what are pro-
fessional forecasters’ attitudes towards ambiguity?
Figure 2.2 plots realized real GDP growth rates and its average year-ahead
forecasts from Survey of Professional Forecasters. There displays no significant
pessimism over time in SPF forecasts. To be consistent with this observation,
we assume that professional forecasters are ambiguity neutral. If not, ambigu-
ity aversion would imply a systematic pessimism in average forecasts due to
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Figure 2.2. SPF Forecasts of Real GDP Growth Rate.
Note: The figure plots real GDP growth rate (red line) and year-ahead real GDP growth rate fore-
cast by professional forecasters (dashed black line) between 1987Q1 and 2014Q4. Forecast data
is from Survey of Professional Forecasters provided by the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia
and real GDP growth data is from Saint-Louis Federal Reserve Economic Database.
distorted belief over the set of possible models.
Assumption 2.3. Professional forecasters possess ambiguity over the cross-
sectional mean of idiosyncratic productivity shock. However, they are ambigu-
ity neutral, i.e., l = 0.
Furthermore, each island j is assumed to inhabit a professional forecaster
indexed by j 2 J = [0,1], who submits his forecast about period t aggregate
output yt at stage 1 of period t. In this section, we assume that professional
forecaster j shares the same information as island j agents. Hence his forecast
over aggregate output can be expressed into
Ej,t [yt] = y⇤ + hy
 
y
 
+ kyaj (yt,l)| {z }
"
 
s2z + e
yt
s2z + eyt + s2i
!
| {z }
"
aj,t + bhy (yt,l) . (2.26)
Therefore, belief divergence measured by the cross-sectional dispersion of ex-
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ante output forecast is given by
FDt (yt,l) ⌘
Z
J
 
Ej,t [yt]  Et [yt]
 2 dj = k2yaj (yt,l)
 
s2z + e
yt
s2z + eyt + s2i
!2
s2i (2.27)
Corollary 2.2 summarizes the impacts of ambiguity shocks on belief divergence.
Corollary 2.2. (Heightened Belief Divergence) Therefore, a positive ambiguity
shock that increases the amount of ambiguity yt raises belief divergence in the
sense that
∂FDt (yt,l)
∂yt
> 0. (2.28)
Proof. Straight-forward following the intuition below.
The intuition here is straight-forward. A positive ambiguity shock makes
firms and workers on all islands believe, in their “as if ” subjective prior, that
the aggregate fundamental is more volatile, which increases the incentive to use
private information when forming expectations over own demand conditions.
This maps into increased responsiveness of island output yj,t to island produc-
tivity aj,t because it is aj,t that serves as the private information over aggregate
demand for island j agents. This raises cross-sectional dispersion of island out-
put. Upon aggregation, we also have aggregate output yt responds more to
average productivity
R
J aj,tdj.
From the perspective of professional forecaster j, increase in kyaj implies
that “there are more to estimate”. Moreover, when he estimates the average
productivity
R
J xj,tdj, he tends to rely more on his private information aj,t in the
sense that
∂
 
s2z+e
yt
s2z+e
yt+s2i
!
∂yt
> 0. This is because he believes, in his “as if” subjective
prior, the aggregate fundamental is now more volatile. These two in combine
increase the responsiveness of forecaster j’s forecast to private information aj,t,
which eventually leads to higher cross-sectional dispersion in output forecasts
ex-ante, i.e., an increase in belief divergence. To note that, the economy itself
does not become more dispersed or more volatile. It is the increased respon-
siveness to idiosyncratic shocks that drives up the cross-sectional dispersion.
This differentiates our paper with the theory of uncertainty shock as in Bloom
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(2009) and Bloom, Floetotto, Jaimovich, Saporta-Eksten, and Terry (2016), who
take fluctuations in dispersion as model inputs rather than model output.
We provide a summary of impacts of ambiguity shock by combing Proposi-
tion 2.3, Corollary 2.1 and Corollary 2.2:
Proposition 2.4 (Impacts of Ambiguity Shock). If decision makers are ambiguity
averse, i.e., l > 0, a positive ambiguity shock that increases the amount of ambiguity
yt generates
• lower market confidence;
• larger belief divergence;
• and finally lower aggregate output on average.
Proof. Directly following Proposition 2.3, Corollary 2.1 and Corollary 2.2.
2.5.3. Discussion: incomplete information and ambiguity aversion
In 2.5.2, we highlight the strategic force behind the impacts of ambiguity shocks
in driving aggregate fluctuations. This is closely related to incomplete infor-
mation embedded in our paper. We close up the analysis of Section 2.5 by
some additional discussions about the interplay between incomplete informa-
tion and ambiguity based on the game theoretic interpretation developed in
Section 2.5.1. By varying degree of incompleteness in information, impacts of
uncertainty shocks are studied.
Incomplete information is of primary importance. When information is
complete, i.e., s2i = 0, island j agents face no uncertainty regarding decisions
of agents on other islands. Then all agents will have the perfect understand-
ing of the whole economy. Therefore, ambiguity shocks play no role in driving
aggregate fluctuations without incompleteness in information. Corollary 2.3
summarizes this result.
Corollary 2.3. Ambiguity shocks have no impacts on aggregate output bhy (yt,l) =
0 when information is complete s2i /s2z = 0.
Proof. Straight-forward following the proof of Proposition 2.1.
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To note that, completeness in information only requires that there exists no
private information. It does not necessarily imply perfect information14. Corol-
lary 2.3 still holds when there presents information friction as long it is common
across agents. Unlike our simplified case with s2i /s2z = 0, when this is the case,
there still presents the distorted posterior belief over the set of possible models.
However, all agents have common knowledge over Yt under complete informa-
tion. Then (2.16) transforms into
cY
1+e
1 a 1+ 1q
j,t = (1  a)A
1+e
1 a
j,t Y
1
q g
t
which leaves no room for ambiguity or ambiguity shock to have any impacts.
To interpret, it is the imperfect coordination across islands, possibly due to im-
perfect communication as in Angeletos and La’O (2013), that matters rather
than imperfect information.
The question of interest naturally arises. Does more incompleteness in in-
formation amplify or dampen the impacts of ambiguity shocks? We answer
these questions by varying not only s2i but also s2z while holding the amount of
ambiguity constant at the A-SS level.
There are two forces at work. On the one hand, more incompleteness in
information, i.e., larger s2i or lower s2z , reduces the incentive in the use of pri-
vate information because private information is becoming less informative not
only about the aggregate state but also about the models. This marginally
changes degree of pessimism since gµ
 
y,l
 
is a function of both kJw
⇣
kyaj ,hy
⌘
and kJww
⇣
kyaj ,hy
⌘
, which are functions of kyaj . It can be proved that mean dis-
tortion gµ
 
y,l
 
marginally decreases w.r.t degree of information incomplete-
ness.
Lemma 2.3. Mean distortion at the A-SS gµ
 
y,l
 
marginally decreases in s2i
and increases in s2z :
∂gµ
 
y,l
 
∂s2i
< 0
∂gµ
 
y,l
 
∂s2z
> 0
Proof. See Appendix.
14See Angeletos and Lian (2016) for more formal discussions.
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On the other hand, fixing the belief distortion gµ (yt,l) = g⇤µ and gµ (yt,l) =
g⇤s, more incompleteness in information implies more load of belief distortion
on island and aggregate output. To see this, express island output yj,t into an
infinite sum over a complete hierarchy of all higher-order beliefs of aggregate
fundamentals eat:
yj,t = ka
 
aj,t +
•
Â
n=1
knyE
n
j,t [eat]
!
(2.29)
where higher-order beliefs of island j agents are defined recursively such that
E1j,t [eat] ⌘ Ej,t [eat] Enj,t [eat] ⌘ Ej,t Z
J
En 1j,t [eat]dj  8n   1
It turns out that increased incompleteness in information increases the response
of any order of belief to prior information. Observe that it is the prior of aggre-
gate fundamental being distorted. Therefore, it must be the case that all orders
of belief are exposed to more belief distortion. Therefore, incompleteness in in-
formation naturally amplify the impact of ambiguity shock at the margin when
we fix the belief distortion. The above two forces interact with each other, which
indicates that incomplete information is actually an amplifying mechanism for
the impact of ambiguity. Proposition 2.5 summarizes this result.
Proposition 2.5. At the ambiguous steady state (A-SS), a marginal increase in s2i
that increases the degree of information incompleteness, decreases the use of private
information and amplifies the impact of ambiguity:
dkyaj
ds2i
< 0
dhy
ds2i
< 0
On the contrary, a marginal increase in s2i that reduces the degree of information in-
completeness, increases the use of private information and dampens the impact of am-
biguity:
dkyaj
ds2z
> 0
dhy
ds2z
> 0
Proof. See Appendix.
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2.5.4. A summary
Taking stock, this section has shown that a positive ambiguity shock generates
a recession with depressedmarket confidence and heightened belief divergence
qualitatively. In what follows, we study the impacts of ambiguity shocks quan-
titatively within an extended dynamic RBC model. We demonstrate that ambi-
guity shock in our theory can generate reasonable co-movements in quantities
at the aggregate level. The availability of our theory is quantitatively evaluated
by bringing the observable implications into the data.
2.6. The Dynamic RBCModel: Quantitative Evaluation
In this section, we illustrate the quantitative potential of our theory by study-
ing a dynamic RBC model. We first set up the model. We then move to the
discussion about our quantitative methodology in the estimation of conditional
Log-Normal equilibrium (Definition 2.2). Finally, observable implications of
ambiguity shock, for both the aggregate quantities, belief divergence and mar-
ket confidence, are then assessed through a calibrated version of the model.
2.6.1. Model Setup
Geography, markets and timing. The economy consists of a continuum of is-
lands, indexed by j 2 J = [0,1] and a mainland. On each island j, there exist a
continuum of firms, indexed by (i, j) 2 I ⇥ J = [0,1]2 and a continuum of work-
ers, indexed by (m, j) 2 M⇥ J = [0,1]2. Firms on island j hire labor and capital
from locally competitive factor markets for the production of island-specific
commodity j. These commodities are traded in a centralized market operated
on the mainland, where a continuum of consumers, indexed by h 2 H = [0,1]
and a large number of final good producers inhabit. We assume that consumer h
and a continuum of workers {(h, j) ; j 2 J} constitute a large household indexed
by h 2 H, who owns a continuum of firms {(h, j) ; j 2 J}. As in the case of the
simple model, our model admits a representative household at the mainland
and a continuum of representative firms and workers on every island.
Time is discrete, indexed by t 2 {0,1, ...} and each period t is decomposed
into three stages. At stage zero, period t shocks are realized. At stage 1, is-
land competitive factor markets open up. Island j firms make labor and capital
demand decisions and symmetrically, the representative household sends out
workers to each island, whomake labor supply decisions on the basis of incom-
plete information over the ambiguous concurrent aggregate state of the econ-
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omy. At stage 2, on the mainland, the centralized commodities market opens
up. All uncertainty, either risk or ambiguity, over the concurrent aggregate state
of the economy resolved. Final goods producers produce. And the representa-
tive household makes consumption and saving decisions upon receiving, capi-
tal income, labor income and all the transfers from island firms upon perceiving
ambiguity over the future aggregate state of the economy. Here we assume that
it is the representative household who owns the capital, therefore, saving takes
the form of island-specific investments for all islands. Therefore, the capital
supply of island j in period t+ 1 is pre-determined at stage 2 of period t by the
representative household.
Households. Period utility of the representative household is given by:
u (Ct)  c
Z
J
N1+ej,t
1+ e
dj
where e is the inverse Fisher elasticity of labor supply. Therefore, the flow bud-
get constraint is such that
PtCt + Pt
Z
J
Kj,t+1   (1  d)Kj,tdj =
Z
J
Wj,tNj,tdj+
Z
J
Rj,tKj,tdj+
Z
J
Pj,tdj
where
R
j Rj,tKj,tdj and
R
J Wj,tNj,tdj denote the total capital and labor income of
all islands respectively and
R
JPj,tdj is the transfers of realized profits from all
island firms.
Island firms. Island j firms use labor and capital for the production of island
j commodity. The production function is Cobb-Douglas:
Yj,t = Aj,tN1 aj,t K
a
j,t
where Aj,t is the island-specific productivity and the realized profit is given by
Pj,t = Pj,tYj,t  Wj,tNj,t   Rj,tKj,t
whereWj,t and Rj,t denote the competitive factors prices on island j in period t
and Pj,t denotes the market price of island j commodity in period tto, which is
determined at stage 2 when the centralized markets for commodities open up.
Since it is the large representative household who owns the firm, any realized
profits are to be transferred to the household for the purchase of final goods
for consumption and investment. Therefore, in the absence of any uncertainty
concerns, island j firms care about the consumer valuation over their profits
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given by
u0 (Ct)
Pt
Pj,t
where Pt is the aggregate price level to be normalized to 1.
Productivity and ambiguity shocks. Aggregate productivity at ⌘ logAt
follows an AR(1) process
at = rat 1 + zt
where zt is the aggregate productivity shock in period t that follows a Normal
distribution with mean 0 and variance s2z .
Island-specific productivity, defined by aj,t ⌘ logAj,t, equals to aggregate
productivity plus an idiosyncratic productivity shock ij,t:
aj,t = at + ij,t
Idiosyncratic productivity shocks ij,t are assumed to be i.i.d normally distributed
with mean wt and variance s2i . Objectively, the cross-sectional mean of idiosyn-
cratic productivity shocks are zero for all periods, i.e. wt = 0 8t > 0. However,
agents inside the economy cannot fully understand it. Instead, they possess
some ambiguity over the complete set of cross-sectional means of idiosyncratic
productivity shocks, i.e., M ⌘ {wt : 8t   0}.
At the very beginning of time, say period 0, all agents subjectively believe
that allwt 2M are i.i.d Normally distributed with mean 0 and variance s2w ⌘ ey.
Here s2w or y measures the amount of ambiguity agents possess in the A-SS.
Ambiguity in the past does not last forever. As it will become evident later,
concurrent ambiguity is resolved at stage 2 of that period. Therefore, at stage
0 of any period t, agents inside the economy only possess ambiguity over con-
current and future cross-sectional means of idiosyncratic productivity shocks,
i.e., Mt ⌘ {wt+k : 8k   0}. The amount of ambiguity they possess at this point,
denoted by yt, is time-varying and governed by an AR(1) process
yt =
 
1  ry
 
y+ ryyt 1 + tt
where tt is the ambiguity shock assumed to be Normally distributed with mean
0 and variance s2t . We close the description of the ambiguity process by ex-
plicitly specifying the common subjective prior belief of all agents over Mt =
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{wt+k : 8k   0} at stage 0 of period t:
wt+k ⇠ i.i.d N
 
0, eyt,t+k
  8k   0
where the amount of ambiguity agents perceived over wt+k at period t, denoted
as yt,t+k, is an increasing affine function of yt:
yt,t+k =
⇣
1  rky
⌘
y+ rkyyt
This particular structure for prior beliefs ensures prior consistency over the fu-
ture ambiguity wt+k,8k   1. It simply tells that period t prior over future am-
biguity wt+k meets period t+ k prior over wt+k if there are no more ambiguity
shocks in between. Put it differently,
ft,t+k = Et [yt+k]
Ambiguity shock tt in the process of ambiguity yt, by its nature, can be un-
derstood a changing prior process. Also, we implicitly assume that a positive
ambiguity shock in period t, i.e., tt > 0, makes agents become “more ambigu-
ous” 15 over all the future ambiguity wt+k. However, it is period t biased in
the sense that it raises concurrent ambiguity more than future ambiguity and
the increase in ambiguity is mean-reverting such that for ambiguity wt+k in
the very far future k ! +•, the subjective belief stays in its A-SS belief, i.e.
limk!+•yt,t+k = y.
Information structure. Denote It,0, Ij,t,1 and It,2 as the information sets
that are available to all agents at stage 0 of period t, are only available to island
j agents at stage 1 of period t and are available to all agents at stage 2 of period
t, respectively. Recursively, we can define these information sets by
It,0 = It 1,2 [ {yt} Ij,t,1 = It,0 [
 
aj,t
 It,2 = [jIj,t,1 [ {zt} (2.30)
To note that all concurrent uncertainty, either risk (state uncertainty over at) or
ambiguity (model uncertainty overwt) are resolved at stage 2 of period t. Hence
consumption-saving decisions by households are made upon perceiving ambi-
guity over the future outlooks of the economy only. Also because idiosyncratic
productivity shocks are i.i.d,
 
aj,t
 
j2J tells no more information than
R
j aj,tdj
does regarding island j productivity in period t+ 1. Therefore, we can simplify
information set at stage 2 of period t by It,2 = It,0 [
nR
j aj,tdj,wt
o
. To simplify
15Heremore ambiguousmeans an increase in the amount of ambiguity perceived by all agents.
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Stage 0
It,0 = It 1,2 [ { t}
Nature generates
at and {aj,t; j 2 (0, 1)}.
Ambiguity shock ⌧t realizes,
hence  t.
Stage 1
Ij,t,1 = It,0 [ {xj,t}
Island j firms and worker observe xj,t,
and make local factors
supply and demand decisions,
where capital supply Kj,t is pre-determined.
Stage 2
It,2 = [jIj,t,1 [ {⇣t}
Consumer observes {zt, ⇣t} and
makes consumption decisions Ct
and saves in the form of {Kj,t+1}1j=1.
Final goods producers produce.
Figure 2.1. Timeline for Period t
notation, we further transform the information structure into
It,0 = It 1,2 [ {yt} Ij,t,1 = It,0 [
 
xj,t
 It,2 = It,0 [ {zt,zt}
where xj,t ⌘ zt + ij,t denotes the de-facto private information at stage 1 over
aggregate productivity shocks and zt = zt + wt denotes the de-facto public in-
formation at stage 2 over aggregate productivity shocks. Figure 2.1 displays the
timeline and information sets for period t in our dynamic RBC model.
Preference of the representative household at stage 2. Denote st+1⌘ It+1,2\It,2
as the arrival of new information at stage 2 between two consecutive periods t
and t + 1. We summarize belief of the representative household at stage 2 by
two corresponding Bayesian posteriors: (a) pM (st+1|It,2), the Bayesian poste-
rior of st+1 at stage 2 of period t under a particular model M, and (2) µ (M|It,2),
the Bayesian posterior over the entire the set of possible models M 2M.
Preference of the representative household at stage 2 of period t, therefore,
can be represented by the recursive smooth model of ambiguity proposed by
Klibanoff, Marinacci, and Mukerji (2009):
Vt (C;It,2) = u (Ct) + bf 1
✓Z
M
f
✓Z
St+1
Vt+1 (C;It,2, st+1)dpM (st+1|It,2)
◆
dµ (M|It,2)
◆
| {z }
Utility Equivalent of the Ambiguous Continuation Value
where f (x) is some strictly increasing and concave function, whose curvature
captures decisionmakers’ taste for ambiguity, i.e., the degree of ambiguity aver-
sion.16
Can learning over time resolve all ambiguity in the long run? Klibanoff,
Marinacci, and Mukerji (2009) proves that if f 1 is Lipschitz and the space of
16Theorem 3 in Klibanoff, Marinacci, and Mukerji (2009) proves that under some regularity
conditions, there are unique and monotonic Vt. For most of business cycle applications, those
regularity conditions can be easily satisfied.
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ambiguous model parameters is finite, the recursive smooth model of ambigu-
ity will converge uniformly to expected utility preferences with true model pa-
rameters. In our model, agents are ambiguous over an infinite parameter space
w ⌘ {wt : 8t   0}. This prevents ambiguity to vanish in the long run through
learning.
Moreover, the additional concavity in f (x) is to capture the fact that am-
biguous continuation value reduces the utility of the decisionmaker since ambi-
guity aversion implies that the representative household dislikesmean-preserving
spread in expected continuation value due to the existence of model uncer-
tainty. Behind recursive smooth model of ambiguity, there is the notion of con-
sequentialism and dynamic consistency, who is themost intuitive waywhenwe
talk about decision makings within the lens of business cycles. And it admits a
tractable Bellman equation formulation.
Denote value function as Jt ⌘ J
  
Kj,t
 
, at 1,zt,zt,yt
 
. Standard dynamic
programming argument can be applied resulting the following Bellman equa-
tion for the representative household at stage 2:
Jt = max
Ct,{Kj,t+1}
u (Ct) + bf 1
✓Z
R
f
⇣
Ewt+1t,2 [Jt+1]
⌘
ft (wt+1)dwt+1
◆
(2.31)
subject to
PtCt + Pt
Z
J
Ij,tdj =
Z
J
Wj,tNj,tdidj+
Z
J
Rj,tKj,tdj+
Z
J
Pj,tdj (2.32)
and
Ij,t = Kj,t+1   (1  d)Kj,t (2.33)
Here Ewt+1t,2 [·] stands for the mathematical expectation conditioned on It,2 under
a particular model wt+1 for cross-sectional mean of tomorrow’s idiosyncratic
productivity shocks. And ft (wt+1) stands for the probability density function
for households’ period t prior over tomorrow’s ambiguity wt+1. Since period t
knowledge does not reveal any information over tomorrow’s ambiguity, prior
belief over tomorrow’s ambiguity wt+1 at stage 2 coincides with that at stage 0.
Preference of the representative household at stage 1. Similar to the simple
model, at stage 1, preference of the representative household is given by the
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smooth model of ambiguityZ
Wt
f
⇣
Ewtj,t,1
⇥
J
  
Kj,t
 
, at 1,zt,zt,yt
 ⇤⌘ ef hj,t,1 (wt)dwt
where the interim belief follows the smooth rule of updating
ef hj,t,1 (wt) µ f0
⇣
Ewtj,t,0
⇥
J
  
Kj,t
 
, at 1,zt,zt,yt
 ⇤⌘
f0
⇣
Ewtj,t,1
⇥
J
  
Kj,t
 
, at 1,zt,zt,yt
 ⇤⌘| {z }
Weights
f
 
xj,t|wt
 
ft (wt)| {z }
Bayesian Kernel
Firm problem at stage 1. Firm problem is formulated in a similar fashion as
the simple model:
Z
Wt
f
✓
Ewtj,t,1

U0 (Ct)
Pt
 
Pj,tYj,t  Wj,tNj,t   Rj,tKj,t
  ◆ ef fj,t,1 (wt)dwt
where the interim belief system satisfying the extended smooth rule of updating
to ensure dynamic consistency:
ef wj,t,1 (wt) µ f0
⇣
Ewtj,t,0
⇥
J
  
Kj,t
 
, at 1,zt,zt,yt
 ⇤⌘
f0
✓
Ewtj,t,1

ln (Ct)  c
R
J
N1+ej,t
1+e dj
 ◆
| {z }
Weights
f
 
xj,t|wt
 
ft (wt)| {z }
Bayesian Kernel
To close up the description of the model, we make the following assumptions
on functional forms
Assumption 2.4. (Log-Exponential) We assume u (Ct) = lnCt and f (x) =
  1l e lx with l   0.
In what follows, we leave out the optimality conditions to Appendix. And
directly move to the discussion over our quantitative methodology in the ap-
proximation of conditional log-normal equilibrium, which is closely related to
what we have done in Section 2.4.3.
2.6.2. Quantitative Methodology
The key feature of the smooth model of ambiguity is that decision makers
would invoke a distorted (relative to Bayesian posterior) posterior belief over
the set of the possible model when evaluating marginal effects of factors supply
86 CHAPTER 2. AMBIGUITY
and demand. In our RBC extension, the belief distortion at stage 1 is given by
Mt,1 (wt) = e lE
wt
t,0 [Jt] (2.34)
and the belief distortion at stage 2 is given by
Mt,2 (wt+1) = e lE
wt+1
t,2 [Jt+1] (2.35)
To quantitatively pin down the whole equilibrium, expected value functions as
functions of concurrent and tomorrow’s ambiguity,
n
Ewtt,0 [Jt] ,E
wt+1
t,2 [Jt+1]
o
, have
to be approximated jointly with policy rules.
For any variable St of interest, we use hatted-lower-case bst to denote the
log-deviation from its ambiguous steady state (A-SS):
bst ⌘ ln (St)  ln (S⇤)  hs  y 
where S⇤ stands for the deterministic steady state (D-SS) level of St and hs
 
y
 
is a function of y, which takes into account the impacts of ambiguity on St at
A-SS.
Focusing on conditional Log-Normal equilibrium (Definition 2.2), we pro-
pose the following policy rules for island employment bnj,t, output byj,t, wage
rate bwj,t and rental rental rate of capital brj,t at stage 1 of period t:
byj,t = kykbkt + kyaat 1 + kyx (yt) xj,t + bhy (yt)bnj,t = knkbkt + knaat 1 + knx (yt) xj,t + bhn (yt)bwj,t = kwkbkt + kwaat 1 + kwx (yt) xj,t + bhw (yt)brj,t = krkbkt + kraat 1 + krx (yt) xj,t + bhr (yt)
and the following policy rules for consumption bct, investment bit and capital
stock tomorrow bkt+1 at stage 2 of period t:
bct = kckbkt + kcaat 1 + kcz (yt) zt + kcz (yt) zt + bhc (yt)bit = kikbkt + kiaat 1 + kiz (yt) zt + kiz (yt) zt + bhi (yt)bkt+1 = kkkbkt + kkaat 1 + kkz (yt) zt + kkz (yt) zt + bhk (yt)
To elaborate a bit, first of all, the log-deviations of variables of interest are
assumed to be from the A-SS instead of the D-SS. This is because the amount
of ambiguity at A-SS y has a non-negligible first-moment impact on allocations
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when decision makers are ambiguity averse. Secondly, stage 1 variables are
measurable with respect to stage 1 information sets. Since idiosyncratic pro-
ductivity shocks are i.i.d across time and across islands, past information can
be effectively summarized into
nbkt, at 1,yto. Therefore stage 1 variables, i.e., byj,t,bnj,t, bwj,t,brj,t , are functions of nbkt, at 1yt,xj,t,o only. Similar arguments ap-
ply to stage 2 variables, i.e.,
nbct,bit,bkt+1o. Thirdly, fixing the amount of ambigu-
ity yt, the policy rules are linear in productivity shocks either the aggregate or
the idiosyncratic. This corresponds to the standard log-linearizationwhen there
is no ambiguity shock at all, i.e. yt = y for 8t. When there presents ambiguity
shock, we allow it to interact with productivity shocks xj,t, zt and zt in a possibly
non-linear way. This reflects the fact that ambiguity shock is capable of generat-
ing time-varying response to productivity shocks, i.e.
 
k⇤x (yt) ,k⇤z (yt) ,k⇤z (yt)
 
.
In addition, if decision makers are ambiguity averse, ambiguity shock has the
first moment impacts manifested by the possibly non-linear functions bh⇤ (yt).
This reflects fluctuations in degree of pessimism over the short-run outlooks of
the economy. In sum, the proposed policy rules can be understood as a semi-
linear perturbation around the ambiguous steady state where we allow for in-
teractions between productivity and ambiguity shocks as well as all higher-
order terms of ambiguity shocks.
To approximate the conditional Log-Normal equilibriumwith the proposed
policy rules, we first implement a quadratic approximation of the value func-
tion
Jt =J⇤ + hJ + kJkbkt + kJaat 1 + kJz,tzt + kJz,tzt
+ kJkabktat 1 + kJkz,tbktzt + kJkz,tbktzt + kJaz,tat 1zt + kJaz,tat 1zt + kJzzztzt
+
1
2
kJkkbk2t + 12kJaaa2t 1 + 12kJzz,tz2t + 12kJzz,tz2t + bhJ (yt)
Plug this back to the value function recursion (2.31), we can approximate ex-
pected value functions by
Ewtt,0 [Jt] ⇡constantt + kJz,t (yt)wt +
1
2
kJzz,t (yt)w
2
t
and
Ewt+1t,2 [bJt+1] ⇡ constantt + b
✓Z
R
kJz,t (yt+1)dF (yt+1|yt)
◆
wt+1
+
1
2
✓Z
R
kJz,t (yt+1)dF (yt+1|yt)
◆
w2t+1
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where kJz,t and kJzz,t are functions of undetermined coefficients in the above
proposed policy rules. A direct implication of the quadratic forms in belief
distortions Mt,1 (wt) and Mt,2 (wt+1) is Normality in posterior belief over the
set of possible models both at stage 1 and stage 2.
In the next step, we log-linearize the optimality conditions derived in Ap-
pendix around the A-SS.While doing this, we seriously take into account that at
stage 1 and 2 posterior belief over cross-sectional mean of idiosyncratic produc-
tivity shocks are distorted in a way consistent with the estimated belief distor-
tions Mt,1 (wt) and Mt,2 (wt+1). By doing this, we share the same spirit with Ilut
and Schneider (2014) and Ilut and Saijo (2016) in dealing with log-linearization
with distorted subjective belief. Plugging the proposed policy rules into the
log-linearized optimality conditions, we arrive at a large system of undeter-
mined coefficients. To note that in the practical implementation, we discretize
the AR(1) process of ambiguity to transform functions over yt into a finite num-
ber of coefficients, each of which corresponds to the value of the function at a
specific value for yt. Such a huge system of undetermined coefficients can be
solved quantitatively with the restriction that kkk < 1 to ensure TVC is not vio-
lated. Detailed math can be found in the Appendix.
2.6.3. Calibration
Table 2.1 summarizes the parameters used in the calibrated version of our base-
line model. Discount factor b is 0.99; Frisch elasticity of labor supply is 2; cap-
ital share in production is 0.36, and depreciation rate of capital is 0.025. q is
chosen to be 1 corresponding to Cobb-Douglas aggregation technology over is-
land commodities, which implies yt =
R
J yj,tdj. Finally, c is chosen to be 4.47 to
ensure that 1/3 of time is devoted to working in the deterministic steady state.
The persistence of aggregate productivity shock r is chosen to be 0.95, a
conventional value in the literature. Following Angeletos, Collard, and Dellas
(2016b), the persistence of ambiguity shock ry is 0.75 indicating a 2.5 quarters
half-life of ambiguity shock, which resembles aggregate demand shock in Blan-
chard and Quah (1989). It remains to specify the standard deviations of the
three exogenous shocks: the aggregate productivity shock sz , the idiosyncratic
productivity shock si and the ambiguity shock st, as well as the amount of
ambiguity at A-SS y and the degree of ambiguity aversion l.
Following Angeletos, Collard, and Dellas (2016b), we select these 5 param-
eters to minimize the distance between the model implied standard deviations
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Table 2.1. Model Parameters
Parameters Role Value
b discount factor 0.99
e inverse Frisch elasticity 0.5
a capital share 0.36
d depreciation rate 0.025
q Cobb-Douglas aggregation 1
c 1/3 hours at D-SS 4.47
r persistence of agg. productivity shock 0.95
ry persistence of ambiguity shock 0.75
100sz std. dev. of agg. productivity shock 0.78
100si std. dev. of island productivity shock 9.0
st std. dev. of ambiguity shock 0.47
y amount of ambiguity ey at A-SS -5.05
l Degree of ambiguity aversion 12.5
of output, consumption, hours, investment and labor productivity and their
data counterparts, where the distances of each variable are weighted by the
precision of model-based estimators. We arrive at the calibration such that
sz = 0.0078 and si = 0.090. The process of the ambiguity shock has a long-
run mean ey = 0.0064 and standard deviation st = 0.47. Finally, the degree of
ambiguity aversion is 12.5.17
2.6.4. Business-Cycle Moments and Aggregate Co-movements
Business-cycle moments. Table 2.2 summarizes key moments of aggregate
variables in the US data over the period of 1971Q1-2014Q4 (column 1) and in
our calibrated baseline model (column 2). The overall empirical fit of the cali-
brated baseline model is quite well.
At the core of such overall fit are the balancing roles between the two ag-
gregate shocks, i.e., aggregate productivity shock zt and ambiguity shock yt.
Column 3 and 4 report the business cycle moments for aggregate variables
when there are only aggregate productivity shocks by setting st = 0 or am-
17To note that, even though there are 5 parameters to match 5 moments, we cannot ensure
perfect matching. This is because we are not doing the unconstrained minimization. We are
minimizing the objective under the constraint that ley is bounded above. Such a constraint
implicitly assumes there should not be too much deviation in belief from objective one at A-SS
and also ensures the uniqueness of A-SS.
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Table 2.2. Bandpass-Filtered Moments of Aggregate Variables
Data(1971Q1-2014Q4) Baseline Model A Only y Only
Standard Deviations
stddev(y) 1.45 1.72 1.28 1.17
stddev(c) 0.87 0.72 0.38 0.63
stddev(n) 1.76 1.93 0.60 1.83
stddev(i) 5.45 4.51 3.75 2.63
stddev(y/n) 0.84 0.96 0.69 0.67
Correlations
corr(c,y) 0.88 0.92 0.92 0.98
corr(n,y) 0.88 0.87 0.99 0.99
corr(i,y) 0.95 0.99 0.99 0.99
corr(c,n) 0.85 0.93 0.90 0.97
corr(c, i) 0.80 0.84 0.88 0.95
corr(i,n) 0.85 0.80 0.99 0.99
Corr. with Productivity
corr(y,y/n) -0.11 0.05 0.99 -0.99
corr(n,y/n) -0.57 -0.45 0.97 -0.99
Note: The first column reports moments for US data from 1971Q1 to 2014Q4. The second column
reports moments in our baseline model. Column 3 and 4 report moments generated by some
models when there are only aggregate productivity shocks or ambiguity shocks respectively. All
moments are band-pass filtered at frequencies 6-32 quarters.
biguity shocks by setting sz = 0 respectively. As in the case of standard RBC,
when there are only aggregate productivity shocks, the model fails to generate
enough fluctuations in hours and predicts counterfactually high positive cor-
relations between output (or hours) and labor productivity. On the contrary,
when there are only ambiguity shocks, the model generates too much volatility
in hours and predicts almost perfectly negative correlations between output or
hours and labor productivity. In combination, the overall fit is achieved through
a natural balancing by our calibrated baseline model.
Aggregate co-movements. Impulse response functions of key aggregate
variables to a positive ambiguity shock are reported in . The aggregate co-
movement patterns are akin to those of the confidence shocks in Angeletos,
Collard, and Dellas (2016b), Huo and Takayama (2015) and Ilut and Saijo (2016),
where a positive ambiguity shock generates a drop of aggregate quantities, i.e.,
output, consumption, hours and investment, while, at the same time, an in-
crease in labor productivity in a way consistent with interpretation of aggregate
demand shocks.
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Figure 2.2. Impulse responses to one standard deviation of positive ambiguity shock
What drives the co-movements pattern behind the these IRFs is the fluc-
tuations of in the degree of the pessimism over the short-run outlooks of the
economy. By construction, a positive ambiguity shock deepens the degree of
the pessimism of all agents over the cross-sectional mean of idiosyncratic pro-
ductivity shocks for all periods onwards. From the perspective of the firms,
such an increased pessimism means into a depressed expectation over the de-
mand of own commodities. In response, firms reduce demand for labor and
capital, generating downward pressure on factors prices. From the perspective
of the households, this implies a modest decrease in expected permanent in-
come. In response, consumption drops. At the same time, the modest drop in
expected permanent income, unlike the case for aggregate productivity shocks,
restricts the strength of wealth effect. Given the fact that households under-
stand the drop in factors prices only last for the near future, hours and invest-
ment decrease in equilibrium since the relevant substitution effect dominates
the opposing wealth effect. In sum, ambiguity shocks generate aggregate co-
movements patterns depicted in Figure 2.2.
Labor wedges. Our calibrated baseline model does a considerably good
job in capturing features of data on hours. We interpret such a goodness of fit
through the lens of labor wedge analysis in line with Chari, Kehoe, and Mc-
Grattan (2007). The key idea is to interpret aggregate data on quantities and
prices as wedges in optimality conditions of a text-book RBC model. Then the
question of interest is the following: how will the data generated by our cali-
brated baseline model be translated into wedges, especially labor wedges? It
turns out that ambiguity shocks generate empirical relevant countercyclical la-
bor wedges. To economize space, detailed math regarding the calculation of
labor wedge are moved to the Appendix.
Table 2.3 compares moments of labor wedge estimated from US data over
the period of 1971Q1-2014Q4 with their model counterparts. It turns out our
calibrated baseline model does a considerable good job in capturing cyclical
behaviors in labor wedge. It is the exactly the aggregate demand shock na-
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Table 2.3. Bandpass-filtered Moments: Labor Wedges
Data(1971Q1-2014Q4) Baseline Model
Stddev 2.17 2.20
Correlation with y -0.75 -0.66
Note: The first column reports moments of labor wedge for US data from 1971Q1 to 2014Q4.
The second column reports corresponding moments in our baseline model. All moments are
band-pass filtered at frequencies 6-32 quarters. Details can be found in Appendix.
ture embedded in ambiguity shock that helps us in explaining labor market
dynamics to a large extent. A positive ambiguity shock makes the households
more pessimistic over current economic condition hence expecting consump-
tion to be lower. This drives down the expected marginal rate of intra-temporal
substitution between leisure and consumption, providing more incentives for
households to supply labor. Therefore, a positive ambiguity shock acts as a
subsidy on labor supply. On the contrary, a positive ambiguity shock makes
island j firms believe demand conditions are turning bad and therefore gener-
ates downward pressure on labor demand. In this sense, a positive ambiguity
shock acts as a tax on labor demand. In combine, firm side effect dominates
household side effect. Therefore, a positive ambiguity shock act as a total labor
wedge on island j. This implies that, on average, a positive ambiguity shock
generates larger labor wedge hence decreases hours in equilibrium.
2.6.5. Belief Divergence
FollowingAssumption 2.3, professional forecasters in themodel are assumed to
be ambiguity neutral. Also, to capture the fact that these professional forecast-
ers have better information position than private agents inside the economy do,
we provide with the professional forecasters in our model with one additional
private information over average productivity
R
J xj,tdj:
sj,t =
Z
J
xj,tdj+ x j,t with x j,t ⇠ N
⇣
0,s2x
⌘
We calibrate the standard deviation of this additional private information s2x to
match the standard deviation of the cross-sectional dispersion in SPF data over
the period of 1987Q1-2014Q4 resulting in 100sx = 0.52.
Table 2.4 reports the standard deviation and correlation with output y for
the US data. Over the period of 1987Q1-2014Q4, the starting point of time of
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which corresponds to the beginning of great moderation, there displays little
variation in belief divergence such that standard deviation is only 0.05 percent-
age points. However, it is significantly negative correlated with output ( 0.39).
Our calibrated baseline model captures exactly this pattern. To note that none
of our parameters are chosen to match the correlation with output in Table 2.4.
And the cyclical pattern of this moment is solely due to ambiguity shock in a
way such that a positive ambiguity is predicted to drive up belief divergence.
Therefore, we can conclude that ambiguity shocks capture salient features of
data in belief divergence pretty well.
Table 2.4. Bandpass-Filtered Moments of Belief Divergence
Data(1987Q1-2014Q4) Baseline Model
Stddev 0.05 0.05
Correlation with y -0.39 -0.67
Note: The first column reports moments of belief divergence for US data from 1987Q1 to 2014Q4.
The second column reports corresponding moments in our baseline model. All moments are
band-pass filtered at frequencies 6-32 quarters.
2.6.6. Estimated Market Confidence v.s. Sentiment Index
To further validate our theory, we address the following question: can our cali-
brated baseline model replicate themovements inmarket confidence as proxied
by Sentiment Index in the data?
Figure 2.3 compares the estimated time-series for market confidence, hours,
belief divergence and output together with their data counterparts between
1987Q1-2014Q4. To construct these estimated time-series, we first select the
sequence of ambiguity and aggregate TFP shocks that can perfectly back-out
output and the cross-sectional dispersion of output forecast in SPF. When we
backout these shocks we assume that the economy initially stays at the am-
biguous steady state.18 We then construct a sequence of simulated market con-
fidence following Definition 2.3. Notably, the simulated market confidence yt
closely tracks Sentiment Index inMichigan Survey of Consumers, especially for
the periods corresponding to NBER recessions. Recall that we do not use any
information on Sentiment Index in the construction of estimated time-series for
ambiguity and aggregate TFP shocks. Such an empirical fit provides additional
18These initial conditions are consistent with data that 1985 is neither a boom or recession.
Since the first 8 observations will be dropped after band-pass filtering, our findings are actually
quite robust to the choice of initial conditions.
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Figure 2.3. Estimated Times-Series vs Empirical Proxies
Note: The figure plots time-series for market confidence and hours estimated from our model
and their data counterparts between 1987Q1-2014Q4. In the data, market confidence is proxied
by Consumer Sentiment Index from Michigan Survey of Consumer. All moments are band-pass
filtered at frequencies 6-32 quarters.
validation to our theory. Also note that, simulated time-series of hours also
closely tracks its data counterpart.
2.7. Conclusion
We develop a novel theory of ambiguity-driven business cycles that contributes
to explain the co-movements across market confidence, belief divergence, and
the aggregate economy. We work on a standard RBCmodel with multiple firms
and multiple commodities and further extend it with ambiguity averse prefer-
ence represented by the smooth model of ambiguity. Within the smooth model
of ambiguity, we contribute to the literature with a Bayesian formulation of am-
biguity shock, namely shock to the variance of agents’ prior belief over possible
models.
Within a simple model without capital, we demonstrate that a positive am-
biguity shock makes all agents, who are ambiguity averse, behave as if they
believe the aggregate fundamental is turning bad and becoming more volatile.
Such dual impacts of ambiguity shock generate endogenous movements across
confidence and uncertainty. When the economy features imperfect coordina-
tion due to incomplete information, dual impacts of a positive ambiguity shock
translates into depressed belief over aggregate demand and the increased in-
centives to use private information both when making output decisions or out-
put forecasts. The former maps into depressed market confidence and the latter
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maps into heightened belief divergence. And finally, aggregate output falls due
to the increase in the economy-wide pessimism over aggregate demand. In this
sense, ambiguity shock in our paper is nothing more than a particular formu-
lation of the aggregate demand shock. In combination, a positive ambiguity
shock generates recession with depressed market confidence and heightened
belief divergence.
We further explore the quantitative potential of our theory within a dy-
namic RBC model. Ambiguity shock is shown to be capable of generating
co-movements across real quantities together with counter-cyclical labor pro-
ductivity and labor wedge. Our model is also capable of capturing cyclicalities
in belief divergence as measured by the cross-sectional dispersion in output
forecast in SPF dataset. Also, the estimated time series of market confidence
closely tracks Sentiment Index in Michigan Survey of Consumer. Therefore, we
conclude that fluctuations in market confidence, belief divergence, and the ag-
gregate economy are nothing more than the many shades of ambiguity shock,
not only qualitatively but also quantitatively.
96 CHAPTER 2. AMBIGUITY
Appendix of Chapter 2
2.A. Derivations and Proofs
Derivation of Equation (2.15). FOC for the island j workers’ problem is such
that
Z
R
f0
 
Ewtj,t,1
"
C1 gt   1
1  g   c
Z
J
N1+ej,t
1+ e
dj
#!
Ewtj,t,1
h
C gt Wj,t   cNej,t
i ef hj,t,1 (wt)dwt = 0
Plugging in the expression for ef hj,t,1 (wt) given by (2.6), we arrive at (2.12) where
distorted posterior belief over the set of possible models can be shown given by
(2.14). Similar procedures lead to (2.13). Then in the last step, combining (2.12)
and (2.13) together leads to (2.15).
Proof of Lemma 2.1. Under conditional log-normal equilibrium, we have that
yj,t =y⇤ + hy + kyx,txj,t + bhy (yt)
nj,t =n⇤ + hn + knx,txj,t + bhn (yt)
yt =
Z
J
yj,tdj+
1
2
✓
1  1
q
◆
d2y,j
where dy,j ⌘ k2yx,ts2i denotes the cross-sectional dispersion in island outputs. We
ignore dy,j in the approximation without loss of generality since they are of sec-
ond order impacts at the aggregates and have no impacts at all on the cyclical
behaviours of belief divergence.
Define S = es⇤+hs for any variable of interest S. Quadratic approximation
over period utility of the representative household is given by
Y1 gt   1
1  g   c
Z
J
N1+ej,t
1+ e
dj
⇡ Y
1 g
1  g

1+ (1  g) byt + 12 (1  g)2 by2t
 
  1
1  g   c
N1+e
1+ e
Z
J
✓
1+ (1+ e)bnj,t + 12 (1+ e)2 bn2j,t
◆
dj
=Const.+Y1 gbyt + 12 (1  g)Y1 gbyt  
Z
J
✓
cN1+ebnj,t + 12 (1+ e)cN1+ebn2j,t
◆
dj
Further define ex-ante (stage 0) expected utility given a particular model wt as
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Jt (wt) such that
Jt (wt) ⌘ Ewtt,0
"
Y1 gt   1
1  g   c
Z
J
N1+ej,t
1+ e
dj
#
It turns out Jt (wt) can be quadratically approximated by
Jt (wt) ⇡Constt + kJw (yt,l)wt + 12kJww (yt,l)w
2
t
where coefficients of linear and quadratic terms are given by
kJw (yt,l) =(Y⇤)1 g
⇣
1+ (1  g)hy
⌘
kyaj (yt,l)  c (N⇤)1+e
⇣
1+ (1+ e)hn
⌘
knaj (yt,l)
kJww (yt,l) =(Y⇤)1 g
⇣
1+ (1  g)hy
⌘
(1  g)k2yajt (yt,l)
  c (N⇤)1+e
⇣
1+ (1+ e)hn
⌘
(1+ e)k2naj (yt,l)
To derive such an approximation, we first approximate e(1 g)hy and e(1+e)hn by
1+ (1  g)hn and 1+ (1+ e)hn respectively. This is doable in the macro ap-
plication since we want to restrict the A-SS impact of ambiguity to avoid too
much statistical sophistication. Then we ignore the intersection terms between
wt and xj,t or between wt and bhs (yt) with s 2 {y,n}. This is doable since those
terms are negligible comparing to kJwwt.
Finally, quadratic approximation over Jt (wt) implies that belief distortion in
(2.17) is of exponential quadratic form. Therefore, posterior belief over the set
of possible models ef j,t,1 (wt) is Normal since the kernel would also be quadratic
in wt. This leads to a Normal density with the mean µt and variance s2t given
by
µt =
 
eyt + gs (yt,l)
s2z + s
2
i + eyt + gs (yt,l)
!
xj,t +
 
s2z + s
2
i
s2z + s
2
i + eyt + gs (yt,l)
!
gµ (yt,l)
(2.36)
and
s2t =
 
s2z + s
2
i
s2z + s
2
i + eyt + gs (yt,l)
! 
eyt + gs (yt,l)
 
(2.37)
98 CHAPTER 2. AMBIGUITY
where the distortions in mean gµ (yt,l) and in variance gs (yt,l) are given by
gµ (yt,l) =  lkJw (yt,l)
✓
eyt
1+ lkJww (yt,l) eyt
◆
gs (yt,l) = 
✓
lkJww (yt,l) eyt
1+ lkJww (yt,l) eyt
◆
eyt
In any well-defined equilibrium, it has to be the case that eyt + gs (yt,l) > 0.
Otherwise, there would be no well defined distroted posterior belief ef j,t,1 (wt)
in the sense that its kernel density would be explosive.
Proof of Proposition 2.1. Suppose that the conditional Log-Normal equilibrium
takes the following form:
yj,t ⌘ lnYj,t =y⇤ + hy
 
y
 
+ kyaj (yt,l) · aj,t + bhy (yt,l)
nj,t ⌘ lnNj,t =n⇤ + hn
 
y
 
+ knaj (yt,l) · aj,t + bhn (yt,l)
yt ⌘ lnYt =y⇤ + hy
 
y
 
+ kyaj (yt,l) ·
Z
J
aj,tdj+ bhy (yt,l)
where we ignore dispersion adjustment of aggregate output in the approxima-
tion without loss of generality since they are of second order impacts at the
aggregates and have no impacts at all on the cyclical behaviours of belief diver-
gence. Then at D-SS, we have the following
ln (c) + (1+ e)n⇤ = ln (1  a) + (1  g)y⇤
While, at A-SS, impacts of ambiguity shocks at A-SS denoted by hs s 2 {n,y}
must satisfy the following
hn = (1  g)hy +
✓
1
q
  g
◆
Hy
 
y,l
 
(2.38)
Here Hy
 
y,l
 
denotes degree of pessimism of island j agents over aggregate
output yt at the A-SS. Under the proposed conditional Log-Normal equilib-
rium, it is given by
Hy
 
y,l
 
= kyaj
 
y,l
  ✓Z
R
Ewtj,t,1
Z
J
aj,tdj
  ef j,t,1 (wt)dwt◆    
xj,t=0,yt=y
To understand why this is the case, recall that ambiguous steady state refers
to the state the economy converges to (a) in the absence of any shocks, i.e.,
aj,t = 0, but (b) taking into account of the existence of ambiguity, i.e., evaluating
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R
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wt
j,t,1
hR
J aj,tdj
i ef j,t,1 (wt)dwt at yt = y 6=  •. Alternatively, we can interpret
Hy
 
y
 
from the perspective of distorted subjective beliefs of all agents. At A-
SS, the amount of ambiguity y plays a non-trivial role in the sense that even
at A-SS, agent’s subjective belief over average productivity is distorted in the
mean. This mean distortion has to be respected when we evaluate the A-SS,
leading to a non-zero term Hy
 
y
 
. Similar arguments can be found in Ilut and
Schneider (2014) and Ilut and Saijo (2016) in the context of “worst case” belief
due to multiple prior preferences. Following (2.36), we have that
Hy
 
y,l
 
= kyaj
 
y,l
  s2i
s2z + s
2
i + ey + gs
 
y,l
 ! gµ  y,l  (2.39)
where kyaj
 
y,l
 
denotes the use of private information at the A-SS.
In the next step, we log-linearize (2.16) around the A-SS:✓
1+ e
1  a   1+
1
q
◆byj,t = ✓ 1+ e1  a
◆
aj,t +
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1
q
  g
◆✓Z
R
Ewtj,t,1 [byt] ef j,t,1 (wt)dwt   Hy  y,l ◆
(2.40)
Therefore, matching coefficients lead to the following two equilibrium condi-
tions✓
1+ e
1  a
◆
  (1  g)
 
kyaj (yt,l) =
✓
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◆
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1
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(2.41)
and✓
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  (1  g)
 bhy (yt,l) = ✓1q   g
◆
Hy (yt,l) 
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1
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◆
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(2.42)
by using the fact that under the proposed policy rules, we have that
Z
R
Ewtj,t,1 [byt] ef j,t,1 (wt)dwt =
"
1 
 
s2i
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i + eyt + gs (yt,l)
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where
Hy (yt,l) = kyaj (yt,l)
 
s2i
s2z + s
2
i + eyt + gs (yt,l)
!
gµ (yt,l) (2.43)
In what follows, we first present an auxiliary lemma that will be intensively
used in later on proofs. It helps us prove that there exists a unique A-SS charac-
terized by the use of private information kyaj ⌘ kyaj
 
y,l
 
and A-SS impacts of
ambiguity shocks hy
 
y
 
. After proving the existence and uniqueness. of A-SS,
we move on to prove that for any given amount of ambiguity yt, there exists a
unique kyaj (yt,l) manifesting the use of private information. And finally, exis-
tence and uniqueness of bhy would be straight-forward given all the results we
have established, which completes the whole proof.
Lemma 2.4. For any realized amount of ambiguity yt, both kJw (yt,l) and
kJww (yt,l) are positive.
Proof. First of all, at the D-SS, it is straight-forward to show that c (N⇤)1+e =
(1  a) (Y⇤)1 g. Then at the A-SS, it has to be the case that
(Y⇤)1 g
⇣
1+ (1  g)hy
⌘
1  g   c
(N⇤)1+e
⇣
1+ (1+ e)hn
⌘
1+ e
> 0
Otherwise, it is better-off to be inactive by choosing Y = C = N = 0. Therefore,
it must be the case that⇣
1+ (1  g)hy
⌘
1  g  
(1  a)
⇣
1+ (1+ e)hn
⌘
1+ e
> 0 (2.44)
Directly following (2.41), we know that kyaj > 0. This implies that
(1+ e)knaj   (1  g)kyaj < 0 (2.45)
since we know
(1+ e)knaj   (1  g)kyaj =  
✓
1
q
  g
◆ 
s2i
s2z + s
2
i + eyt + gs (yt,l)
!
kyaj
Furthermore, it can be shown that, by using c (N⇤)1+e = (1  a) (Y⇤)1 g, we
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would have that
kJw (yt,l) = (Y⇤)1 g
h⇣
1+ (1  g)hy
⌘
kyaj (yt,l) 
⇣
1+ (1+ e)hn
⌘
(1  a)knaj (yt,l)
i
Then it is straight-forward to prove kJw (yt,l)> 0 given (2.44) and (2.45). Then
we know gµ (yt,l)< 0, hence Hy
 
y,l
 
< 0. Following (2.38), we will have that
(1  g)hy > (1+ e)hn (2.46)
Since we know that
kJww (yt,l) = (Y⇤)1 g
h⇣
1+ (1  g)hy
⌘
(1  g)k2yajt (yt,l) 
⇣
1+ (1+ e)hn
⌘
(1  a) (1+ e)k2naj (yt,l)
i
it is straight-forward to have kJww (yt,l) > 0 given (2.45) and (2.46).
Unique A-SS:
Define S = (Y⇤)1 g, X =
⇥ 1+e
1 a   (1  g)
⇤
, S2 = e
y
1+lk Jww
and finally bi =
s2i
s2z+s
2
i +S2
. Then A-SS can be characterized by the following four equations:
Xkyaj =
✓
1+ e
1  a
◆
 
✓
1
q
  g
◆
kyajbi (2.47)
Xhy =  
✓
1
q
  g
◆
kyajbilk JwS
2 (2.48)
k Jw =S
h⇣
1+ (1  g)hy
⌘
kyaj  
⇣
1+ (1+ e)hn
⌘
(1  a)knaj
i
(2.49)
and
k Jww =S
h⇣
1+ (1  g)hy
⌘
(1  g)k2yaj  
⇣
1+ (1+ e)hn
⌘
(1+ e) (1  a)k2naj
i
(2.50)
Focus on (2.47) first. Simple algebra leads to
kyaj =
1+e
1 a
X+
  1
q   g
 
bi
⌘ f
⇣
kyaj ,hy
⌘
(2.51)
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It can be shown that
∂ f
∂kyaj
< 0
∂ f
∂hy
< 0
For any given hy, the LHS of (2.47) is increasing in kyaj and the RHS is decreasing
in kyaj . Together with the boundary conditions, by intermediate value theorem,
we can prove that for any hy there exists a unique k⇤yaj
⇣
hy
⌘
that satisfy (2.51).
Furthermore, we can show that such a function is decreasing in the sense that
dkyaj
dhy
=
∂ f/∂hy
1  ∂ f/∂kyaj
< 0
Next focus on (2.48). Things aremuchmore complicated here. Our target here is
to show that given any identified function k⇤yaj
⇣
hy
⌘
, there exists a unique hy that
satisfies (2.48). Existence can be easily proved by boundary conditions. Unique-
ness can be ensured under some regularity conditions. Define LHS and RHS of
(2.48) upon taking as k⇤yaj
⇣
hy
⌘
into consideration as LHS(hy) and RHS
⇣
hy
⌘
. A
sufficient condition for uniqueness is that
dRHS
dhy
<
dLHS
dhy
= X whenever LHS = RHS
It can be shown that
dRHS
dhy
= lk JwS2

 
✓
1
q
  g
◆  dkyajbi
dhy
+

 
✓
1
q
  g
◆
kyajbi
 
dlk JwS2
dhy
By using the fact that k⇤yaj
⇣
hy
⌘
is a solution for (2.47), we will have that

 
✓
1
q
  g
◆  dkyajbi
dhy
= X
dkyaj
dhy
Further evaluating it at LHS = RHS implies that
 
✓
1
q
  g
◆
kyajbi
 
=
Xhy
lk JwS2
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Therefore, we have that
1
X
dRHS
dhy
=lk JwS2
dkyaj
dhy
+ hy
d log (k Jw)
dhy
+ hy
d log
 
S2
 
dhy
=  Xhy  1
q   g
 
kyajbi
dkyaj
dhy
+ hy
d log (k Jw)
dhy
+ hy
d log
 
S2
 
dhy
or equivalently
  1
Xhy
dRHS
dhy
=
X  1
q   g
 
kyajbi
dkyaj
dhy
  1
k Jw
∂k Jw
∂kyaj
dkyaj
dhy
  1
k Jw
∂k Jw
∂hy
+ lS2
∂k Jww
∂hy
+ lS2
∂k Jww
∂kyaj
dkyaj
dhy
The followings can be easily proved:
∂k Jw
∂kyaj
=S
h
(1  g)hy   (1+ e)hn
i
= S
✓
1
q
  g
◆
kyajbilk JwS
2
∂k Jw
∂hy
=S
h
(1  g)kyaj   (1+ e)knaj
i
= S
✓
1
q
  g
◆
kyajbi
and
∂k Jww
∂kyaj
=2S
h⇣
1+ (1  g)hy
⌘
(1  g)kyaj  
⇣
1+ (1+ e)hn
⌘
(1+ e)knaj
i
> 0
∂k Jww
∂hy
=S
h
(1  g)2 k2yaj   (1+ e)2 k2naj
i
> 0
when evaluating at A-SS, i.e., (2.47) and (2.48) are satisfied. Simple algebra
would eventually imply
  1
Xhy
dRHS
dhy
=A
dkyaj
dhy
+ B
where we define the A and B are such that
A ⌘ X  1
q   g
 
kyajbi
  S
✓
1
q
  g
◆
kyajbilS
2
+ 2lS2S
h⇣
1+ (1  g)hy
⌘
(1  g)kyaj  
⇣
1+ (1+ e)hn
⌘
(1+ e)knaj
i
=
X  1
q   g
 
kyajbi
+ lS2S

2
⇣
1+ (1  g)hy
⌘
(1  g)kyaj   2
⇣
1+ (1+ e)hn
⌘
(1+ e)knaj  
✓
1
q
  g
◆
kyajbi
 
=
X  1
q   g
 
kyajbi
+ lS2S
h
2 (1  g)2 hykyaj   2 (1+ e)hnknaj + (1  g)kyaj   (1+ e)knaj
i
> 0
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and
B ⌘  1
k Jw
∂k Jw
∂hy
+ lS2
∂k Jww
∂hy
=  1
k Jw
∂k Jw
∂hy
+ lS2S
h
(1  g)2 k2yaj   (1+ e)2 k2naj
i
<
leyS
h
(1  g)2 k2yaj   (1+ e)2 k2naj
i
1+ leyk Jww
Therefore, we have that
 hyB <
leyS
h
  (1  g)2 k2yaj hy + (1+ e)2 k2naj (1  a)hn
i
1+ leyk Jww
Finally, we can prove
1+ leyk Jww   leyS
h
  (1  g)2 k2yaj hy + (1+ e)2 k2naj (1  a)hn
i
=1+ leyS
h
(1  g)k2yaj   (1+ e) (1  a)k2naj + 2 (1  g)2 k2yaj hy   2 (1+ e)2 k2naj (1  a)hn
i
=1+ leyS
nh
1+ 2 (1  g)hy
i
(1  g)k2yaj  
h
1+ 2 (1+ e)hn
i
(1+ e) (1  a)k2naj
o
> 0
where the last step can be justified by the fact that hy is relatively small for any
reasonable macro-application in the sense that 1+ 2 (1  g)hy > 0. Therefore,
we arrive at the fact that
 hyB < 1
which ensures uniqueness since it directly implies that dRHS
dhy
< X.
Unique kyaj (yt,l):
Use of private information kyaj is determined by (2.41). Denote the gap be-
tween LHS and RHS of (2.41) as f
⇣
kyaj
⌘
such that
f
⇣
kyaj
⌘
⌘
✓
1+ e
1  a
◆
  (1  g)
 
kyaj  
✓
1+ e
1  a
◆
+
✓
1
q
  g
◆ 
s2i
s2z + s
2
i + eyt + gs (yt,l)
!
kyaj
(2.52)
It can be shown that
• f
⇣
kyaj
⌘
< 0 if kyaj < 1
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• f
⇣
kyaj
⌘
> 0 if kyaj > 1+
(1 g)(1 a)
(1+e) (1 g)(1 a)
• f 0
⇣
kyaj
⌘
> 0
The last item follows the fact that gs (yt,l) is decreasing in kyaj because gs (yt,l)
decreases in kJww, which is an increasing function of kyaj .
Finally, in the last step of the proof, it is straight-forward to demonstrate the
existence and uniqueness for bhy (yt,l) from (2.42) given existence and unique-
ness given the existence and uniqueness for A-SS and kyaj .
Proof of Proposition 2.2 . Directly follows the comparison between Proof of
Proposition 2.1 and the solution for the beauty contest identified in the propo-
sition. The comparative static analysis of gµ and gs can be proved by demon-
strating kJw is increasing and kJww. is decreasing in yt.
Proof of Proposition 2.3 . It can be shown that (2.52) has the following proper-
ties regarding its partial derivatives evaluated at its equilibriumpoint f
⇣
kyaj
⌘
=
0:
• ∂ f
⇣
kyaj
⌘
∂kyaj
|
f
⇣
kyaj
⌘
=0
> 0
• ∂ f
⇣
kyaj
⌘
∂yt
|
f
⇣
kyaj
⌘
=0
< 0
which are all straight-forward!. Then we can prove that kyaj (yt,l) is increasing
in yt. Then following the (2.27), FDt (yt,l) increases with yt can be proved
easily.
Also it can be shown that kJw is increasing in yt since it is increasing in kyaj ,
which is an increasing function of yt. Also note that we can transform (2.43)
into
Hy (yt,l) =  kyaj (yt,l)
 
s2i
s2z + s
2
i + eyt + gs (yt,l)
! 
eyt + gs (yt,l)
 
lkJw
Following (2.41), we know that in equilibrium it must be the case that eyt +
gs (yt,l) is increasing in yt. Then we know Hy (yt,l)must be decreasing in yt.
Put this into (2.41), we complete the proof.
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Proof of Lemma 2.3 and Proposition 2.5. First of all, it can be shown that✓
k Jww +
1
ley
◆
∂ logk Jw
∂kyaj
=
1
k Jw
∂k Jw
∂kyaj
✓
k Jww +
1
ley
◆
=S
✓
1
q
  g
◆
kyajbi
=S
h
(1  g)kyaj   (1+ e)knaj
i
<2S
h⇣
1+ (1  g)hy
⌘
(1  g)kyaj  
⇣
1+ (1+ e)hn
⌘
(1+ e)knaj
i
=
∂k Jww
∂kyaj
The inequality follows the same argument as in the proof for unique A-SS. Then
we can claim that
∂ logk Jw
∂kyaj
<
ley
1+ lk Jwwey
∂k Jww
∂kyaj
At A-SS, we have that
gµ
 
y,l
 
=   lk Jwe
y
1+ lk Jwwey
) log  gµ  y,l   = log⇣lk Jwey⌘  log⇣1+ lk Jwwey⌘
Taking derivative leads to
∂ log
  gµ  y,l  
∂kyaj
=
∂ logk Jw
∂kyaj
  le
y
1+ lk Jwwey
∂k Jww
∂kyaj
< 0
Therefore, we have that
∂gµ
 
y,l
 
∂kyaj
> 0 (2.53)
At the A-SS when the amount of ambiguity is y, equilibrium is characterized
by (2.47) and (2.48). We can transform (2.48) by
Xhy =
✓
1+ e
1  a
◆
  Xkyaj
 
gµ
 
y,l
 
(2.54)
As in the proof of unique A-SS, (2.47) defines a decreasing function of kyx
⇣
hy
⌘
.
And an increase in s2i or a decrease in s2z increases the RHS of (2.47) for any
given hy. This indicates that the function k⇤yx
⇣
hy
⌘
derived from (2.47) shifted
to the left in response to an increase in s2i or a decrease in s2z . Furthermore,
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the RHS of (2.54) increases with kyaj marginally at the point where LHS equals
RHS. Following the proof of unique A-SS, the gap between RHS and LHS of
(2.54) is marginally increasing in hy at the point where LHS equals RHS. Then
a marginal increase in kyaj implies a marginal increase in y. Therefore, (2.54)
defines an increasing function of k⇤⇤yx
⇣
hy
⌘
. The decreasing function k⇤yx
⇣
hy
⌘
,
the increasing function of k⇤⇤yx
⇣
hy
⌘
and the left hand side shift of k⇤yx
⇣
hy
⌘
in
combine predict that
dkyaj
ds2i
< 0
dkyaj
ds2
s2z
> 0 (2.55)
and
dhy
ds2i
< 0
dhy
ds2
s2z
> 0 (2.56)
Finally, (2.53) and (2.55) together prove Lemma 2.3.
2.B. Accuracy of the Approximation
Suppose that the allocation constitutes a Log-Normal equilibrium in the sense
that in equilibrium yj,t ⌘ ln
 
Yj,t
 
takes the following forms
yj,t = y+ kyaj (yt,l) aj,t + bhy (yt,l)
Then we can, implement a quadratic approximation around the ambiguous
steady state (A-SS) over Jt (wt)⌘ Ewtj,t,0

Y1 gt  1
1 g   c
R
J
(Yj,t/Aj,t)
(1+e)/(1 a)
1+e dj
 
, which
gives out the following quadratic functional forms with respect to wt:
Jt (wt) ⇡ constt + kJw (yt,l)wt + 12kJww (yt,l)w
2
t
Directly following (2.17), the approximation implies aNormally distributed dis-
torted posterior belief over the set of possible models. This is exactly what
Lemma 2.1 is about. In addition, the fixed point condition (2.16) combined with
normality in distorted belief over the set of possible models would automati-
cally imply a conditional Log-Normal equilibrium such that
yt = y+ kyaj (yt,l)
Z
J
aj,tdj+ bhy (yt,l) + Rt + At + Dt| {z }
uncertainty adjustment
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where uncertainty adjustment consists of (a) risk adjustment Rt, (b) ambigu-
ity adjustment and finally (c) dispersion adjustment. All of these adjustments
are of second order impacts at the aggregates and have no impacts at all on
the cyclical behaviours of belief divergence. Therefore, we ignore these adjust-
ments in the approximated conditional Log-Normal equilibriumwithout loss of
generality. Equivalently, this corresponds to the usual log-linearation of (2.16),
but around the ambiguous steady state (A-SS) instead of deterministic steady
state (D-SS). In sum, to approximate the conditional Log-Normal equilibrium,
we implement a second order approximation over ex-ante expected value func-
tion of the representative household and at the same time a log-linearization of
optimality conditions, both around the A-SS.
How accurate is our approximation? We address this issue into two steps.
First of all, we highlight at what points of the analysis approximations are used.
Then we analyze in details what are the nature of the approximations and con-
duct some evaluations.
During the characterization of the approximated conditional Log-Normal
equilibrium, we first conduct a quadratic approximation of the ex-ante expected
utility Jt (wt) under a particular modelwt so as to express the belief distortion in
(2.17) into exponential-quadratic form. This implies approximated Normality
for ef j,t,1 (wt) the distorted posterior over the set of possible models when evalu-
ating marginal effects of an act. Second, given the approximated normality pos-
terior, we log-linearize the optimality conditions, consisting of (2.1) and (2.15),
around the A-SS. By doing so, we ignore uncertainty adjustments who are by
nature a couple of second-order terms having negligible impacts on allocations
and no impacts at all on belief divergence. For the second approximation, it is
fairly standard in the literature. As a matter of fact, the ignored uncertainty ad-
justments are of magnitude s2z + s
2
i + eyt . However, the first moment impacts of
ambiguity shocks are of magnitude leyt , which dominates uncertainty adjust-
ments given the calibrated degree of ambiguity aversion l. While, for the first
approximation, we deal with this issue by comparing the estimated posterior
density as in (2.17) and a semi-true posterior density numerically. To compute
the semi-true posterior density, we take the estimated policy functions (2.18)
and (2.19) as given and compute (2.17) analytically without using quadratic ap-
proximation over Jt (wt). Figure 2.B.1 demonstrates such comparison where
parameters are chosen such that q = 1, e= 0.5, a= 0.36, y= 5.05, sz = 0.0078,
si = 0.090 and st = 0.47. These are the same as our quantitative evaluations
in Section 2.6. c is chosen to be 1.895 to have hours in D-SS being 1/3, which
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(a) Baseline Calibration l = 12.5
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(b) Extreme Calibration l = 100
Figure 2.B.1. Accuracy of the Approximation
is the same standard when we calibrate c in Section 2.6. Following Angeletos
and La’O (2009), g is chosen to be 0.2 to ensure an empirically plausible income
effect of labor supply. Comparisons over estimated- and semi-true- posteriors
are conducted under two parameterizations for degree of ambiguity aversion
l: one baseline calibration l= 12.5 (the left-panel) and one counterfactually ex-
treme calibration l= 100 (the right-panel). Finally, we normalize the realization
of island productivity by setting aj,t = 0. This indicates the Bayesian posterior
should be mean zero. Therefore, the leftwards shifts of all the four posterior
densities manifest degree of pessimism due to ambiguity aversion. Finally, it
turns out the approximation of the distorted posterior over the set of possible
models is fairly accurate, not only for the baseline but also for the extreme cali-
bration. Moreover, once wemove to the extreme calibration, our approximation
turns out to under-estimates both degree of pessimism and volatility in beliefs
over the set of possible models when comparing to the semi-true counter-part.
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This further indicates that our approximation is quite conservative under ex-
treme calibrations.
2.C. Labor Wedges
Define the marginal rate of intra-temporal substitution between leisure and
consumption MRSNj,t and labor productivity MPLj,t on island j by
MRSNj,t = ebnj,t + bct
and
MPLj,t =byj,t   bnj,t
Then we can define island j labor wedge from the perspective of household
by the gap between real wage bwj,t and island j marginal rate of intra-temporal
substitution between leisure and consumption MRSNj,t:
tnhj,t ⌘ bwj,t  MRSNj,t
and island j labor wedge from the perspective of firm as the gap between island
j labor productivity MPLj,t and real wage bwj,t:
t
n f
j,t ⌘ MPLj,t   bwj,t
Finally, we define the total labor wedge in the economy by the cross-sectional
average over the sum of the two:
tnt ⌘
Z
J
⇣
tnhj,t + t
nh
j,t
⌘
dj
Plugging in optimality conditions for labor, model implied wedges are such
that
tnhj,t =
Z
R
Ewtj,t,1 [bct] ef j,t,1 (wt)dwt   bct
t
n f
j,t =
1
q
byj,t   ZR Ewtj,t,1 [byt] ef j,t,1 (wt)dwt
 
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2.D. Details for Quantitative Analysis
2.D.1. Equilibrium Conditions
Equilibrium can be characterized by the standard TVC and following condi-
tions:
• labor optimality condition
cNej,t =
 Z
R
Ewtj,t,1
"
1
Ct
✓Yj,t
Yt
◆  1q # ef j,t,1 (wt)dwt!✓(1  a) Yj,tNj,t
◆
• optimal capital demand condition
Rj,t
Z
R
Ewtj,t,1

1
Ct
  ef j,t,1 (wt)dwt = ✓ZR Ewtj,t,1

1
Ct
Pj,t
  ef j,t,1 (wt)dwt◆✓aYj,tKj,t
◆
• Euler equation
1
Ct
= b
Z
R
Ewt+1t,2

1
Ct+1
 
(1  d) + Rj,t+1
   eft,2 (wt+1)dwt+1 (2.57)
• budget constraint
Yt = Ct +
Z
J
Ij,tdj (2.58)
• capital accumulation
Kj,t+1 = (1  d)Kj,t + Ij,t (2.59)
• production function for island commodities
Yj,t = Aj,tKaj,tN
1 a
j,t (2.60)
• production function for final goods
logYt =
Z
J
logYj,tdj (2.61)
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• value function recursion for Jt ⌘ J
  
Kj,t
 
, at 1,zt,zt,yt
 
:
Jt = max
Ct,{Kj,t+1}
ln (Ct) + b
✓
  1
l
◆
ln
✓Z
R
e lE
wt+1
t,2 [Jt+1] ft (wt+1)dwt+1
◆
• distorted beliefs
nef j,t,1 (wt) , eft,2 (wt+1)o at stage 1 and at stage 2 respec-
tively
ef j,t,1 (wt) = e lEwtt,0 [Jt] f  xj,t|wt  ft (wt)
and
eft,2 (wt+1) = e lEwtt,2 [Jt+1] ft (wt+1)
Observe that in equilibrium, it will be the case that Kj,t = Kt for all t > 0. This
is because at stage 2 there exists no heterogeneity in belief over capital return
rj,t across islands. Therefore, capital supply exhibits no heterogeneity. In what
follows, we replace all Kj,t with Kt for simplicity.
2.D.2. Solution Method
We propose the following semi-linear policy rules of conditional log-normal
equilibrium for island employment bnj,t, output byj,t, wage rate bwj,t and rental
rental rate of capital brj,t at stage 1 of period t:
byj,t = kykbkt + kyaat 1 + kyx (yt) xj,t + bhy (yt)bnj,t = knkbkt + knaat 1 + knx (yt) xj,t + bhn (yt)bwj,t = kwkbkt + kwaat 1 + kwx (yt) xj,t + bhw (yt)brj,t = krkbkt + kraat 1 + krx (yt) xj,t + bhr (yt)
and the for consumption bct, investment bit and capital stock tomorrow bkt+1 at
stage 2 of period t:
bct = kckbkt + kcaat 1 + kcz (yt) zt + kcz (yt) zt + bhc (yt)bit = kikbkt + kiaat 1 + kiz (yt) zt + kiz (yt) zt + bhi (yt)bkt+1 = kkkbkt + kkaat 1 + kkz (yt) zt + kkz (yt) zt + bhk (yt)
Quadratic approximation of value function
Under the proposed policy rules, quadratic approximation of household period
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utility around the A-SS is such that
ln (Ct)  c
Z
j
N1+ej,t
1+ e
dj (2.62)
⇡c⇤ + hc + kckbkt + kcaat 1 + kcz,tzt + kcz,tzt + bhc (yt) (2.63)
  cN
1+e
1+ e
Z
j
h
1+ (1+ e)
⇣
knkbkt + knaat 1 + knx,txj,t + bhn (yt)⌘ (2.64)
+
1
2
(1+ e)2
⇣
knkbkt + knaat 1 + knx,txj,t + bhn (yt)⌘2 dj (2.65)
(2.66)
Guess that Jt is given by
Jt =J⇤ + hJ + kJkbkt + kJaat 1 + kJz,tzt + kJz,tzt (2.67)
+ kJkabktat 1 + kJkz,tbktzt + kJkz,tbktzt + kJaz,tat 1zt + kJaz,tat 1zt + kJzzztzt
(2.68)
+
1
2
kJkkbk2t + 12kJaaa2t 1 + 12kJzz,tz2t + 12kJzz,tz2t + bhJ (yt) (2.69)
Hence we have✓
  1
l
◆
ln
✓Z
wt+1
e lE
wt+1
t,2 [Jt+1] ef ct,2 (wt+1)dwt+1◆ (2.70)
=constantt + kJkbkt+1 + kJaat + kJkabkt+1at + 12kJkkbk2t+1 + 12kJaaa2t (2.71)
Value function recursion implies that
Ewtt,0 [Jt] =
✓
^J⇤ + hJ + bhJ (yt)◆+ kJkbkt + kJaat 1 + kJz,twt + kJkabktat 1 + kJkz,tbktwt + kJaz,tat 1wt
(2.72)
+
1
2
kJkkbk2t + 12kJaaa2t 1 + 12kJzz,tw2t (2.73)
⇡constantt + kJz,twt + 12kJzz,tw
2
t (2.74)
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where the following matching coefficients leads to
kJz,t =kcz,t   cN⇤
h
1+ (1+ e)hn
i
knx,t + bkJkkkz,t (2.75)
kJk =kck   cN⇤
h
1+ (1+ e)hn
i
knk + bkJkkkk (2.76)
kJzz,t =  (1+ e)cN⇤
h
1+ (1+ e)hn
i
k2nx,t + bkJkkk
2
kz,t (2.77)
kJkk =  (1+ e)cN⇤
h
1+ (1+ e)hn
i
k2nk + bkJkkk
2
kk (2.78)
To arrive these expression, we first approximate e(1+e)hn by 1+ (1+ e)hn and
by ignoring a couple of higher order terms without loss of generality.
Furthermore, we can approximate by
Ewtt,2 [Jt+1] ⇡ constantt + kJz,t+1wt +
1
2
kJzz,t+1w
2
t
where termwith over-line denotes period t expectation over that term in period
t+ 1.
Distorted posterior beliefs
Distorted beliefs are normal with the following kernels
ef j,t,1 (wt) = e l(kJz,twt+ 12 kJzz,tw2t ) f  xj,t|wt  ft (wt)
and
eft,2 (wt+1) = e l(kJz,t+1wt+ 12 kJzz,t+1w2t ) ft (wt+1)
Ambiguous Steady State
A-SS can be characterized by
log (c) + (1+ e)n⇤ + (1+ e)hn = log (1  a) + y⇤   c⇤ + hy   hc + Hn
 
y
 
y⇤ + hy =(1  a)
⇣
n⇤ + hn
⌘
+ a
⇣
k⇤ + hk
⌘
r⇤ + hr = log (a) + y⇤   k⇤ + hy   hk + Hr
 
y
 
1=O1 +O2
Xc + Xi =Xy
Xi =dXk
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where terms with star denote the D-SS and the auxiliary functions are such that
Hn (yt) =
"✓
1
q
kyx,t   kcz,t
◆ 
s2i
s2z + s
2
i
!
+ kcz,t
 
s2z
s2z + s
2
i
!#0@  lkJz,t
1
s2z+s
2
i
+ 1eyt + lkJzz,t
1A
Hr (yt) =
1
q
kyx,t
 
s2i
s2z + s
2
i
!0@  lkJz,t
1
s2z+s
2
i
+ 1eyt + lkJzz,t
1A
S1 (yt) ⌘ (krx,t+1   kcz,t+1)
 
 lkJz,t+1
1
eyt,t+1
+ lkJzz,t+1
!
+
⇣bhr (yt+1)  bhc (yt+1)⌘
S2 (yt) ⌘  (kcz,t+1)
 
 lkJz,t+1
1
eyt,t+1
+ lkJzz,t+1
!
  bhc (yt+1)
O1 =ber
⇤+hr+S1(y)
O2 =b (1  d) eS2(y)
and
Xc =
⇣
ec
⇤+hc
⌘
Xi =
⇣
ei
⇤+hi
⌘
Xy =
⇣
ey
⇤+hy
⌘
Xk =
⇣
ek
⇤+hk
⌘
Log-linearization of optimality conditions
Log-linearzation of optimality conditions around the A-SS leads to
• labor optimality
(1+ e)bnj,t =✓1  1q
◆byj,t + Z
wt
Ewtj,t,1

1
q
byt   bct  ef j,t,1 (wt)dwt   Hn  y 
• optimal capital demand condition
brj,t = ✓1  1q
◆byj,t + Z
wt
Ewtj,t,1

1
q
byt   bkt  ef j,t,1 (wt)dwt   Hr  y 
• Euler equation
ct =O1
Z
R
Ewt+1t,2
⇥brj,t+1   bct+1⇤ eft,2 (wt+1)dwt+1  O2 ZR Ewt+1t,2 [bct+1] eft,2 (wt+1)dwt+1
• budget constraint
Xcbct + Xibit = Xybyt
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• capital accumulation
Xkbkt+1 = (1  d)Xkbkt + Xibit
• production function for island commodities
byj,t = rat 1 + xj,t + abkt + (1  a)bnj,t
• production function for final goods
byt = Z
J
byj,tdj
Systems of undetermined coefficients
Combining the proposed policy rules and log-linearized optimality condi-
tions, we arrive at the following systems of undetermined coefficients:
• Determination of kJ⇤
kJz,t =kcz,t   cN1+eknx,t + bkJkkkz,t
kJk =kck   cN1+eknk + bkJkkkk
kJzz,t =  (1+ e)cN1+ek2nx,t + bkJkkk2kz,t
kJkk =  (1+ e)cN1+ek2nk + bkJkkk2kk
• Determination of ambiguous steady state
log (c) + (1+ e)n⇤ + (1+ e)hn = log (1  a) + y⇤   c⇤ + hy   hc + Hn
 
y
 
y⇤ + hy =(1  a)
⇣
n⇤ + hn
⌘
+ a
⇣
k⇤ + hk
⌘
r⇤ + hr = log (a) + y⇤   k⇤ + hy   hk + Hr
 
y
 
1=O1 +O2
Xc + Xi =Xy
Xi =dXk
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• Determination of k⇤k and k⇤a
(1+ e)knk =
✓
1  1
q
◆
kyk +

1
q
kyk   kck
 
(1+ e)kna =
✓
1  1
q
◆
kya +

1
q
kya   kca
 
kyk =(1  a)knk + a
kya =r+ (1  a)kna
krk =kyk   1
kra =kya
 kck =(O1krk   kck)kkk
 kca =(O1krk   kck)kka + (O1kra   kca)r
Xckck + Xikik =Xykyk
Xckca + Xikia =Xykya
kkk =(1  d) + dkik
kka =dkia
• Determination of k⇤x,t, k⇤z,t and k⇤w,t
(1+ e)knx,t =
✓
1  1
q
◆
kyx,t +
"✓
1
q
kyx,t   kcz,t
◆ s2z
s2z + s
2
i
!
  kcz,t
 
s2z
s2z + s
2
i
!#
+
"✓
1
q
kyx,t   kcz,t
◆ 
s2i
s2z + s
2
i
!
+ kcz,t
 
s2z
s2z + s
2
i
!#0@ 1s2z+s2i
1
s2z+s
2
i
+ 1eyt + lkJzz,t
1A
kyx,t =1+ (1  a)knx,t
krx,t =
✓
1  1
q
◆
kyx,t +
1
q
kyx,t
 
s2z
s2z + s
2
i
!
+
✓
1
q
kyx,t
◆ 
s2i
s2z + s
2
i
!0@ 1s2z+s2i
1
s2z+s
2
i
+ 1eyt + lkJzz
1A
 kcz,t =(O1krk   kck)kkz,t
 kcz,t =(O1krk   kck)kkz,t + (O1kra   kca)
Xckcz,t + Xikiz,t =Xykyx,t
Xckcz,t + Xikiz,t =0
kkz,t =dkiz,t
kkz,t =dkiz,t
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• Determination of bh⇤ (yt)
(1+ e)bhn (yt) =✓1  1q
◆bhy (yt) + 1qbhy (yt)  bhc (yt)
 
+ bHn (yt)
bhy (yt) =(1  a)bhn (yt)bhr (yt) =bhy (yt) + bHr (yt)
 bhc (yt) =(O1krk   kck)bhk (yt) +O1bS1 (yt) +O2bS2 (yt)
Xcbhc (yt) + Xibhi (yt) =Xybhy (yt)bhk (yt) =dbhi (yt)
where bHn (yt) ⌘ Hn (yt)  Hn (y¯) and bHr (yt) ⌘ Hr (yt)  Hr (y¯).
The algorithm
To quantitatively solve for the equilibrium, we first discretize the ambiguity
process by a stationary Markov process with 11 states. This transforms func-
tions over yt into 11 undetermined coefficients. Then we arrive at a non-linear
large system of equations regarding undetermined coefficients. We describe the
algorithm to solve this system of undermined coefficients below.
1. Guess that the ambiguous steady state coincideswith deterministic steady
state such that hS = 0 for all S 2 {y, c,n, i,k,r}. This leads to O1 = ber⇤+hr
and O2 = b (1  d). Further guess that S1
 
y
 
= S1
 
y
 
= 0.
2. Given
 
O1,O2,S1,S2,Xc,Xy,Xi,Xk
 
, solve for k⇤k and k⇤a. We restricts
kkk < 1 to ensure TVC being satisfied.
3. Jointly solve kJ⇤, k⇤x,t, k⇤z,t and k⇤w,t given the solution for k⇤k and k⇤a.
4. Solve bh⇤ (yt) for the given solution for kJ⇤, k⇤x,t, k⇤z,t, k⇤w,t, k⇤k and k⇤a.
5. Solve for the A-SS and compute new levels of
 
O1,O2,S1,S2,Xc,Xy,Xi,Xk
 
.
6. Check for convergence over
 
O1,O2,S1,S2,Xc,Xy,Xi,Xk
 
. If converge,
stop. Otherwise, go back to Step 2.
Convergence can be achieved when the amount of ambiguity at A-SS y is not
extremely high or when degree of ambiguity aversion l is not extremely high.
This is because these are the conditions to ensure unique A-SS as in the simple
model without capital. Other than this constraint, the algorithm works well in
the approximation of the semi-linear conditional log-normal equilibrium.
Chapter 3
Financial Sentiments and Coordinated
Information Provision1
1I thank Fabrizio Zilibotti, Heng Chen, Nir Jaimovich and Pengfei Wang for their useful dis-
cussions and comments.
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3.1. Introduction
Empirical studies have documented that financial market fluctuations are dis-
connected with market fundamentals. For example, Shiller (2003) states that
financial markets are inefficient because fundamentals are not sufficient to ra-
tionalize stock market volatility. Hall (2001) also finds that many high tech
firms with sustained high stock market value turned out to have negative earn-
ings. Further the non-fundamental volatilities are shown to reflect financial
sentiment. For example, Verma and Verma (2007) empirically finds “significant
positive effects of investor sentiments on stock returns.”2
Where does the sentiment come from in financial market? What are the ori-
gins of financial sentiment? Financial markets are blamed for its inefficiency
in providing the “right” amount of information over market fundamentals,
which leads to waves of pessimism and optimism preventing the market from
working efficiently. In this paper, we show that financial sentiments may stem
from the process of information production and transmission. Specifically, the
strategic interaction between information providers, e.g., analysts, and infor-
mation receivers, e.g., investors, can be the driving force of sentiment or non-
fundament fluctuations.
Framework. We formalize such an idea in a sender-receiver game that fea-
tures endogenous information production and transmission. Analysts offer fi-
nancial forecasts to investors. Specifically, analysts draft reports that analyze
the strength of market fundamental and aggregate investment, e.g., earnings
and multiples of the stock price. Their reports offer a forecast or recommen-
dation based on their estimates of both fundamental and aggregate actions
(eg. average recommendation made by other analysts and level of aggregate
investment). Investors make investment decisions, based on the information
they acquire from the analysts. Their payoff depends not only on fundamental
but also on the level of aggregate investment, which reflects complementarity
among investment decisions. Therefore, both variations in fundamental as well
as non-fundamental sentiment can play a role. Individual investor increases
his investment when the aggregate investment is higher. Such externalities in
payoff are formalized as in Angeletos and Pavan (2007). Ourmodel setup, how-
ever, features a three-way coordination among agents in the financial market:
(1) coordination among investors; (2) coordination among analysts; and (3) co-
ordination between analysts and investors.
2For more references, see Hirshleifer (2001) and Baker and Wurgler (2007) for survey treat-
ment on this in the empirical finance literature.
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Notably, sentiment arises in a self-fulfilling manner through information
production and tranmission. Suppose that all analysts believe that aggregate
investment reflects sentimental fluctuations. In response, financial reports writ-
ten by analysts contain information about sentiment. As a result, information
available to investors is contaminated by sentiment, therefore, individual in-
vestment decisions and aggregate investment are correlated with sentiment.
The analysts’ beliefs are self-fulfilling, that is, aggregate investment indeed de-
pends on sentiment as a result.
Main Results. In this paper, we focus on symmetric-linear-Gaussian equi-
librium where all actions i.e., report drafting or investing, are linear in signals
and the information structure remains Gaussian. We demonstrate that, in ad-
dition to fundamental equilibrium where aggregate investment only responds
to fundamentals, there exist sentiment equilibrium, in which, other than ex-
ogenous fundamentals, endogenous non-fundamental aggregate uncertainty
affects aggregate investment.
We derive the necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of senti-
ment equilibrium, which highlights the importance of three elements in driving
sentiment fluctuations, i.e., (1) the strategic interactions between analysts and
investors; (2) imperfect coordination of analysts and investors; and (3) strong
enough correlation between investment decision and sentiment. The necessary
and sufficient condition states that as long as analysts care so much about re-
porting the level of aggregate investment K or have sufficiently strong incen-
tive to align own report with the other analysts’ reports, sentiment equilibrium
arises.
Too much of concerns about the aggregate investment or sufficiently strong
incentives to align own report with the others’ divert analysts focus away from
fundamental. Instead, analysts respond to actions of other agents, namely ag-
gregate investment and average opinion of all other analysts. Strong desire to
coordinate but inability to do it perfectly creates the room for sentiment to kick in
inducing correlated beliefs and actions in a self-fulfilling manner. Acting as a
coordination device, self-fulfilling sentiment creates co-movements in agents’
beliefs and hence actions, which translates into non-fundamental volatility.
We demonstrate that the necessary and sufficient condition for the existence
of sentiment equilibrium, ensures uniqueness in the distribution of sentiment
too. Therefore, allocations in any sentiment equilibrium are isomorphic to the
standard beauty contest with a common noise in the signal about fundamental.
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In a sense, our model provides a micro-foundation for the common noises in
the public information, which has been assumed exogenous in much of the
literature.
Finally, considering the welfare implications of sentiment fluctuations, we
demonstrate that sentiment fluctuationsmake the financial marketmore volatile
by inducing non-fundamental volatility and by deteriorating the informative-
ness of investors’ private information about fundamentals. However, senti-
ment, acting as a coordination device that helps agents to coordinate their be-
liefs and actions also reduces cross-sectional dispersion of investment, which is
welfare improving. Therefore, whether sentiment deteriorates or enhances so-
cial welfare depends on the relative importance of volatility and cross-sectional
dispersion in the determination of welfare loss. In other words, it is not neces-
sarily true that sentiment is welfare reducing.
Relations to Literature. Our paper can be related to several strands of lit-
erature. First of all, our paper builds on Benhabib, Wang, and Wen (2015) and
Benhabib, Liu, and Wang (2016) in generating self-fulfilling sentiment fluctu-
ations. Benhabib, Wang, and Wen (2015) demonstrate that within a business
cycle model that features Dixit-Stiglitz monopolistic competition, self-fulfilling
sentiment may arise if firms cannot tell apart the idiosyncratic demand from
the aggregate demand. In our paper, instead of focusing on the business cycle
implications of sentiment fluctuations, we focus on the information produc-
tion and transmission process within the financial markets and demonstrate
that strategic interactions combined with imperfect coordination, create self-
fulfilling sentiment fluctuations. Furthermore, in Benhabib, Liu, and Wang
(2016), the authors focus on the “two-way feedback” between the real and fi-
nancial markets and demonstrate that endogenous price signals in the financial
market induce sentiment fluctuations in the real economy. The feedback creates
multiple equilibria under complete information, which at the core of driving the
continuum of sentiment equilibria differing in the variance of sentiment. While
in our paper, the focus is the information production and transmission and
the economy features unique equilibrium under complete information. What
drives sentiment fluctuation is the strategic interactions and imperfect coordi-
nation instead of multiplicity in complete information allocation. Our paper
also sheds light on the welfare implications of sentiment fluctuations, which
is absent from either Benhabib, Wang, and Wen (2015) or Benhabib, Liu, and
Wang (2016).
Secondly, our paper also builds on the literature of sender-receiver game in
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the modelling of information transmission process. Most of works in sender-
receiver game literature assume that senders have perfect information over the
fundamentals and focus on the strategic information disclosure among senders.
See Takahashi and Ambrus (2008), Battaglini (2002) Bhattacharya and Mukher-
jee (2013), and Chan and Suen (2009) for example. Our paper contributes to this
line of literature by demonstrating that when senders have incomplete informa-
tion over fundamentals, there can be self-fulfilling sentiment fluctuations. To
note that incomplete information is not only a more reasonable setup but also
the necessary condition for the emergence of self-fulfilling sentiments. Chen
and Suen (2018) also studies a sender-receiver game with senders having in-
complete information over fundamental. We differ from them by introducing
strategic complementarity among senders, which turns out to be the origins of
sentiment fluctuations.
Thirdly, our paper directly relates to the literature of coordination games
with incomplete information. See Morris and Shin (2002), Angeletos and Pavan
(2007) and Myatt and Wallace (2012) in the context of abstract game theoretic
models and Lorenzoni (2009), Angeletos and La’O (2013) and Woodford (2003)
in the context of business cycle model. All of these works feature some exoge-
nous public information over aggregate fundamental. Our model contributes
to this line of literature by providing a micro-foundation for the public noise. If
information were to be endogenously determined through the sender-receiver
structure, the arising of sentiment fluctuations act as a public noise in the infor-
mation available to receivers.
Finally, in the broader context, our paper also relates to the sunspot liter-
ature. See Diamond and Dybvig (1983), Benhabib and Farmer (1994) for ex-
ample and Benhabib and Farmer (1999) for a survey treatment on this line of
literature. In these works, non-convexity or strong form of complementarity
generates multiple equilibria, each of whom differing in aggregate variables’
response to fundamental. Multiple equilibria also arise in our paper. We dif-
fer from sunspot literature both in the nature and cause of the multiplicity. In
our paper, multiple equilibria arise due to strategic interaction and imperfect
coordination and multiplicity is over the realization of self-fulfilling sentiment.
While, in case of the standard sunspot literature, multiplicity is about differ-
ent responsiveness of endogenous variables to fundamentals and the cause of
multiplicity is either non-convexity or strong strategic complementarity.
Layout. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 sets up
the model and defines the rational expectation equilibrium. Section 3.3 char-
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acterizes the equilibrium and highlights the origins of sentiment in financial
markets. In Section 3.4, welfare implications of sentiment is discussed.
3.2. The Model
3.2.1. Agents, Actions and Payoffs
The economy consists of a continuum of investors indexed by j 2 J ⌘ [0,1], as
well as a continuum of analysts indexed by i 2 I ⌘ [0,1]. Investors need to
choose an investment kj 2R to maximize his payoff:
uj =U
 
kj,K,sk,q
 
,
where q 2 R stands for the fundamental; K ⌘ Rj kjdj for the aggregate invest-
ment; and sk ⌘
hR
j
 
kj   K
 2 dji1/2 denotes the cross-sectional dispersion of in-
vestors’ investment. Following Angeletos and Pavan (2007), U is assumed to
be of the following form:
U (k,K,sk,q) = (k,K,q)Su (k,K,q)
0 + 1
2
Usksks
2
k ,
where Su denotes a 3⇥ 3 matrix consisting of model primitives.
Assumption 3.1. Ukq > 0 and UkK > 0
Payoff of investor j depends on the fundamental q, which can be interpreted
as, for example, the underlying productivity of the economy or the profitability
of the firm that attracts investment. We assume thatUkq > 0, which captures the
idea that the marginal return to investment increases in q. Investment decisions
are of strategic complementarity, that is,UkK > 0. The cross-sectional dispersion
of investments sk affects the individual investor’s payoff but has no strategic
impact.3 Analyst i in each analyst drafts a report yi 2R to maximize his payoff:
vi = V
 
yi,y,sy,K,sk,q
 
,
where y⌘ Ri yidi is the average forecast reported by all analysts and sy⌘ hRi (yi   y)2i1/2
denotes the cross-sectional dispersion of these forecats. The utility function of
3The assumption that s2z has no strategic impact ensures certainty equivalence, which is the
feature of many macro models using log-linearization.
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analysts V is assumed to be of the following quadratic form:
V
 
yi,y,sy,K,sk,q
 
= (yi,y,K,q)Sv (yi,y,K,q)
0 +
 
sy,sk
 
Ss
 
sy,sk
 0 ,
where Sv is a 4 ⇥ 4 matrix and Ss is a 2 ⇥ 2 matrix which consist of model
primitives.
Assumption 3.2. Vyq > 0, VyK > 0, Vyy > 0, and Vyy < 0.
The fact that the analysts tend to herd their information for career concern
has been documented empirically in numerous studies for example Hong, Ku-
bik, and Solomon (2000). In ourmodel, such an incentive is captured byVyy > 0,
which implies that individual analyst has incentive to benchmark his own fore-
cast to the prevailing forecast of others’. We further assume that Vyq > 0 and
VyK > 0, so that analyst i’s forecast is more sanguine, if either the fundamental
q or the aggregate investment K is higher. For example, analysts intend to offer
forecasts that are close to the fundamental q (e.g., the value of the firm whose
security is being traded) as well as aggregate action K (e.g., other investors’ in-
vestment decisions). Neither cross-sectional dispersions of information sy, nor
that of investment decisions sk has any strategic role.
Assumption 3.3. Ukk < 0,  UkK/Ukk < 1, Vyy < 0 and  Vyy/Vyy < 1.
We further impose Assumption 3.3 so that equilibrium uniqueness is en-
sured in a useful benchmark case where there exists the strong complementar-
ity among investors but the information structure is exogenous. Observe first
that Vyy < 0 and Ukk < 0 ensure concavity in payoff of analysts and investors.
Further,  UkK/Ukk < 1 and  Vyy/Vyy < 1 ensure a weak form of strategic com-
plementarity following Angeletos and Lian (2016). The two sets of assumptions
combined lead to the equilibrium uniqueness in the benchmark case.4
One illustrating example of the payoff functions is given as follows. As in
Morris and Shin (2002), payoff of investors can take the following form:
uj =U
 
kj,K,q
 
=   (1  a) kj   q 2   a kj   K 2 ,
where a measure the degree of coordination motive of mass investors. Payoff
4In our model, information is endogenous and multiplicity arises because of strategic inter-
actions between senders and receivers rather than the strong complementarity among investors.
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of analyst i can take the following form:
vi = V (yi,y,K,q) =   (1  y  f) (yi   q)2   y (yi   K)2   f (yi   y)2 ,
where analyst i writes his report to minimize a weighted average of the dis-
tance of his own forecast (1) from fundamental q, (2) from aggregate investment
K and (3) from the average forecasts of other analysts y. In this example, ana-
lysts forecast the market condition consists of fundamental, aggregate invest-
ment and average forecast with the relative importance being parameterized
by (1  y  f), y and f respectively.
3.2.2. Information Structure
There exist two types of aggregate uncertainty that contribute to the fluctua-
tion of aggregate investment K in this model, that is, fundamental q and non-
fundamental uncertainty, z (interpreted as sentiment). The fundamental q is
drawn by Nature from a Gaussian distribution, that is, q ⇠ N(0,s2q ), where s2q is
the variance. Sentiment is an aggregate shock that may endogenously arise and
its distribution is determined as an equilibrium outcome. The payoffs of ana-
lysts’ and investors’ do not depend on the sentiment shock. But as we will elab-
orate later, sentiment impacts on the aggregate investment K in a self-fulfilling
manner.
Analyst i cannot can observe the realization of fundamental q, but they re-
ceive private information xi about it:
xi = q + ii
where ii is normally distributed with mean 0 and variance s2i , independent of
fundamental q and i.i.d across all analysts. To maintain tractability, we assume
that analysts can observe the the sentiment z perfectly, if it arises.
Investors learn the fundamental q and sentiment z, through reading finan-
cial forecasts by analysts.5 However, investors are constrained by their capacity
of learning, so that they cannot read all the reports from all analysts. We assume
that investor j randomly selects and reads a subset Bj ✓ I of financial forecasts.
The randomness in Bj implies that investors act as if they receive only one piece
5The assumption that investors can only learn from financial forecasts offered by analysts
is only a simplification but not crucial for our model mechanisms. Allowing investors to have
access to private forecasts does not change our results
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of information sj, such that
sj = y+ # j
where # j is i.i.d normal with mean 0 and variance
  1
k   1
 
s2i and uncorrelated
with y. The parameter s2i represents the heterogeneity across forecasts of ana-
lysts. The parameter k 2 [0,1] characterizes the learning capacity of investors.
If k = 0, investors have no capacity of learning (or Bj is an empty set) and sj is
a pure noise. If k = 1, investor j has infinite amount of capacity (or Bj = I) and
observes y.
Such an assumption on information acquisition deserves elaboration. First,
we assume that each investor has access to a subset of forecasts, given his ca-
pacity of learning, so that the informational heterogeneity across investors is
maintained. Similar modelling device has been employed by Lorenzoni (2009).6
Second, if sentiment does not arise, y= q. Our assumption prevents the perfect
information revealing, that is, investors acquire fundamental q.
3.2.3. Equilibrium Definition
Definition 3.1 (Rational Expectation Equilibrium). A rational expectation equilib-
rium consists of (1) a set of analysts’ information providing strategies {y⇤i (xi,z)}i2I ;
(2) a set of investors’ investment strategies
n
k⇤j
 
sj
 o
j2J
; (3) two aggregation functions
for aggregate investment K (q,z) and average forecasts y (q,z); and (4) an endogenous
distribution P of sentiment z, which is independent of fundamental q such that
• given K (q,z) and y (q,z), I IBi and all other analysts’ reports {ym (xm,z)}m 6=i,
analyst i maximizes own expected utility, i.e.,
y⇤i (xi,z) = argmax
yi2R
E
h
V
 
yi,y,sy,K,sk,q
  |I IBi i 8i 2 I (3.1)
• given {yi (xi,z)}i2I , I IBi and all the other investors’ strategies {km (sm)}m 6=i,
6Lorenzoni (2009) studies an island with dispersed information. In equilibrium, price of is-
land j goods is a linear combination of aggregate TFP shock and island-specific TFP. If consumer
on island i can trade with all other islands, he knows the aggregate TFP perfectly, which com-
pletely removes private information from the economy. Instead, if consumers are randomly
assigned to a subset of goods for consumption hence only observe the prices of one subset of
goods, it is as if each consumer receives another private signal about aggregate TFP. Therefore,
information remains to be dispersed, even when trading across islands is allowed.
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investor j maximizes own expected utility, i.e.,
k⇤j
 
sj
 
= argmax
kj2R
E
h
U
 
kj,K,sk,q
  |I IBj i 8j 2 J (3.2)
• and the endogenous distribution of sentiment P (z) ensures the consistency, i.e.,
K (q,z) =
Z
j
k⇤j
 
y+ ij
 
dj 8 (q,z) 2R⇥R (3.3)
and
y (q,z) =
Z
i
y⇤i (xi,z)di 8 (q,z) 2R⇥R (3.4)
In equilibrium, all investors and analysts believe that sentiment is drawn
from a distribution P, aggregate investment is a mapping from both fundamen-
tal and sentiment K (q,z) and average forecast is a mapping y (q,z). Analyst i
maximizes his expected payoff, taking as given the reporting strategies of all
other analysts, investing strategies of investors, the aggregate investment as
well as the average forecast. Investor j maximizes his expected payoff, taking
as given the investing strategies of all other investors as well as the reporting
strategies of all analysts. The resulting decisions of analysts and investors are
consistent with aggregate investment K (q,z) and average forecast y (q,z). The
distribution of sentiment P is endogenously determined to ensure the consis-
tency.7
Observe that it is always possible that sentiment z has a degenerate distri-
bution, in which z= 0 with probability 1. This corresponds to the case where all
endogenous variables are solely driven by exogenous fundamental uncertainty
q. We label this case fundamental equilibrium. Otherwise, it is a sentiment
equilibrium, when there exists non-degenerate sentiment.
3.3. Equilibrium Characterization
3.3.1. The Complete Information Benchmark
The model is defined to feature complete information if si = 0, where analysts
observe the fundamental q or their private information is infinitely precise. In
7We exclude cross-sectional dispersions of financial reports sy and of investments sk from
the equilibrium definition because they are assumed to be pure payoff externalities without any
strategic roles in determining either optimal reporting strategy y⇤ (xi,z) or optimal investment
strategy k⇤
⇣
sj
⌘
.
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this case, analysts have common knowledge about q and therefore provide ho-
mogenous forecasts. As a result, investors receive identical reports and the vari-
ance of # j varnishes to 0.
Proposition 3.1 (Complete Information). Under complete information, there exists
a unique equilibrium such that analyst i’s forecast and investor j’s investment are both
linear in q, i.e., yi = y= b (q)⌘ b0 + bqq for all i 2 I and kj = K = g (q)⌘ g0 + gqq
for all j 2 J where
g0 =
 Uk (0,0,0,0)
Ukk +UkK
gq =
 Ukq
Ukk +UkK
> 0
and
b0 =
 Vy (0,0,0,0,0,0) VyKg0
Vyy +Vyy
bq =
 Vyq  VyKgq
Vyy +Vyy
> 0
Further, sentiment z has a degenerate distribution such that z = 0 with probability 1.
In the complete information benchmark, both forecasts of analysts and in-
vestments of investors increases with fundamental q, i.e., bq ,gq > 0. Whenever
fundamental q is stronger, analysts write more positive report and investors
invest more aggressively. Note that, when information is complete, the econ-
omy features no sentiment fluctuations, because the shared common knowl-
edge among analysts and agents in the economy completely shuts down co-
ordination frictions. Therefore, aggregate investment and average forecasts of
analysts are also common knowledge. Recall that forecasts of analysts con-
tain information about (1) fundamental q, (2) aggregate investment K and (3)
average forecasts of all analysts. As a result, investors can perfectly infer the
fundamental q. The whole economy features not only complete information,
but also perfect information about fundamental q.8 Therefore, the complete in-
formation benchmark features perfect information transmission from analysts
to investors. In equilibrium, beliefs are actions are anchored by fundamental
q, which leaves no room for any non-fundamental volatility due to sentiment
fluctuations.
In what follows, to economize notations, without loss of generality, we nor-
malize the complete information allocation such that g0 = b0 = 0 and gq = 1
8We differentiate between notions of complete information and perfect information according
to Angeletos and Lian (2016). Complete information means the existence of no private informa-
tion or simply assuming common knowledge. While perfect information refers to the situation
of knowing states of the economy perfectly. It is not necessarily true that one implies the other,
depending on the assumptions of states and information structure.
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by the imposing restrictions over model primitives. Upon normalization, un-
der complete information, analyst i’s forecast yi = bqq and investor j’s decision
kj = q.
Assumption 3.4. (Normalization). Payoff functions U and V are normalized
such that Uk (0,0,0,0) = Vy (0,0,0,0,0,0) = 0 and Ukq =Ukk +UkK.
3.3.2. Fundamental Equilibrium and Sentiment Equilibrium
In both fundamental and sentiment equilibrium, analysts and investors maxi-
mize their expected payoff given the relevant information as well as the equi-
librium distributions of fundamental q and sentiment z. Below, we characterize
the analysts’ optimal reporting and investor’s optimal investing strategies, tak-
ing as given the distribution of sentiment P (z).
Proposition 3.2 (Optimality). Let a, c, f and y be such that
a =  UkK
Ukk
> 0 c =  Vyq
Vyy
> 0 f =  Vyy
Vyy
2 (0,1) y =  VyK
Vyy
> 0
For any distribution of sentiment P, degenerate or non-degenerate, analyst i’s optimal
reporting strategy is such that
yi =E [cq + fy+ yK|xi,z] 8i (3.5)
and investor j’s optimal investing strategy is such that
kj =E
⇥
(1  a) q + aK|sj
⇤ 8j (3.6)
In any equilibrium, optimal investing strategy of investor j is a weighted
average of his belief over fundamental q and his belief over aggregate invest-
ment K. Conditional on sj and the distribution of sentiment P, equation (3.6)
constitutes a fixed point condition over
 
kj : j 2 J
 
. Investment decisions are
complementary to each other: when all investors other than j invest more, it
incentivizes investor j to invest more.9
In any equilibrium, financial report yi issued by analyst i increases in fun-
damental q, aggregate investment K and the average forecast of all analysts.
9Such a fixed point is a common feature for models feature coordination motives and con-
tinuum action space, e.g., Morris and Shin (2002), Angeletos and Pavan (2007) and Myatt and
Wallace (2012) in the abstract game theoretic models and Lorenzoni (2009), Angeletos and La’O
(2013) and Woodford (2003) in the context of business cycle models.
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Analyst i’s report truthfully reflects his belief over the general market condition
characterized by the fundamental q and aggregate investment K. The weights
assigned by analyst i to beliefs over fundamental and aggregate investment
are c and f, respectively. Observe that equation (3.5) constitutes another fixed
point condition over {yi : i 2 I}. The fact that f > 0 ensures that forecasts of
analysts are of strategic complementarity.
Two fixed point conditions (3.5) and (3.6) are not independent of each other.
Fixed point condition (3.5) has to be solved by taking solution of fixed point
condition (3.6), i.e. K, as given. Similarly, fixed point condition (3.6) has to be
solved by taking solution of fixed point condition (3.5), i.e. y, as given. By solv-
ing (3.5) and (3.6), we can solve the equilibrium for any exogenous distribution
of sentiment P (z).
Note that fundamental equilibrium is equivalent to the case with degener-
ate sentiment distribution. Therefore, solving fixed point conditions with de-
generate P leads to the characterization of fundamental equilibrium.
Lemma 3.1. Fundamental Equilibrium There always exists symmetric linear
equilibrium without non-fundamental sentiment shock, such that
yi (xi) = px,Fxi kj
 
sj
 
= ps,Fsj K (q) = pq,Fq.
where the elasticities (px,F,ps,F,pq,F) are the solutions to the system of equa-
tions (), () and (). Finally, information available to investor j is also linear in q,
such that
sj = px,Fq + # j (3.7)
Throughout this paper, we focus on symmetric-linear-Gaussian equilibrium.
With exogenous information structure, symmetry comes from the fact that all
agents are the same ex-ante and linearity arises due to quadratic payoff and
Gaussian shocks.10 When information structure is endogenous, as in our setup,
linearity and Gaussian distributions are self-fulfilling in equilibrium. Linear-
ity of action rules imply all endogenous variables are normally distributed, in-
cluding information produced by analysts. Gaussian endogenous information
further leads to linearity in action rules.
10With general payoff function, linearity can be understood as the results of log-linearization
around a known steady state allocation, an approach commonly used in macro and finance liter-
ature.
132 CHAPTER 3. FINANCIAL SENTIMENT
Following the same logic, we are interested in characterizing sentiment equi-
librium where sentiment z is normally distributed with mean 0 and variance s2z
and contributes linearly to aggregate investment11:
K (q,z) = pq,Sq + z. (3.8)
The nature of the sentiment z is also self-fulfilling. Suppose that all ana-
lysts believe that sentiment z affects aggregate investment K as in (3.8). Then
financial reports written by analysts contain information about both fundamen-
tal q and sentiment z. Hence, information available to investor j, i.e., sj must be
correlated with sentiment z, which further implies that kj is correlated with sen-
timent z for all j 2 J. Therefore, upon aggregation, it confirms the initial belief
that aggregate investment is a function of sentiment z. However, to sustain the
self-fulfilling sentiment, internal consistency, which requires that that the initial
belief over aggregate investment coincides with equilibrium outcome induced
by individual optimal investment decisions, has to be respected. It eventually
pins down the distribution of sentiment P (z) or on s2z .
Proposition 3.3 (Sentiment Equilibrium). Symmetric linear equilibriumwith Gaus-
sian sentiment can be characterized by a 4-tuple of elasticities (px,S,pz,S,ps,S,pq,S)
together with the variance of sentiment s2z such that allocations are given by
yi (xi,z) = px,Sxi + pz,Sz kj
 
sj
 
= ps,Ssj K (q,z) = pq,Sq + z
and sentiment z is normally distributed with mean 0 and variance s2z . Furthermore,
symmetric linear equilibrium with Gaussian sentiment exists if and only if
(1  a)
✓
y
1  f
◆
  c
✓
s2q
s2i
◆ 
c
✓
s2q
s2i
◆
s2q  
✓
1
k
  1
◆
s2i > 0 (3.9)
The variance of sentiment s2z > 0 is uniquely determined in equilibrium.
Recall that sentiment z is defined to impact aggregate investment on a one-
to-one basis. Internal consistency over sentiment z requires that
ps,Spz,S = 1
 
s2z > 0
 
(3.10)
11Sentiment z is normalized to havemean 0. In general, it can have a non-zeromean. However,
it can be reduced to our model by simply re-labelling sentiment by subtracting the mean. Also,
sentiment z is assumed to contribute to aggregate investment one to one. In general, it can be
the case that K (q,z) = pq,Sq + dz0. This is equivalent to our model by imposing the fact that in
equilibrium s2z = d2s2z0 .
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How much sentiment correlated with aggregate investment must be equal to
the multiplication of how much it affects analysts’ report pz,S and how much
investors use private information to make investment ps,S. Similarly, internal
consistency over fundamental q implies that
pq,S = ps,Spx,S (3.11)
Furthermore, given the fact that realization of sentiment z is common knowl-
edge among all analysts, optimal reporting strategy of analysts (3.5) implies
that response of forecasts of analyst i equals to the weighted average of the im-
pacts of sentiment on aggregate investment K and on other analysts’ forecasts
pz,S = y · 1
 
s2z > 0
 
+ fpz,S (3.12)
Moreover, analyst i’s posterior belief over fundamental q is E [q|xi] =
⇣
s2q
s2q+s
2
i
⌘
xi.
Therefore, use of private information of analyst i must satisfy
px,S = (c+ fpx,S + ypq,S)
✓
s2q
s2q + s
2
i
◆
(3.13)
where c + fpx,S + ypq,S measures how much analysts care about reporting
fundamental q consisting of direct concerns c and indirect concerns through
aggregate investment K and average forecasts by all other analysts y. These
four conditions uniquely pin down the 4-tuple of elasticities independent of
the variance of sentiment s2z .
Finally, the variance of sentiment s2z is endogenously determined to ensure
that it provides the “right” incentive to investors in the use of private informa-
tion:
ps,S = (1  a) px,Ss
2
q
p2x,Ss
2
q + p
2
z,Ss
2
z +
  1
k   1
 
s2i| {z }
r(sj,q)
+ a
⇣
p2x,Ss
2
q + p
2
z,Ss
2
z
⌘
/pz,S
p2x,Ss
2
q + p
2
z,Ss
2
z +
  1
k   1
 
s2i| {z }
r(sj,K)
(3.14)
There are two opposing forces associatedwith amore volatile sentiment. Higher
s2z contaminates the informativeness of sj on fundamental q, i.e. ∂r
 
sj,q
 
/∂s2z <
0. While, higher s2z implies that sj convey more information over aggregate in-
vestment K, i.e., ∂r
 
sj,K
 
/∂s2z > 0.
Observe that s2z cannot be too large. Once it is i.e., s2z ! +•, all investors
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know that their information sj is contaminated by sentiment z so much that the
information sj becomes no value in forecasting fundamentals q: r
 
sj,q
 
= 0.
sj simply becomes a piece of perfect information over aggregate investment
K: r
 
sj,K
 
= 1. This is because when sentiment becomes infinite volatile, non-
fundamental volatility completely dominates fundamental volatility in the vari-
ations of aggregate investment K. With sj conveying no information about fun-
damental q and perfect information over aggregate investment K, individual
investment decision would responds to sj or equivalently K by a factor of a.
Weak form complementarity a 2 (0,1) directly implies that both kj and K must
be 0 naively, contradicting with the initial belief that economy features huge
amount sentiment fluctuations at the aggregate level. Reducing s2z would pos-
sibly restore internal consistency. However, there is a natural lower bound 0
for s2z . Therefore, it is possible for some model primitives, there presents no
sentiment fluctuations at all.
Proposition 3.3 demonstrates that the necessary and sufficient condition to
ensure existence is given by (3.9). More importantly, the same condition also
implies uniqueness in s2z . Uniquely determined s2z implies that all sentiment
equilibria only differ in the realization of sentiment z. Therefore, allocations
in sentiment equilibrium are isomorphic to standard beauty contest model that
features a common noise z⇠ N  0,s2z   in the . In this sense, our model provides
a micro-foundation for the common noises in the public information literature.
Our model setup abstracts away any non-convexity and strong complemen-
tarity in actions so as to focus on how sentiment arises in the process of informa-
tion production and transmission. Three key elements lead to the emergence of
sentiment in this model: (1) the strategic interactions between analysts and in-
vestors; (2) the imperfect coordination of analysts and investors; and (3) strong
enough correlation between individual investment decision kj and sentiment z.
Corollary 3.1. There exists no sentiment equilibrium if either analysts’ coor-
dination incentive y, or heterogeneity in analysts’ information si or investor’s
learning capacity k is sufficiently low.
First of all, with little incentive to report the aggregate investment K, i.e. y=
0, there exists no strategic interactions between analysts and investors or fore-
casts offered by analysts are independent of investing strategies of investors.
All analysts simply play a standard beauty contest as in Morris and Shin (2002)
such that yi = cE
⇥
q|I IBi
⇤
+ fE
⇥
y|I IBi
⇤
. The unique equilibrium, therefore, is yi
being solely a function of fundamental q. From the perspectives of investors,
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they behave as if they are playing another beauty contest kj = (1  a)E
h
q|I Ij
i
+
aE
h
K|I Ij
i
with exogenous information over fundamental q. Therefore, in equi-
librium, all endogenous outcomes of the model including information, beliefs
and actions are anchored to fundamental q, leaving no room for sentiment fluc-
tuations.
Secondly, if we were able to remove the heterogeneity from the informa-
tion set of analysts’, i.e., si ! 0, the fundamental becomes common knowledge
among analysts. This is exactly the complete information benchmark in Propo-
sition 3.1 featuring perfect information revelation from analysts to investors.
Perfect information over fundamental q anchors all agents’ beliefs and actions,
leaving no room for sentiment fluctuations.
Finally, when learning capacity is sufficiently low k = 0, investors would
ignore sj when making investment decisions. As a result, there lacks enough
correlation between individual investment kj and sentiment z, which violates
the consistency that requires aggregate investment K respond to sentiment z
positively.
Corollary 3.2. Strong enough strategic interactions between analysts and in-
vestors or strong desire to align report with other analysts’ reports are sufficient
for sentiment fluctuations:
(1) Fixing primitives
 
a,f,c,s2q ,s
2
i ,s2i ,k
  2 (0,1) ⇥ R5+ ⇥ (0,1), there exists
a threshold y as a function of
 
a,f,c,s2q ,s
2
i ,s2i ,k
 
such that there exist
sentiment equilibrium if and only if y > y > 0;
(2) Fixing primitives
 
a,y,c,s2q ,s
2
i ,s2i ,k
  2 (0,1) ⇥ R5+ ⇥ (0,1), there exists
a threshold f as a function of
 
a,y,c,s2q ,s
2
i ,s2i ,k
 
such that there exist
sentiment equilibrium if and only if f > f > 0.
Both thresholds increase in learning capacity.
∂y
∂k
< 0;
∂f
∂k
< 0.
Strategic interactions. Corollary 3.2 states that when coordination between
individual analyst and mass investors is imperfect, i.e., si > 0 and a< 1, strong
enough strategic interactions between analysts and mass investors ensures sen-
timent fluctuations. This is because with strong enough strategic interaction
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(y> f), analysts’ reports contains a lot of information on sentiment z given the
fact that z affects aggregate investment K on a fixed one-to-one basis in equi-
librium. Therefore, information available to investor j would contain quite a
lot information over sentiment. It increases the responsiveness of investor j’s
investment decision kj to sentiment z, which eventually supports the existence
of sentiment equilibrium.
Career concerns. Corollary 3.2 also states that high enough f or strong
enough career concerns of analysts ensures sentiment fluctuations in equilib-
rium. There are two opposing forces at work. On the one hand, larger incen-
tives to align own report with the rest of others’ provide less incentive in the
use of private information xi, which makes y less unpredictable. Given the fact
that aggregate investment K is a function of y for sure, more career concern re-
sults in less imperfection in coordination between analysts and investors. On
the other hand, more incentive to align reports also provides more incentive to
include sentiment z into financial report yi given the fact that analyst i under-
stands the others’ reports also contain sentiment z under sentiment equilibrium.
As a result, reliance of average reports y on sentiment z is increased, which for
sure raises reliance of individual investment kj on sentiment z. It turns out that
the latter force dominates the former. Therefore, strong enough career concerns
create room for sentiment fluctuations.
Learning capacity. Finally, Corollary 3.2 highlights that higher k raises the
threshold for y and f. When learning capacity k increases, investors can read
more financial reports and get more precise information over average report
y. Therefore, investors rely more on sj to make investment decisions in stead of
relying on the the common prior, which raises the responsiveness of investment
kj to sentiment z. It also increases responsiveness of aggregate investment K to
y which makes aggregate investment K less predictable from the perspective
of an individual analyst. Hence less perfect coordination between individual
analysts and investors. Both forces help create sentiment fluctuations.
3.4. Welfare Implications of Sentimental Fluctuations
In this section, we compare social welfare under fundamental equilibrium and
sentiment equilibrium.
Definition 3.2. Social welfare in our model is defined to be the ex-ante expected payoff
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of investors
SW ⌘
Z
(q,z)
Z
sj
U
 
k
 
sj
 
,K (q,z) ,sk (q,z) ,q
 
dP
 
sj|q,z
 
dP (q,z) .
Following Angeletos and Pavan (2007), we define social welfare to be ex-
ante expected payoff of the mass investors and the hypothetical planner is as-
sumed to have no interest in protecting payoff of analysts. Following the same
derivations in Angeletos and Pavan (2007),12 social welfare can be rewritten as:
SW =E [U (g⇤ (q) ,g⇤ (q)0,q)]  L, (3.15)
where g⇤ (q) ⌘  Uk (0,0,0,0)   UK (0,0,0,0)   Ukq+UKqUkk+2UkK+UKK q denotes the effi-
cient investing strategies under complete information and L denotes the wel-
fare loss due to volatility and dispersion
L =  Ukk + 2UkK +UKK
2
E
h
(K  g⇤ (q))2
i
| {z }
Volatility
  Ukk +Uss
2
E
h
(k  K)2
i
| {z }
Dispersion
(3.16)
Social welfare is the sum ofwelfare under efficient investing strategies E [U (g⇤,g⇤0,q)]
and awelfare lossL consisting of volatility E
h
(K  g⇤ (q))2
i
and cross-sectional
dispersion E
h
(k  K)2
i
of investments. Observe that sentiment does not affect
the former. Therefore, we focus on the welfare loss L for the comparison.
We further impose the Assumption 3.5 on U, which ensures that higher
volatility or dispersion reduces social welfare and the economy features no wel-
fare loss under complete information.
Assumption 3.5. Ukk + 2UkK +UKK < 0, Ukk +Uss < 0 and g⇤ (q) = q.
In general, there could be multiple fundamental equilibria in the a sender-
receiver game, where equilibria differ with each other in the response of ag-
gregate investment K to fundamental q. To ensure a clear comparison between
sentiment equilibrium and fundamental equilibrium, we only focus on the case
where fundamental equilibrium can be uniquely determined.
Proposition 3.4 (Welfare Implications). Volatility is higher in sentiment equilib-
rium but cross-sectional dispersion of investment is lower than that in fundamental
equilibrium.
12See appendix of Angeletos and Pavan (2007) for detailed derivations.
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To understand the economic intuition behind this result, it is useful to un-
derstand the role of self-fulfilling sentiment z in the financial market. First of all,
it induces non-fundamental volatility, which raises volatility of the market. On
the other hand, considering making forecasts over fundamental q, sentiment z
deteriorates the informativeness of investor j’s private information sj over fun-
damental q. Both of the two roles of sentiment contribute to higher volatility in
sentiment equilibrium. However, sentiment fluctuations help investors to co-
ordinate their actions, given it is a common shock. As a result, cross-sectional
dispersion of investment sk decreases.
It is commonly believed that sentiment fluctuations or non-fundamental
volatilities are detrimental to social welfare, which is true if sentiment fluctua-
tions only affect volatilities of the economy. As we have demonstrate in Section
3.3, information heterogeneity (s2i 6= 0) is the necessary condition for the emer-
gence of sentiment. Therefore, sentiment fluctuations must be coupled with a
corresponding change in cross-sectional dispersion of the economy. The oppo-
site impacts of sentiment z on volatility and cross-sectional dispersion lead to
an ambiguous implication on social welfare. In fact, social welfare can be either
higher or lower in sentiment equilibrium depending on the relative importance
of volatility and dispersion in social welfare loss. If cross-sectional dispersion is
far more important than volatility, sentiment can be a welfare improving, given
it coordinates agents on both sides of information producing and receiving.
3.5. Conclusion
We conclude that financial sentiment may originates from endogenous infor-
mation production and transmission of the financial market in a self-fulfilling
manner. Within a sender-receiver game that features endogenous information
production and transmission, we derive the necessary and sufficient condi-
tions for the arising of sentiment fluctuations. The condition demonstrates that
whenever the senders of information such as security analysts cannot perfectly
coordinate with receivers of information such as investors, strong enough con-
cerns of actions of the others, either level of aggregate investment or average
opinions of other analysts, result in endogenous non-fundamental aggregate
uncertainty, namely sentiment.
Strong desire to coordinate but inability to do it perfect creates enough room
for sentiment to induce correlated beliefs and actions. At the aggregate level,
they into non-fundamental volatilities, which is welfare deteriorating. While
at the cross-section, they result in lower dispersion in investment decisions,
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which is welfare improving. Welfare implications of self-fulfilling sentiment
are ambiguous depending on the relative importance of volatility and cross-
sectional dispersion in the determination of welfare loss.
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Appendix of Chapter 3
Proof of Proposition 3.1. Under complete information, analysts share a com-
mon belief. So do investors. Therefore, it must be the case that yi = y for all
i 2 I and kj = k for all j 2 J. Hence we have that y = y, K = k and sy = sk = 0.
Consider the problem of analysts first. Since analysts have perfect infor-
mation over q and z (if any). Therefore, in the optimality, it must be the case
that
Vy (y,y,0,k,0,q) = 0, Vy (0,0,0,0,0,0) +
 
Vyy +Vyy
 
y+VyKk+Vyqq = 0
(3.17)
Next, consider the problem of investors. All investors have the same infor-
mation y. Common knowledge here implies that K = k is also common knowl-
edge. Therefore, in the optimality, it must be the case that
E [Uk (k,k,0,q) |y] = 0,Uk (0,0,0,0) + (Ukk +UkK) k+UkqE [q|y] = 0 (3.18)
Equation (3.18) directly implies that k is a function of y only. Plugging it
back to equation (3.17) implies that y is a pure function of q, i.e., there is perfect
information revealing from analysts to investors. Then it must be the case that
E [q|y] = q.
Finally, we arrive at a system of two linear equations8<:Vy (0,0,0,0,0,0) +
 
Vyy +Vyy
 
y+VyKk+Vyqq = 0
Uk (0,0,0,0) + (Ukk +UkK) k+Ukqq = 0
Solving it leads to the expressions in Proposition 3.1.
Proof of Proposition 3.2. Concavity ofU implies that at the optimal, it must be
the case that
E
h
Uk
 
kj,K,sk,q
  |I Ij i = 0
It can be shown that
Uk
 
kj,K,sk,q
 
=Uk (g (q) ,g (q) ,0,q) +Ukk
 
kj   g (q)
 
+UkK (K  g (q))
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Further using the fact that Uk (g (q) ,g (q) ,0,q) = 0, we have
E
h
Ukk
 
kj   g (q)
 
+UkK (K  g (q)) |I Ij
i
= 0
Therefore, we have that
kj = (1  a)E
h
gk (q) |I Ij
i
+ aE
h
K|I Ij
i
(3.19)
Similarly, concavity in V implies that at the optimal, it must be the case that
E
h
Vy
 
yi,y,sy,K,sk,q
  |I IBi i = 0
It can be shown that
Vy
 
yi,y,sy,K,sk,q
 
=Vy (b (q) ,b (q) ,0,g (q) ,0,q)
+Vyy (yi   b (q)) +Vyy (y  b (q)) +VyK (K  g (q))
Further using the fact that Vy (b (q) ,b (q) ,0,g (q) ,0,q) = 0, we have
E
h
Vyy (yi   b (q)) +Vyy (y  b (q)) +VyK (K  g (q)) |I IBi
i
= 0
Therefore, we have that
yi = (1  f  gqy)E
h
gy (q) |I IBi
i
+ fE
h
y|I IBi
i
+ yE
h
K|I IBi
i
(3.20)
Imposing the normalization of complete information equilibrium, i.e., g (q) =
gy (q) = q, leads to the expression in Proposition 3.2.
Proof of Lemma 3.1. If there presents no sentiment in equilibrium and the equi-
librium allocation is linear and symmetric, it must be the case that both y and K
are linear in fundamental q:
y = pyqq K = pq,Fq
Then the information available to invest j would be
sj = pyqq + # j
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Following (3.6), solving the signal extraction problem leads to
kj =
[(1  a) + apq,F]pyqs2q
p2yqs
2
q +
  1
k   1
 
s2i
sj ⌘ ps,Fsj (3.21)
Furthermore, solving the signal extraction problem of (3.5) leads to
yi =
 
c+ fpyq + ypq,F
 ✓ s2q
s2q + s
2
i
◆
xi ⌘ px,Fxi (3.22)
Finally, using the fact that pyq = px,F and pq,F = ps,Fpyq , we can arrive at the
equilibrium conditions regulating (px,F,ps,F,pq,F):
px,F = (c+ fpx,F + ypq,F)
✓
s2q
s2q + s
2
i
◆
(3.23)
ps,F =
[(1  a) + apq,F]px,Fs2q
p2x,Fs
2
q +
  1
k   1
 
s2i
(3.24)
and
pq,F = ps,Fpx,F (3.25)
To show the existence, transform (3.23), (3.24) and (3.25) into one fixed point
condition for pq,F:
f (pq,F) ⌘ (1  a) (1  pq,F)
264 c+ ypq,F
1  f
⇣
s2q
s2q+s
2
i
⌘
375
2✓
s2q
s2i + s
2
q
◆2
s2q   pq,F
✓
1
k
  1
◆
s2i = 0
(3.26)
It is straight-forward to demonstrate existence since we have (1) f (pq,F)> 0 for
all pq,F < 0 and (2) f (pq,F) < 0 for all pq,F   1.
Proof of Proposition 3.3. When there presents sentiment, it must be the case
that both y and K are given by:
y = pyqq + pyzz K = pq,Sq + z
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Then the information available to invest j would be
sj = pyqq + pyzz+ # j
Following (3.6), solving the signal extraction problem leads to
kj =
[(1  a) + apq,S]pyqs2q + apyzs2z
p2yqs
2
q + p
2
yzs
2
z +
  1
k   1
 
s2i
sj ⌘ ps,Ssj (3.27)
Denote that yi = px,Sxi + pz,Sz. Solving the signal extraction problem in (3.5)
leads to
yi =
 
c+ fpyq + ypq,S
 ✓ s2q
s2q + s
2
i
◆
xi + (y+ fpz,S) z ⌘ px,Sxi + pz,Sz (3.28)
The consistency condition over q on K implies that
pq,S = ps,Spx,S (3.29)
Finally, consistency conditions over z on y and K imply that
pz,S =
✓
y
1  f
◆
1
 
s2z > 0
 
(3.30)
ps,Spz,S = 1
 
s2z > 0
 
(3.31)
Using the fact that pyq = px,S and pq,S = ps,Spyq , we arrive at
px,S = (c+ fpx,S + ypq,S)
✓
s2q
s2q + s
2
i
◆
(3.32)
pq,S = ps,Spx,S (3.33)
pz,S =
✓
y
1  f
◆
1
 
s2z > 0
 
(3.34)
ps,Spz,S = 1
 
s2z > 0
 
(3.35)
and
ps,S =
[(1  a) + apq,S]px,Ss2q + apz,Ss2z
p2x,Ss
2
q + p
2
z,Ss
2
z +
  1
k   1
 
s2i
(3.36)
Further using the fact that pz,Spq,S = px,S, we can obtain (3.14).
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In the next step, solving (3.32), (3.33), (3.34) and (3.35) jointly leads to
pz,S =
y
1  f ps,S =
1  f
y
(3.37)
and
px,S = c
✓
s2q
s2i
◆
pq,S =
✓
1  f
y
◆
c
✓
s2q
s2i
◆
(3.38)
Plugging all these into (3.36), we arrive at a fixed point condition of s2z :
g
 
s2z
  ⌘ a1s2z + b1
a2s2z + b2
  1  f
y
= 0 (3.39)
where we have that
a1 = apz,S b1 = [(1  a) + apq,S]px,Ss2q (3.40)
a2 = p2z,S b2 = p
2
x,Ss
2
q +
✓
1
k
  1
◆
s2i (3.41)
g
 
s2z
  ⌘ [(1  a) + apq,S]px,Ss2q + apz,Ss2z
p2x,Ss
2
q + p
2
z,Ss
2
z +
  1
k   1
 
s2i
  1  f
y
= 0 (3.42)
It can be shown that
∂g
 
s2z
 
∂s2z
µ
a1b2   a2b1
pz,S
= a
✓
1
k
  1
◆
s2i   (1  a)
✓
y
1  f
◆
px,Ss
2
q (3.43)
Also, we have that
lim
s2z!+•
g
 
s2z
 
=   (1  a)
✓
1  f
y
◆
(3.44)
and
lim
s2z!0
g
 
s2z
 
=
b1
b2
  1  f
y
(3.45)
=
[(1  a) + apq,S]px,Ss2q
p2x,Ss
2
q +
  1
k   1
 
s2i
  1  f
y
(3.46)
µ (1  a)
✓
y
1  f
◆
  px,S
 
px,Ss
2
q  
✓
1
k
  1
◆
s2i (3.47)
We separate the problem into two cases.
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1. If (1  a)
h⇣
y
1 f
⌘
  px,S
i
px,Ss2q  
  1
k   1
 
s2i > 0, thenwe have lims2z!0 g
 
s2z
 
>
0, lims2z!+• g
 
s2z
 
< 0 and finally
∂g(s2z )
∂s2z
< 0. This proves the uniqueness
and existence of s2z 2 (0,+•).
2. If (1  a)
h⇣
y
1 f
⌘
  px,S
i
px,Ss2q  
  1
k   1
 
s2i < 0, thenwe have lims2z!0 g
 
s2z
 
<
0, lims2z!+• g
 
s2z
 
< 0 and finally
∂g(s2z )
∂s2z
is either positive or negative with
no critical point. Therefore, it must be the case that g
 
s2z
 
< 0 for all s2z > 0.
In sum, (1  a)
h⇣
y
1 f
⌘
  px,S
i
px,Ss2q  
  1
k   1
 
s2i > 0 is the necessary and suf-
ficient condition for g
 
s2z
 
= 0 to have a unique solution in the range of (0,+•).
Proof of Corollary 3.1. Straight-forward following the (3.9).
Proof of Corollary 3.2. The existence of thresholds y and f directly follows
Proposition 3.3. y can be proved to be decreasing in k following the fact that
(3.9) is increasing in both y and k. The same argument applies to the compara-
tive static analysis of f.
Proof of Proposition 3.4. Under the condition (3.9), it can be shown that the
fixed point condition (3.26)must be positivewhen evaluated atpq,S, i.e., f (pq,s)>
0. Also note that if there presents a unique fundamental equilibrium, f (pq,F)
must be decreasing when crossing the x-axis. Therefore, f (pq,s) > 0 directly
implies that pq,S < pq,F. That is to say in fundamental equilibrium, aggregate
investment K is more responsive to fundamental q. Observe that in equilibrium
both pq,S and pq,F are less than one. Then it must be the case that
VolatilityS ⌘ E
h
(pq,Sq + z  q)2
i
> E
h
(pq,Fq   q)2
i
⌘ VolatilityF
Also, it can be shown that for T 2 {F,S} we have that
1=
✓
c
1
px,T
+ f+ yps,T
◆✓
s2q
s2q + s
2
i
◆
where px,T =
c+ypq,T
1 f
✓
s2q
s2q+s
2
i
◆ ⇣ s2q
s2q+s
2
i
⌘
. Therefore, it is straight-forward to show that
ps,S < ps,F (3.48)
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Finally, given the fact that cross-sectional dispersion in investments isp2s,S
  1
k   1
 
s2i
under sentiment equilibrium and is p2s,F
  1
k   1
 
s2i under fundamental equilib-
rium. It is straight-forward to show that sentiment equilibrium features lower
cross-sectional dispersion.
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